What is called negative predictions in [28637] is now called a *Schema-based predictions.

Other than that terminological change, what is stated in [28637] and its daughter postings seem to be what I would say now. It has been 6.5 years since the posting of [28637]. There does not seem to be any sign that things are getting any better in the field.

[The postings under this thread have been copied from elsewhere; they were originally posted in March 2009, as the dates of these postings indicate. 3/1/2012]

(A) is what is remarked in Miyagawa and Arikawa 2007: 654 and (B) is what we find in Kato 1988 that seems to come closest to what M&A must have meant when citing Kato 1988 in (A) below.

(A) Miyagawa and Arikawa 2007: 654
If the universal occurs in subject position, it is most naturally interpreted under neutral intonation as being outside the scope of negation; most speakers find it difficult, if not impossible, to interpret it inside the scope of negation (Kato 1988).
(2) Zen'in-ga tesuto-o uke-na-katta.

(B) Kato 1988: 32
It has been well observed in the literature that the sentence (9) is ambiguous in two ways, while sentence (10) is not ambiguous.
(9) zen'in WA ko-nakat-ta
(10) zen'in GA ko-nakat-ta
(11) a. Not all of them came.
b. No one came.
The quantifier zen'in 'all, everyone' may be negated to get the reading (11a) if it appears with WA as in (9) and WA functions as CONTRASTIVE; it may not be construed as negated as in (11b), if WA functions as TOPIC. It seems, however, that when the regular Case marker such as GA appears as in (10), it has only the total negation reading (11b).
　　This interpretive asymmetry between WA and GA, if it is a real one, imposes a serious problem on our theory of negation reviewed above. This is because nothing in our theory prevents us from assigning sentence (10) with structure (12), from which it is predicted that GA phrase may be interpreted negated:
(12) NEG [_S [_α zen'in][_S x ga ki-ta]]
***End of (B)***

Let us grant that what M&A intended was that Kato 1988: 32 remarks that "[i]t has been well observed in the literature ..." (Kataoka-san, do you know earlier references on this that you think Kato (1988) had in mind (as the past literature)?) If so, they are relying on Kato 1988 for the "well-observed contrast in the literature." Be that as it may, we should not fail to note that the main claim of Kato 1988 is as indicated in (C) below, which is the last sentence of the text discussion in Kato 1988.

(C) Kato 1988: 36
This result confirms the basic claim of the theory of negation developed in Kato (1985), the claim that the relative scope of the negative and quantifiers in a clause is free and that the resolution of the scope ambiguity is performed in the sphere of discourse.

In other words, Kato 1988 offers an analysis of the putative absence of the NEG>Q (and in terms of his own discussion, the Q-being-negated reading) in (10) "in the sphere of discourse." M&A's failure to even mention that is indeed a good and clear example of Cargo Cult Science: present what looks good to you and hide what may look bad to you.

(C) Kato 1988: 36
This result confirms the basic claim of the theory of negation developed in Kato (1985), the claim that the relative scope of the negative and quantifiers in a clause is free and that the resolution of the scope ambiguity is performed in the sphere of discourse.

In other words, Kato 1988 offers an analysis of the putative absence of the NEG>Q (and in terms of his own discussion, the Q-being-negated reading) in (10) "in the sphere of discourse."

Kato's (1988) (18), given below, contains yosan no kankei de, which would facilitate the NEG>Q (or Kato's Q-negated) reading.

(18) yosan no kankei de, sotsugyoo-sei zen'in ni shootai-joo o dase-nakat-ta

What is suggested by the discussion in Kato 1998 is that Kato's (10) and M&A's (20) can be made (more) acceptable by providing some pragmatic context that would favor the NEG>Q reading.

Kato's (10): zen'in-ga konakatta (I am representing Kato's GA as ga.)
M&A's (20): Zen'in-ga testo-o ukenakatta

I would in fact suspect that (i-b) will be judged more acceptable than (i-a) under the NEG>Q reading.

(i) a. Zen'in-ga paatii-ni denakatta.
b.Yosan no kankei de, zen'in-ga paatii-ni denakatta.

Such a result would be as expected, according to Kato's characterization of the (putative) absence of the NEG>Q reading in Kato's (10).

(A) Miyagawa and Arikawa 2007: 654
If the universal occurs in subject position, it is most naturally interpreted under neutral intonation as being outside the scope of negation; most speakers find it difficult, if not impossible, to interpret it inside the scope of negation (Kato 1988).
(2) Zen'in-ga tesuto-o uke-na-katta.


(B) Kato 1988: 32
It has been well observed in the literature that the sentence (9) is ambiguous in two ways, while sentence (10) is not ambiguous.
(9) zen'in WA ko-nakat-ta
(10) zen'in GA ko-nakat-ta
(11) a. Not all of them came.
b. No one came.
The quantifier zen'in 'all, everyone' may be negated to get the reading (11a) if it appears with WA as in (9) and WA functions as CONTRASTIVE; it may not be construed as negated as in (11b), if WA functions as TOPIC. It seems, however, that when the regular Case marker such as GA appears as in (10), it has only the total negation reading (11b).

(A) of M&A 2007 quoted above immediately follows their remark that their (19) allows the Neg>all reading.

M&A 2007: (19)
Taro-ga zen'in-o sikar-ana-katta.

