The last two paragraphs of Chapter 8 are as follows:
(The formatting is lost here.)

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　　In addressing social sciences, Feynman remarks as follows: ^FN14


　　　"Because of the success of science, there is, I think, a kind of pseudoscience. Social science is an example of a science which is not a science; they don't do [things] scientifically, they follow the forms―or you gather data, you do so-and-so and so forth but they don't get any laws, they haven't found out anything. They haven't got anywhere yet―maybe someday they will, but it is not very well developed, … I may be quite wrong, maybe they do know all these things, but I don't think I'm wrong. You see, I have the advantage of having found out how hard it is to get to really know something, how careful you have to be about checking the experiments, how easy it is to make mistakes and fool yourself. I know what it means to know something, and therefore I see how they get their information and I can't believe that they know it, they haven't done the work necessary, haven't done the checks necessary, haven't done the care necessary. I have a great suspicion that they don't know, that this stuff is [wrong] and they're intimidating people. I think so. I don't know the world very well but that's what I think." (Feynman 1999: 22)


What I have proposed in the preceding pages is how we can "do the work necessary, do the checks necessary, and do the care necessary" for obtaining reliable information from our experiments about properties of the language faculty.
　　What I envisage is a time when we will be able to deduce hard predictions (predicted schematic asymmetries) in various languages, will be able to evaluate by experiments the validity of our universal and language-particular hypotheses, and will be able to formulate hypotheses of a successively more general nature, without losing rigorous testability. When something like that has become the norm of the research program, an experiment dealing with one language can be understood clearly in terms of the universal hypotheses (along with language-particular hypotheses) in question so that the implications of the result of an experiment dealing with a particular language can be transparent with respect to other languages. Researchers "working with" different languages will at that point share (many of) the same puzzles and issues pertaining to universal properties of the language faculty. They will know precisely what necessary care and checks they need to do in order to design effective experiments for testing the validity of the same universal hypotheses. That will enable us to proceed in a way much more robust than what has been presented in the preceding chapters, still on the basis of confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries. The field will at that point be widely regarded as an exact science, and everyone will take that for granted. And I also suspect that, at that point, other fields of research that deal with the brain and the mind pay close attention to the research results and methodology in language faculty science because they find it useful to try to learn from the categorical nature of the experimental results in language faculty science and its methodology that has guided its research efforts.^FN15

FN14: A video clip containing these remarks can be found at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IaO69CF5mbY (last accessed on 7/25/2013).

FN15: This reminds us of Chomsky's (1975: 5) remark that "it is not unreasonable to suppose that the study of this particular human achievement, the ability to speak and understand a human language, may serve as a suggestive model for inquiry into other domains of human competence and action that are not quite so amenable to direct investigation."