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[45227] Hajime Hoji (→ [45189]) Aug/23/2015 (Sun) 05:14
Hoji 1985 (and Hoji 1990)
What is noted above addresses my own papers collected in the Ohsumi volume, but it applies to any work that is (presumably) meant to be about the language faculty or that is alleged/claimed to pursue rigorous testability.

So, it applies to Hoji 1985 and Hoji 1990, as well.
Going over Hoji 1985, for example, from the perspectives of Hoji 2015 gives us a clear sense about the difference in research orientation in Hoji 1985 and Hoji 2015.

(The following remarks have been copied from a draft of the Preface.)

"In retrospect, Hoji 1985 tried to identify the informant intuitions that are necessarily based on the satisfaction of a c-command condition, being concerned mainly with the (un)availability of bound variable construal and scope dependency in Japanese that seem to be sensitive to, i.e., that seem to require the satisfaction of, a c-command condition. By making reference to the (un)availability of the dependency interpretations in question, I argued for a particular view of the phrase structure of Japanese that it is strictly binary-branching. In the terms of Hoji 2015, Hoji 1985 tried to identify as good probes as possible in discovering the universal properties of the language faculty through investigation of Japanese, and used the probes thus identified to argue for the thesis that the Japanese phrase structure is strictly binary branching. Clearly, I was not thinking in those terms when I wrote Hoji 1985. But, this now seems to me to be a reasonable interpretation of what I was trying to do in Hoji 1985."

"I do not mean that I was not concerned with testability in Hoji 1985. I would like to say I was, to the extent that I was concerned in Hoji 1985 with how robust the proposed or adopted generalizations were. The empirical generalizations put forth (or adopted) in Hoji 1985 are, however, often far from being robust. Following what I understood to be the common practice in the field, my main concern in Hoji 1985 was to express/describe some "phenomena" in Japanese in the terms of the theory I adopted at the time and what I might be able to say about the theory on the basis my "findings" in Japanese. The essentially compatibility-seeking research attitude adopted in Hoji 1985, coupled with the absence of strong commitment to the internalist approach resulted in the way "generalizations" are handled and presented in Hoji 1985."

(The list of Feynman quotations is given as I have somewhat randomly compiled them. I part because of an effective exposition and in part because I do not want to give the readers the false impression that my research methodology has been developed on the basis of what Feynman has stated -- I came to learn about Feynman's remarks long after I had come to pursue my research basically in line with what is presented in Hoji 2015 -- I am not going to give tons of Feynman quotations in the Preface.)

"Through my research subsequent to Hoji 1985, I have come to think that much of the research in the field of generative grammar does not pursue rigorous testability. This seems to me to have resulted in the general lack of a clear sense of progress in the field over the years. I had thought that such a state of affairs was due to the lack of intellectual rigor on the part of the practitioners, including myself. Upon having read Feynman's "Cargo Cult Science" several years ago, I came to realize that one of the reasons for what one might call the absence of intellectual rigor and integrity is that we do not have a means to determine what the facts are. If we do not know what the facts are, we may not know how not to fool ourselves.
I provide some quotations of Feynman's remarks here in hopes that they might give the reader a general idea about the intended points. For a fuller discussion, the readers are referred to Hoji 2015.

"Now it behooves me, of course, to tell you what they're missing. But it would be just about as difficult to explain to the South Sea islanders how they have to arrange things so that they get some wealth in their system. It is not something simple like telling them how to improve the shapes of the earphones. But there is one feature I notice that is generally missing in cargo cult science. That is the idea that we all hope you have learned in studying science in school\we never say explicitly what this is, but just hope that you catch on by all the examples of scientific investigation. It is interesting, therefore, to bring it out now and speak of it explicitly. It's a kind of scientific integrity, a principle of scientific thought that corresponds to a kind of utter honesty\a kind of leaning over backwards. For example, if you're doing an experiment, you should report everything that you think might make it invalid\not only what you think is right about it: other causes that could possibly explain your results; and things you thought of that you've eliminated by some other experiment, and how they worked\to make sure the other fellow can tell they have been eliminated.