So, the crucial observation M&A 2007 note in regard to their (20) is coupled with the observation in regard to (19). As noted in [36500], they mention Kato 1988 in relation to the observation about their (20), perhaps intending to give the reader an impression that Kato 1988 gives at least the observation concerning their (20). In fact, Kato 1998 does mention the observation, as noted in [36500]. But for Kato 1998, the NEG>Q reading (for him the negated-Q-reading) is 'marked' even when the Q is in the object position. He mentions his (16) in the context of demonstrating that it is not always impossible to have the NEG>Q reading (for him the negated-Q-reading). So, Kato 1998 cannot be cited as a work in which the alleged contrast is noted and discussed. M&A in fact does not cite Kato 1998 when they mention the observation regarding (20). But, given that fact that the crucial generalization in question is between (19) and (20), M&A should have had the decency and integrity to acknowledge that they are not citing Kato 1998 for the crucial generalization involving the alleged contrast. (After all, Kato 1998 does not address or admit such a generalization, to begin with.) See the last three paragraphs, below (12), in [36500] for an independent issue I have with M&A 2007.

For any (alleged) generalization that we might have seen, heard, or might want to "use" or think of, I suggest that we check and see how the predicted schematic asymmetry is deduced by what (universal and language-particular) hypotheses, how the prediction can be tested, and whether we obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in accordance with the prediction, in line with the methodological proposal summarized under Methodology [42404].

If we fail to obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry, that means something must be wrong, and the continuing use of such an alleged generalization is likely to result in more confusion (if one is interested in language faculty science as an exact science) than anything, although it may contribute to the creation and expansion of "a swamp over which the paralyzing vapours of the publication explosion hold an eternal sway" as Popper 1974: 977 puts it.

My 2003 Lingua paper and much of the subsequent works are an attempt to critically evaluate the empirical claims made in Hoji 1985 with regard to bound variable anaphora and scope dependency in Japanese, in line with the above. As pointed out in some depth in works by Ayumi Ueyama and J.-R. Hayashishita, the generalizations as presented in Hoji 1985 cannot be maintained as such. As discussed in the works just alluded to and elsewhere, and as will be further illustrated in the work that I hope will be made available soon, we can indeed obtain confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries (i.e., a high degree of reproducibility of the informant judgments as predicted) with regard to bound variable anaphora (and also scope dependency) by identifying the most effective experimental devices in various "preliminary experiments."

If an alleged generalization fails to constitute a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry, one can always try to identify the experimental devices that might be responsible for the failure, modify the hypotheses and/or the experimental design, and make (slightly) different predictions accordingly, etc. If one can obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in that way, one has indeed made significant progress in identifying a "fact" in language faculty science, along with a plausible "account" of it. The effective/reliable hypotheses and various other experimental devices thus identified will be used in further theorizing and experimentation.

Included in the experimental devices here is the choice of a so-called binder-bindee pair. Certain pairs are effective experimental devices in discovering properties of the language faculty, more narrowly, those of the Computational System of the language faculty, but others are not. We have a better chance of obtaining a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry with the former type of pairs than with the latter type. And we should insist on using the former type in subsequent theorizing and experiments. As pointed out in Methodology [42417], the main purpose of identifying the most effective experimental devices in this way is to leave as little room as possible for making "excuses" for failing to obtain an experimental result in accordance with our prediction in subsequent experiments. The relevant remark in Methodology [42417] is repeated here. It addresses the quality (and hence the effectiveness) of informants rather than the effectiveness of other experimental devices, but the point is the same.

In order to obtain a rigorous and categorical experimental result in accordance with the prediction (i.e., the predicted schematic asymmetry), informant-classification or informant-calibration is necessary by means of "preliminary experiments." It cannot be emphasized more that such informant-calibration and informant-classification are for the purpose of maximizing the effectiveness of the experimental result, which in turn is for the purpose of maximizing the significance of the experimental device. The main purpose of this is to leave as little room as possible for making "excuses" for failing to obtain an experimental result in accordance with our prediction. Those researchers who do not pursue rigorous testability and pursue "compatibility-based research" seem to think that informant-calibration and informant-classification are for the purpose of obtaining the experimental results that we want. But the real purpose of informant-calibration and informant-grouping is to maximize the significance of the experimental result, and ultimately to maximize testability.

In fact, one of the reviewers of the preliminary version of my 2003 Lingua paper remarked, "The paper starts out searching for the "right example" to confirm the c-command based theory. So, the reader gets the impression that one can argue for any theory by finding specific examples that fit it." The "right examples" is not quite correct. But starting out searching the "right binder" and the "right bindee" is right. If we did not have the "right binder" and the "right bindee," and hence if we were not able to obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry with regard to bound variable anaphora, for example, it would NOT make any sense to proceed further with our theorizing and experimentation and expect to learn anything in a rigorous way. What is most crucial here is that we want to maximize testability. For that reason, we surely want to have as general a characterization as possible of the "right binder" and the "right bindee." It should also be emphasized that a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry is not the same as, in fact quite different from, a mere contrast. It minimally requires that what is called a *Schema-based prediction (the prediction that any example conforming to a particular Schema is judged completely unacceptable under the specified (type of) interpretation) has survived a rigorous disconfirmation attempt; please see Methodology [42404]. Once one tries to obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry, one will quickly realize how difficult it actually is to do so. I hope that serious researchers will take this as a challenge to them so that they try to come up with a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in support of the generalization they maintain/adopt/etc., and more precisely in support of the universal and language-particular hypotheses that adopt/propose as an account of the generalization in question, and that they will at least think twice before continuing to use the relevant generalizations and hypotheses in their further research. That would greatly reduce confusion in the field, in my view. But again, if one's goal is NOT to discover properties of the Computational System of the language faculty by pursuing rigorous testability, more generally, by adopting the hypothetico-deductive method of hypothesis-testing, there may NOT be a clear sense about what constitutes "confusion," to begin with.

For any (alleged) generalization that we might have seen, heard, or might want to "use" or think of, I suggest that we check and see how the predicted schematic asymmetry is deduced by what (universal and language-particular) hypotheses, how the prediction can be tested, and whether we obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in accordance with the prediction, in line with the methodological proposal summarized under Methodology [42404].

If we fail to obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry, that means something must be wrong, and the continuing use of such an alleged generalization is likely to result in more confusion (if one is interested in language faculty science as an exact science) than anything, although it may contribute to the creation and expansion of "a swamp over which the paralyzing vapours of the publication explosion hold an eternal sway" as Popper 1974: 977 puts it. For the methodological issue behind this, please see the thread under Methodology [29073].

Popper, K. 1974. "Replies to My Critics," in Paul Authur Schilpp ed., Volume 2 of The Philosophy of Karl Popper, The Open Court Publishing, La Salle, Illinois, pp. 961-1197.

An important omission here is that confirmed schematic asymmetries, even when they are not deduced from (universal and language-particular) hypotheses, can still be considered as a candidate for a "fact" in language faculty science. If an alleged generalization fails to constitute a confirmed schematic asymmetries -- whether or not it is predicted -- it does not qualify even as a candidate for a "fact" in language faculty science, for the reasons stated in the postings under Methodology [42404].

[29124] addresses zibunzisin and to a lessor degree otagai. Related discussion can be found in my 2010 paper "Hypothesis testing in generative grammar: Evaluation of predicted schematic asymmetries" Journal of Japanese Linguistics. Volume 26, pp. 25-52, available here.

The language-particular hypotheses in question are:

(i) Zibunzisin has a formal property that makes it subject to so-called Principle A of the Binding Theory.
(ii) Otagai has a formal property that makes it subject to so-called Principle A of the Binding Theory.

By combining (i)/(ii) with the universal hypothesis (i.e., so-called Principle A of the Binding Theory), along with hypotheses regarding how surface strings of particular schematic forms (e.g., the Subject Object Verb) in Japanese correspond to a particular structural representation of LF objects corresponding to "Subject," "Object," etc., we make definite predictions. What we have seen is that the predictions have been clearly disconfirmed. This, however, does not necessarily mean that the hypotheses in (i)/(ii) are not valid because it is possible that the disconfirmation of the predictions is due to something else other than (i)/(ii). But that does not justify the continued use of (i)/(ii) in our theoretical discussion whose empirical consequences are meant to be testable. As noted in my JJL paper and elsewhere, it is not clear, regardless of the result of the new experiment, what significance we can assign to the experimental results if the prediction in question is derived in part on the basis of a hypothesis that has already been shown to yield "wrong" predictions; see Methodology [42407]. I repeat here the heuristics in (1) given there.

(1) a. Secure testability.
b. Maximize testability.
c. Maximize the significance of the experimental result.

As noted in Methodology [42407], the methodology I have been trying to articulate is a consequence of having the language faculty as the object of inquiry and adopting the heuristics in (1).

What other language-particular hypotheses or generalizations in Japanese are there that have been presented and accepted in much of the field as being valid? Since it is not always clear how the alleged generalizations are derived in theory, let us focus on "generalizations" (rather than hypotheses that are claimed to give rise to them). What come to mind as such "generalizations" have to do with:

(iii) a. bound variable anaphora (not involving alleged (local) anaphors in Japanese) (This has to do with co-called WCO effects, among other things.)
b. wide scope distributive readings (This has to do with so-called rigidity effects on scope, among other things.)

(iv) local disjointness effects (the effects of so-called Principle/Condition B of the Binding Theory)

(v) so-called subjacency effects

(vi) "locality requirement" on the so-called floating numeral and its host

(vii) scope interaction between Negation and a scope-bearing element (involving the interaction between zen'in and Negation, for example)

(iii-a) and (iii-b), along with (i) and (ii), have been (among) the main dependency relations that are made reference to in the context of discussion of properties of the so-called scrambling construction in Japanese, with regard to "reconstruction effects" and also so-called A-movement effects. We can meaningfully test the validity of hypotheses regarding the so-called Japanese scrambling construction (and other constructions whose "derivation" is hypothesized to involve movement) in Japanese only to the extent that the hypotheses in (i) and (ii) and those underlying (iii-a) and (iii-b) are shown to be empirically supported, i.e., are shown to have survived rigorous disconfirmation attempts.

As discussed in Hoji 2003 (Lingua) with respect to (iii), and works by J.-R. Hayashishita and A. Ueyama, cited in Hoji 2003, the "generalizations" reported in Hoji 1985 are not valid as stated in Hoji 1985, i.e., without necessary care regarding the choice of the intended binder and the intended bindee in the case of (iii-a) and also the choice of what is intended to take wide scope in the case of (iii-b). What is reported in Hoji 2003 (Lingua) and subsequent works (including Hoji 2006 "Assessing Competing Analyses: Two Hypotheses about 'Scrambling' in Japanese" available here, is an attempt to show that we can in the case of (iii) obtain solid generalizations stated in theoretical terms, i.e., confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries in the terms of what is given under Methodology [40404], by improving various aspects of the experimental devices, including the relevant hypotheses. In the case of (i) and (ii), by contrast, attempts to save them have not succeeded in obtaining a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry, and the failure is rather dramatic.

(iv) has been addressed with regard to the distinction between coreference and bound variable anaphora, as well as with regard to so-called sloppy-identity readings. It has turned out to be quite difficult to obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in Japanese with regard to (iv). The current understanding (of mine) is that we can obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in Japanese with regard to (iv) only if we consider the so-called scrambling construction, which I discuss toward the end of the book I am preparing.

Now, what about (v), (vi), and (vii), repeated here?