Details that could throw doubt on your interpretation must be given, if you know them. You must do the best you can\if you know anything at all wrong, or possibly wrong\to explain it. If you make a theory, for example, and advertise it, or put it out, then you must also put down all the facts that disagree with it, as well as those that agree with it. There is also a more subtle problem. When you have put a lot of ideas together to make an elaborate theory, you want to make sure, when explaining what it fits, that those things it fits are not just the things that gave you the idea for the theory; but that the finished theory makes something else come out right, in addition." (From "Cargo Cult Science," included in Feynman 1985 Surely You're Joking Mr. Feynman ) (p. 340-341).

"In the strong nuclear interaction, we have this theory of colored quarks and gluons, very precise and completely stated, but with very few hard predictions. Itfs technically very difficult to get a sharp test of the theory, and thatfs a challenge. I feel passionately that thatfs a loose thread; while therefs no evidence in conflict with the theory, wefre not likely to make much progress until we can check hard predictions with hard numbers." (Feynman 1999: 199)

"Another thing I must point out is that you cannot prove a vague theory wrong. If the guess that you make is poorly expressed and rather vague, and the method that you use for figuring out the consequences is a little vague\you are not sure, and you say, gI think everythingfs right because itfs all due to so and so, and such and such do this and that more or less, and I can sort of explain how this works ch, then you see that this theory is good, because it cannot be proved wrong! Also if the process of computing the consequences is indefinite, then with a little skill any experimental results can be made to look like the expected consequences." (Feynman 1965/94: 152–153)

"The principle of science, the definition, almost, is the following: The test of all knowledge is experiment. Experiment is the sole judge of scientific etruthf" (The Feynman Lectures on Physics: 1-1, reproduced in Feynman 1963: 2).

"In general, we look for a new law by the following process. First we guess it. Then we compute the consequences of the guess to see what would be implied if this law that we guessed is right. Then we compare the result of the computation to nature, with experiment or experience, compare it directly with observation, to see if it works. If it disagrees with experiment, it is wrong. In that simple statement is the key to science. It does not make any difference how beautiful your guess is. It does not make any difference how smart you are, who made the guess, or what his name is – if it disagrees with the experiment, it is wrong. Thatfs all there is to it." (Feynman 1965/94: 150)

"It is true that one has to check a little to make sure that it is wrong, because whoever did the experiment may have reported incorrectly, or there may have been some feature in the experiment that was not noticed, some dirt or something; or the man who computed the consequences, even though it may have been the one who made the guesses, could have made some mistake in the analysis. These are obvious remarks, so when I say if it disagrees with experiment it is wrong, I mean after the experiment has been checked, the calculations have been checked, and the thing has been rubbed back and forth a few times to make sure that the con- sequences are logical consequences from the guess, and that in fact it disagrees with a very carefully checked experiment." (Feynman 1965/94: 150–151)

"Because of the success of science, there is, I think, a kind of pseudoscience. Social science is an example of a science which is not a science; they donft do [things] scientifically, they follow the forms–or you gather data, you do so-and- so and so forth but they donft get any laws, they havenft found out anything. They havenft got anywhere yet–maybe someday they will, but it is not very well developed c I may be quite wrong, maybe they do know all these things, but I donft think Ifm wrong. You see, I have the advantage of having found out how hard it is to get to really know something, how careful you have to be about checking the experiments, how easy it is to make mistakes and fool yourself. I know what it means to know something, and therefore I see how they get their information and I canft believe that they know it, they havenft done the work necessary, havenft done the checks necessary, havenft done the care necessary. I have a great suspicion that they donft know, that this stuff is [wrong] and theyfre intimidating people. I think so. I donft know the world very well but thatfs what I think." (Feynman 1999: 22)

One of the concrete proposals in Hoji 2015 is how to identify facts in a research program that aims at discovering properties of the language faculty by following Feynman's "Guess-Compute-Compare" method, so that we can try not to fool ourselves."

References :
[45189] Hajime Hoji Aug/11/2015 (12:12)A section of the Preface