(v) so-called subjacency effects

(vi) "locality requirement" on the so-called floating numeral and its host

(vii) scope interaction between Negation and a scope-bearing element (involving the interaction between zen'in and Negation, for example)

It is not clear, especially when we approach the issue with the attitude of refutation, how much reproducibility we can obtain with regard to (v), despite the fairly common understanding that the effects are fairly clear. According to fairly informal surveys I conducted some years ago, we can obtain something close to the predicted judgments only if we consider reconstruction effects of binding/scope in the paradigm that is meant to test subjacency effects, and, in order to do so effectively, we must first establish confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries with respect to (iii).

As to, (vi) and (vii), it is quite easy to show that what is assumed in the field to be a valid generalization with regard to (vi) and (vii) falls far short of being valid. It should be noted regarding (vi) that when the late S.-Y. Kuroda discussed it in his 1980 paper, he stated in effect that it was not clear whether the judgments under discussion were a reflection of the grammar. Haig (1980) made a similar remark. It is works subsequent to 1980 that have taken the alleged generalization as arising from the grammar (although exactly how has seemed (to me) to have remained rather obscure.)

I have conducted on-line experiments on these; and the results were quite robust, i.e., the predictions have been disconfirmed quite clearly. Now, as in the case of (i) and (ii), the disconfirmation of the predictions in question does not necessarily mean that the hypotheses that have given rise to the predictions are invalid. It is possible that some other factors are responsible for the fact that we have failed to obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry, and one can thus try to attribute the failure in question to such factor(s). In making such an attempt, one must try to make sure as much as possible that such a "move" would not result in reducing the testability of one's proposal; see the remarks toward the end of section 1.9 in Methodology [42415].

I would like to suggest to native speakers of Japanese that they examine the alleged generalizations very critically, asking whether or not examples that conform to a particular schema always disallow the intended interpretation, no matter what lexical and pragmatic adjustments might be made. When we have obtained a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry despite such rigorous disconfirmation attempts, we can use it in our further investigation, dealing with "phenomena" that may be more involved and complex. We should also try to be as clear as possible as to how the predictions in question are derived, i.e., what, universal and language-particular, hypotheses give rise to the predictions in question. Once we try to do that, we will often face a situation where it is not clear exactly how the prediction is derived. Here, Feynman's remark below seems suggestive, although the intended analogy should be understood with a (large) grain of salt in light of such a huge gap between particle physics and language faculty science in terms of what has been accumulated over the years (in terms of the amount, and the precision of "facts" that are accounted for by theory and the deductive nature of theory).

"Another thing I must point out is that you cannot prove a vague theory wrong. If the guess that you make is poorly expressed and rather vague, and the method that you use for figuring out the consequences is a little vague - you are not sure, and you say, 'I think everything's right because it's all due to so and so, and such and such do this and that more or less, and I can sort of explain how this works ...', then you see that this theory is good, because it cannot be proved wrong! Also if the process of computing the consequences is indefinite, then with a little skill any experimental results can be made to look like the expected consequences." (Feynman 1965/94: 152-153 (The Character of Physical Law))

What other "generalizations" in Japanese come to mind?

I have recently come across a paper, which makes crucial reference to the "generalization" in (viii).

(viii) Zibun must have its antecedent in a subject position that c-commands it.

The claim that "zibun" must have an antecedent c-commanding it or must have a subject-antecedent has been shown to be invalid (at least unless alleged noise gets controlled) in (an) experiment(s) by D. Oshima before/around 2005 and I did an experiment myself in 2005 and got results that were quite consistent with Oshima's result(s). So, the "issue" has been long dead as far as I am concerned, at least if we place significance, as I do, on the use of effective experimental devices, including the "binder" and the "bindee," to maximize our chances of making progress. I.e., there is little hope of making any substantive progress if we used zibun as the bindee in a crucial experiment, unless the alleged noise has been controlled in one way or another. But if one has a different goal in mind, one can continue to do anything one wants, I suppose. The practice in the field by so-called generative grammarians makes me wonder what their goal might be. It surely does not seem to be discovering properties of the language faculty by applying rigorous testability to the empirical consequences of their hypotheses.

Miyagawa and Arikawa 2007: 654 states:

***
If the universal occurs in subject position,it is most naturally interpreted under neutral intonation as being outside the scope of negation; most speakers find it difficult,if not impossible,to interpret it inside the scope of negation (Kato 1988).

(20) Zenin-ga tesuto-o uke-na-katta.FN3(not provided here, HH)
all-NOM test-ACC take-NEG-PAST
‘All did not take the test.’
‘*not > all’,‘all > not’

Crucially, as pointed out in Miyagawa 2001, if the object scrambles across the subject zenin, the partial negation reading becomes easier to obtain.

(21) Tesuto-o_i zenin-ga t_i uke-na-katta.
test-ACC_i all-NOM t_i take-NEG-PAST
‘That test,all didn’t take.’
‘not > all’,‘all > not’

(20) and (21) are diagrammed as in (22) and (23),respectively.^FN4

FN4: An anonymous reviewer asks precisely what the difference is in entailment between (20) and (21). For example, it is distinctly odd to follow (20) with Hanako-wa uketa ‘Hanako took it’ because (20) entails that no one took the test, but it is completely natural to follow (21) with this statement since (21) entails only that some people failed to take the test.
***End of Quotation***

It should be more than "distinctly odd." It should be a contradiction to follow (i-a) with (i-b), provided that it is clearly understood that Hanako is among the people under discussion.

(i)　a.　No one came.
　　b.　Hanako came.

For example, the sequence in (ii) and (iii) are felt to be clearly contradictory, provided that it is clearly understood that Mary is one of the examinees. (ii) and (iii) differ from each other only with respect to the order of the subject and the (ni-marked) object in the first sentence.

(ii)　Zyukoosya-ga hito-ri-mo ankeeto-ni kotaenakatta.
　examinee-NOM one-CL-also questionnaire-DAT did:not:answer
　'None of the examinees answered the questionnaire.'
　Mary-wa tyanto kotaeta kedo.
　Mary-TOP neatly answered but
　'Mary answered (it) neatly, though.'

(iii)　Ankeeto-ni zyukoosya-ga hito-ri-mo kotaenakatta.
　questionnaire-DAT examinee-NOM one-CL-also did:not:answer
　'None of the examinees answered the questionnaire.'
　Mary-wa tyanto kotaeta kedo.
　Mary-TOP neatly answered but
　'Mary answered (it) neatly, though.'

Furthermore, according to M&A's claim, (iv) and (v) are as contradictory as (ii) and (iii).

(iv)　Zen'in-ga ankeeto-ni kotaenakatta.
　all-NOM questionnaire-DAT did:not:answer
'All did not answer the questionnaire.'
　Mary-wa tyanto kotaeta kedo.
Mary-TOP neatly answered but
　'Mary answered (it) neatly, though.'

(v)　Zen'in-ga a-no bakarasii ankeeto-o musisinakatta.
　all-NOM that-GEN stupid questionnaire-ACC did:not:ignore
　'All did not ignore that stupid questionnaire.'
　Mary-wa musisita kedo.
　Mary-TOP ignored but
　'Mary ignored (it), though.'

According to M&A, (iv) and (v) should contrast sharply with (vi) and (vii).

(vi)　Ankeeto-ni zen'in-ga kotaenakatta.
　questionnaire-DAT all-NOM did:not:answer
　'All did not answer the questionnaire.'
　Mary-wa tyanto kotaeta kedo.
Mary-TOP neatly answered but
　'Mary answered (it) neatly, though.'

(vii)　A-no bakarasii ankeeto-o zen'in-ga musisinakatta.
　that-GEN stupid questionnaire-ACC all-NOM did:not:ignore
　'All did not ignore that stupid questionnaire.'
　Mary-wa musisita kedo.
　Mary-TOP ignored but
'Mary ignored (it), though.'

　I conducted an on-line experiment a few years ago (February, 2007) on this. Included in the experiments were examples like (ii)-(vii). Examples like (ii) and (iii) were judged clearly unacceptable by most informants, as expected. With 26 informants on the 0-100 scale (0=completely unacceptable and 100=fully acceptable), the average scores for (ii) and (iii) were 0.96 and 1.92, respectively.

Now, Examples like (iv) and (v) should be as unacceptable as (ii) and (iii), but the judgments by the same informants on those were 48.18 and 50.96. Examples like (vi) and (vii) are judged somewhat more acceptable than those like (ii) and (iii), with (vi) getting 72.12 and (vii) getting 58.65. But, the improvement here is not significant because examples like (iv) and (v) are judged fairly acceptable, to begin with. (Notice also that there is also improvement in (iii) over (ii).)

If you want to check some of the relevant examples with native speakers of Japanese, you can show the following examples and ask them how they find these examples. (viii) is a "control" example; it is a version of (v) that is contradictory.

(ii) 受講者が一人もアンケートに答えなかった。　メリーはちゃんと答えたけど。(Score: 0.96)
(iii) アンケートに受講者が一人も答えなかった。　メリーはちゃんと答えたけど。(Score: 1.92)
(iv) 全員がアンケートに答えなかった。　メリーはちゃんと答えたけど。(Score: 48.18)
(v) 全員があの馬鹿らしいアンケートを無視しなかった。　メリーは無視したけど。(Score: 50.96)
(vi) アンケートに全員が答えなかった。メリーはちゃんと答えたけど。(Score: 72.12)
(vii) あの馬鹿らしいアンケートを全員が無視しなかった。　メリーは無視したけど。(Score: 58.65)

(viii) 受講者が一人もあの馬鹿らしいアンケートを無視しなかった。　メリーは無視したけど。(Score: 6.73)

In line with the methodological proposal summarized in Methodology [42404], there is NO POINT to continuing to use the alleged generalization or the proposed "theoretical" account of it IF one is interested in discovering something about the properties of the Computational System of the language faculty.

As I indicated in Generalizations [42432], the alleged generalization concerning Negation and a scope-bearing element is not a special case. The fact that it has continued to be used for all these years and is still being used now is beyond my comprehension. I think it is in part a reflection of the fact, I think it is a fact, that people just do not think it is possible to approach the language faculty by rigorously applying the hypothetico-deductive method. (And hence they think that they can only talk about" it, without seriously pursuing rigorous testability. "Judgments are always murky and we must live with it..." Please see the methodological proposal summarized in Methodology [42404] for how we can aspire to do much better than that. If you are interested in learning more about it, please email me.

Here, Feynman's remark below seems suggestive, although the intended analogy should be understood with a (large) grain of salt in light of such a huge gap between particle physics and language faculty science in terms of what has been accumulated over the yeara (in terms of the amount, and the precision of "facts" that are accounted for by theory and the deductive nature of theory).

"Another thing I must point out is that you cannot prove a vague theory wrong. If the guess that you make is poorly expressed and rather vague, and the method that you use for figuring out the consequences is a little vague - you are not sure, and you say, 'I think everything's right because it's all due to so and so, and such and such do this and that more or less, and I can sort of explain how this works ...', then you see that this theory is good, because it cannot be proved wrong! Also if the process of computing the consequences is indefinite, then with a little skill any experimental results can be made to look like the expected consequences." (Feynman 1965/94: 152-153 (The Character of Physical Law))

What follows the above remark in Feynman 1965/94 is interesting and seems to warn against an attitude that categorically denounces "this jockeying around, this 'feeling' way of guessing at the results."

"When a subject is first new, and these particles are new to us, this jockeying around, this 'feeling' way of guessing at the results, is the beginning of any science. The same thing is true of the symmetry proposition in physics as is true of psychology, so do not laugh too hard." But he continues as "It is necessary in the beginning to be very careful. It is easy to fall into deep end by this kind of vague theory. It is hard to prove it wrong, and it takes a certain skill and experience not to walk off the plank in the game," and that is how Feynman concludes the paragraph.

One might take refuge in something like the above remark of Feynman's, and try to defend what one has been doing over the years, saying something like, "Even in physics, they have at times proceed without making everything explicit. So, there is nothing wrong with what we do. Demanding a very high degree of testability can in fact have more negative consequences than positive effects in our field at the moment." In light of the fact that we do not even know a priori what "facts" would qualify as a reflection of the language faculty (or more narrowly, as a reflection of properties of the Computational System (=CS) of the language faculty), it seems imperative, however, that we try our best in identifying what is a likely reflection of the CS. Merely accumulating speculative remarks in a rather sloppy manner, without pursuing rigorous testability, seems to me to result in preventing language faculty science from becoming an exact science more than anything.

The following remark by P. Dirac may be of some interest, in this connection.

　　"One can distinguish between two main procedures for a theoretical physicist. One of them is to work from experimental basis. For this, one must keep in close touch with the experimental physicists. One reads about all the results they obtain and tries to fit them into a comprehensive and satisfying scheme.
　　The other procedure is to work from the mathematical basis. One examines and criticizes the existing theory. One tries to pin-point the faults in it and then tries to remove them. The difficulty here is to remove the faults without destroying the very great successes of the existing theory.
　　There are these two general procedures, but of course the distinction between them is not hard-and-fast. There are all grades of procedures between the extremes.
　　Which procedure one follows depends largely on the subject of study. For a subject about which very little is known, where one is breaking quire new ground, one is pretty well forced to follow the procedure based on experiment. In the beginning, for a new subject, one merely collects experimental evidence and classifies it.

...

　　In any region of physics where very little is known, one must keep to the experimental basis if one is not to indulge in wild speculation that is almost certain to be wrong. I do not wish to condemn speculation altogether. It can be entertaining and may be indirectly useful even if it does turn out to be wrong. One should always keep an open mind receptive to new ideas, so one should not completely oppose speculation, but one must take care not to get too involved in it." (Dirac 1989 "Methods in Theoretical Physics" pp. 19-20, contained in From a Life of Physics, World Scientific.)

It is interesting to note that Dirac is famous for his "mathematical" approach. It is stated at the beginning of Weinberg 1992: chapter 6, 132 (Weinberg 1992 Dreams of A Final Theory. New York: Vintage.): "In 1974 Paul Dirac came to Harvard to speak about his historic work as one of the founders of modern quantum electrodynamics. Toward the end of his talk he addressed himself to our graduate students and advised them to be concerned only with the beauty of their equations, not with what the equations mean."

Weinberg continues as:

"It was not good advice for students, but the search for beauty in physics was a theme that ran throughout Dirac's work and indeed through much of the history of physics."

The remarks by Dirac quoted above are from his lecture in 1968, which is contained in From a Life of Physics 1989 by H.A. Bethe, P.A.M. Dirac, W. Heisenberg, E.P. Wigner, O. Klein, L.D. Landau (by E.M. Lifshitz). World Scientific. Singapore, New Jersey, London, Hong Kong. (The last paper contained in the volume is about Landau and by E.M. Lifshitz.)


Farmelo (2009: 428) attributes (i) to Steven Weinberg, Dirac Centenary Meeting, University of Bristol, 8 August 2002, noting in his endnote 1 (p. 492), "Weinberg wrote these words for me to read about at the Centenary meeting. Text checked by Weinberg, 22 July 2007 (e-mail)."
Graham Farmelo 2009 The Strangest Man: The Hidden Life of Paul Dirac, Mystic of the Atom, Basic Books.

(i) "Dirac told physics students they should not worry about the meaning of equations, only about their beauty. This advice was good only for physicists whose sense of purely mathematical beauty is so keen that they can rely on it to see the way ahead. There have not been many such physicists - perhaps only Dirac himself."

One must naturally wonder what makes such practice in the field possible. The answer, I believe, lies in the fact that we have failed to develop a rigorous means to evaluate hypotheses in generative grammar. What is needed most critically is, in my view, a good understanding and articulation of the logic of hypothesis-testing in generative grammar, and the development of a minimally satisfactory structure of our experimental design and its justification.

Over 5 years have passed since the posting in [29943]. The current methodological articulation, as briefly summarized under the thread in Methodology [42404] "The current articulation of the methodology of language faculty science as an exact science" seems to me more satisfactory. Many of the specific points made there are illustrated in my book draft by results of on-line experiments along with how various aspects of experiments get improved, in line with the the proposed methodology.

What is needed most critically is, in my view, a good understanding and articulation of the logic of hypothesis testing in generative grammar, and the development of a minimally satisfactory structure of our experimental design and its justification.

In concrete terms, one can ask questions like the following in relation to any work one might be reading or writing, assuming that the work in question is meant to be making a claim that has empirical consequences in the context of generative enterprise.

(i) What generalization is proposed or adopted in the work, which crucially involves a proposition that something is impossible under some specified condition?
(ii) What account is given for (i)?
(iii) How solid is the alleged generalization in (i)? How much repeatability obtains in regard to the predicted speaker judgments on what is claimed to be impossible ? Of course, we are not just talking about a few 'minimal pairs here; the claim is that something is impossible due to some property of the Computational System and hence what is claimed to be impossible must be impossible no matter what.
(iv) With the account in (ii), what negative predictions -- predictions that something is impossible under some specified condition -- are made beyond what has given rise to the alleged generalization in (i)?
(v) How can we test the predictions in (iv)?
(vi) How are the predictions borne out? How much repeatability obtains in terms of the predicted speaker judgments?

I should also note that what is noted under [29124] would equally apply to much of the works in the field that deal with Japanese, resulting in a great deal of confusion; textbooks on Japanese linguistics (Blackwell), such as Tsujimura 1996, 1999, for example, are full of alleged generalizations that have long been shown to be invalid, once we accept the criterion advocated elsewhere (e.g., please see [29940] in the Further Discussion board -- where some references are provided) and/or the "Research Interests" page -- as noted there, my point of contention is that if we did not adopt some such criterion, there would be little hope of making generative grammar an empirical science or of making it a progressive research program in the sense of Lakatos 1970.)
　　　One must naturally wonder what makes such practice in the field possible. The answer, I believe, lies in the fact that we have failed to develop a rigorous means to evaluate hypotheses in generative grammar. What is needed most critically is, in my view, a good understanding and articulation of the logic of hypothesis-testing in generative grammar, and the development of a minimally satisfactory structure of our experimental design and its justification.

The point made in [29124] gets confirmed by the reactions to (7) and to (8) by the native speakers of English and Japanese, respectively.

(7) *John feared that the FBI (rather than the CIA) might assassinate himself.
(8) John-wa (CIA zya nakute) FBI-ga zibunzisin-o ansasutu suruno zya naika to osorete ita.

(8) is a fairly accurate translation of (7). (i) is not acceptable (unless in a dream or something) (presumably because the act of assassination can be done only to others not to oneself) and furthermore the FBI, being 'non-human', cannot be an antecedent of himself, anyway.

(i) #/*John assassinated himself.

The embedded subject therefore cannot be an antecedent for himself in (7). The matrix (i.e., main clause) subject John, one might think, may be a possible antecedent of himself, i.e., one might think that it may be possible for (7) to mean (ii).

(ii) John feared that the FBI (rather than the CIA) might assassinate John.

But the native speakers' judgments on (7) seem quite clear on (7); they reject (7). And such a judgment has been attributed to a principle that is part of the Computational System and to some formal property of himself.

If zibunzisin in Japanese had the same formal property as himself in English, (8) should be rejected as clearly as (7) is.

The Japanese counterpart of (i), given in (iii), is as odd as (i).

(iii) #/*John-wa zibunzisin-o ansatusita.

Yet, (8) is readily accepted by native speakers of Japanese.

The native speakers of English can check their own judgments on (7) and ask native speakers of Japanese about (8), and the native speakers of Japanese can do the 'reverse', to check the validity of what is reported above.

One might try to make a stipulation that accommodates the acceptability of (7).

But I see no plausible way to do so without making the claim (i) not refutable.

(i) Zibunzisin in Japanese has the same formal property as English himself

It has been proposed and accepted fairly widely, in one form or another, that the Computational System (=CS) (the narrowly construed part of the language faculty, with the other part being the mental lexicon) makes reference to a formal property of some items in the mental Lexicon, as they are included as input to the (CS), in such a way that it ensures that they cannot be allowed in the output of the Computational System unless there is an item in some specified position in the representation of which they are part (with the item in question 'serving as their antecedent'), whether the restriction is stated as one on the representation or one on derivation.

One such example is the so-called reflexive in English (himself, herself, etc.). Due to their hypothesized property alluded to above (and other properties that differentiate him from her), the (b) examples in (1)-(3) below are predicted to be unacceptable.

(1) 　a. 　John loves himself.
　　b. 　John thinks Mary loves himself.
(2) 　a. 　John recommended himself for that position.
　　b. 　John thought that Mary had recommended himself for that position.
(3) 　a. 　Mary, who had firmly believed that Chomsky would recommend her, was shocked to death when she found out that Chomsky recommended Bill instead. (where her = Mary)
　　b. 　Mary, who had firmly believed that Chomsky would recommend herself, was shocked to death when she found out that Chomsky recommended Bill instead.

One of the generalizations that result from the relevant property of the English reflexives is (4).

(4) An English reflexive in an object position is felicitous only if there is a phrase in the same clause that can serve as its antecedent.

Assuming that the empirical content of the notion of 'antecedent' here is simple enough, it is straightforward to test the validity of (4). (4) is claimed to be a result of some property of the CS, which is generally understood to be universal (with the possible exception of the value of the so-called head-parameter) and some lexical property of what the CS refers to. To the extent that the universal and language-particular hypotheses in question are valid, the predicted judgment on the relevant examples should be robust.

The reactions by native speakers of English seem to indicate that (4) is indeed a valid generalization. (See Methodology [29083].)

Now, if zibunzisin in Japanese had the same formal property, we would expect the generalization in (5) to be valid, and the predicted speaker judgments robust.

(5) Zibunzisin in an object position is felicitous only if there is a phrase in the same clause that can serve as its antecedent.

The native speakers' reactions to the Japanese counterparts of (1b), (2b) and (3b), given below, are far from what is predicted. (See Methodology [29083].)

I would like to suggest that native speakers of Japanese check the examples below. Non-native speakers of Japanese may want to ask a native speaker of Japanese about how hopeless the examples in (5)-(7) are under the specified interpretations. If you are a native speaker of English, you can compare how you find the (b) examples in (1)-(3) and how your 'Japanese informants' react to (5) and (7). As discussed in the thread under Methodology [29073], it is not sufficient to provide a few or several (or even many) minimal pairs that might seem to support the generalization in (5). After all, what is claimed in (5) is that something just cannot be possible due to the CS-related properties. The point is thus to see if we indeed cannot come up with acceptable examples that are predicted to be impossible no matter how hard we try.

(5) a. John-wa Mary-ga zibunzisin-ni horete iru to omoikonde ita. (John = zibunzisin)
(intended as) 'John thought that Mary loved himself.'
b. John-wa Mary-ga zibunzisin-o uragiru to-wa omotte inakatta. (John = zibunzisin)
(intended as) 'John did not think that Mary would betray himself.'
c. John-wa Mary-ga zibunzisin-o suisensita to bakari omotteita. (John = zibunzisin)
(intended as) 'John firmly believed that Mary had recommended himself.'

(6) Chomsky-ga zibunzisin-o suisensuru to bakari omotte ita John-wa Chomsky-ga Bill-o suisensita to sitte gakuzen to sita.
(intended as) 'John, who thought that Chomksy would recommend himself (=John), was shocked to death when he found out that Chomsky recommended Bill.

If your Japanese informants find it easier to see the examples written in Japanese and if your computer has Japanese fonts, you can show them (5') and (6').

(5') a. ジョンはメリーが自分自身に惚れていると思い込んでいた。（ジョン=自分自身)
b. ジョンはメリーが自分自身を裏切るとは思っていなかった。（ジョン=自分自身)
c. ジョンはメリーが自分自身を推薦したとばかり思っていた。（ジョン=自分自身)

(6') チョムスキーが自分自身を推薦すると思い込んでいたジョンは、チョムスキーがビルを推薦したと知って愕然とした。(自分自身=ジョン)

I am pretty sure that you will understand what I mean.

Notice incidentally that (3b) in English and (6) in Japanese can be easily understood as having been uttered in essentially the same context. Because of the use of herself in (3b), which cannot 'go with' Chomsky (assuming that Chomsky here means Noam Chomsky), (3b) must favor the Mary =herself reading, if anything. In the case of (6), given that zibunzisin can in principle 'go with' any nominal phrase (NP/DP), regardless of the 'person', 'gender', or 'number' that it 'represents', (6) does not favor the John =zibunzisin reading in the way (3b) favors the Mary =herself reading. If such a factor as this affected the speaker judgments at all, we should expect that (3b) allows the Mary =herself reading more easily than (6) allows the John =zibunzisin reading.

Yet, native speakers of English reject the Mary =herself reading quite robustly for (3b) (and (3b) is in fact judged unacceptable since the Chomsky =herself reading is not possible for an independent reason ). By sharp contrast, Japanese native speakers accept (6) with the Mary =herself reading fairly easily. This would be quite unexpected if zibunzisin had the formal property under discussion. Notice that a few speakers' not finding (6) unacceptable under the specified reading should not be considered as any comfort for those who wish to maintain that zibunzisin has the property under discussion.

It is necessary, first of all, to see if such judgments would be reproduced with a number of other examples of the same structure. At one point, there were two informants who 'systematically rejected' (5) and (6) under the specified interpretation. When asked to check a few months later the same examples ((5) and (6)), one of the two informants accepted all of them.

One might argue that the lexical specification internalized by the one remaining informant (i.e., one out of 40 or so informants at the time being referred to here) is what is relevant to the research that maintains that zibunzisin has the property in question. In order to pursue that line of thinking, it would be necessary to first make sure that this speaker indeed rejects other examples of the same form as (5) and (6) under the intended interpretation, that the speaker is not considering the 'preferred reading' (and judging the not-preferred reading as 'unacceptable'), etc.

Only after having checked those, should we seriously consider the research program which only considers the properties of the CS and what it refers to that might have been internallized by such (rather rare) speakers.

My personal knowledge of some of those researchers who endorse or assume the thesis that zibunzisin has the relevant property in question is that they do not have particularly robust judgments themselves on the examples that are predicted to be impossible. They seem to focus on particular pairs of examples and maintain that the alleged contrast in those pairs is what supports the thesis in question. Leaving aside how clearly unacceptable those allegedly ill-formed examples are to many speakers (see my "Assessing Competing Analyses: Two Hypotheses about 'Scrambling' in Japanese" (2006) and "Otagai" (2006) for discussion, both of which are available at the Downloadable page at this HP), such a move is missing the point. The point must be, as noted above, that something is predicted to be impossible due to some properties of the CS and what it refers to (in this case the lexical property of some items (such as zibunzisin), and hence being able to come up with some pairs of examples that seem to support the thesis in question would not mean much if there are (numerous) acceptable examples of the same schematic form despite the prediction that they fail to yield the specified anaphoric relation in question. This point seems to be rather poorly understood, if at all, in the field at large, resulting in much confusion, while contributing to the creation and expansion of "a swamp over which the paralyzing vapours of the publication explosion hold an eternal sway," as Popper 1974: 977 puts it. For the methodological issue behind this, please see the thread under Methodology [29073].

Popper, K. 1974. "Replies to My Critics," in Paul Authur Schilpp ed., Volume 2 of The Philosophy of Karl Popper, The Open Court Publishing, La Salle, Illinois, pp. 961-1197.

The logic that is crucial in the ensuing discussion/postings is given or at least hinted at in Methodology [28637] and [29073].

I will soon make postings on some alleged generalizations that have been widely accepted in the generative grammatical literature (even to the extent that they are presented as such in 'textbooks' in Japanese linguistics). Among the generalizations in question are those having to do with the hypotheses in (i).

(i) Zibunzisin has the same formal property as English reflexives (e.g., himself) in terms of the requirement of having its 'antecedent' in a particular structural position.

(ii) Otagai has the same formal property as English reciprocal each other in terms of the requirement of having its 'antecedent' in a particular structural position.

If you are interested in some relevant discussion, please take a look at:

"Assessing Competing Analyses: Two Hypotheses about 'Scrambling' in Japanese" (2006) in Ayumi Ueyama, ed., Theoretical and Empirical Studies of Reference and Anaphora?Toward the establishment of generative grammar as an empirical science, pp. 139-185.

which is downloadable at the "Downloadable Papers" page.