Section 1 of Chapter 5 is as follows:
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　　The subject matter of language faculty science is the language faculty. The language faculty is hypothesized to underlie our ability to relate sounds and meaning. Because the language faculty is internal to the mind of an individual, language faculty scientists are internalists by definition. Taking seriously the methodological naturalist approach, we aim at accumulating knowledge about the language faculty by putting forth hypotheses so as to make predictions that are as definite as possible. More specifically, we aspire to accumulate knowledge about the language faculty by adopting the hypothetico-deductive method, dubbed by Feynman as the "Guess-Compute-Compare" method. As stated in the preceding chapters, the proposed methodology for language faculty science as an exact science is a consequence of taking the language faculty as the object of inquiry and adopting the "Guess-Compute-Compare" (or "Guess-Deduce-Compare") method for testing our hypotheses.
　　In Chapters 2-4, I have articulated how language faculty science as an exact science is possible. As discussed in Chapter 2, our desire to seek as much generality as possible with regard to an individual informant's judgments, in pursuit of discovering universal properties of the language faculty, has led us to work with schemata and recognize the fundamental schematic asymmetry as indicated in [P].

[P]　The fundamental schematic asymmetry
　a.　　The *Schema-based prediction:
　　　Every example sentence instantiating a *Schema is unacceptable with the specified interpretation pertaining to two expressions.
　b.　　The okSchema-based prediction:
　　　Some example sentences instantiating an okSchema are acceptable at least to some extent with the specified interpretation pertaining to two expressions.

A combination of a *Schema-based prediction and its corresponding okSchema-based prediction is called a predicted schematic asymmetry. If we obtain informant judgments in accordance with the predicted schematic asymmetry, we obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry, which I have suggested should be considered as basic units of facts in language faculty science.
　　While we are concerned with universal properties of the language faculty, our predictions are about judgments by an individual informant on the relation between sounds and meaning in a particular language. Our predictions―in the form of predicted schematic asymmetries―must therefore be given rise to, at least, by the following three types of hypotheses.

[H]　a.　　Universal hypotheses
　　b.　　Language-particular hypotheses
　　c.　Bridging hypotheses

Bridging hypotheses relate a particular interpretation detectable by the informant to some hypothesized concept/relation.
　　I have adopted in Chapter 3 Chomsky's (1993) model of the Computational System (CS) of the language faculty and Ueyama's (2010) model of judgment-making by informants, as general bases deducing definite and categorical predictions about individual informants' judgments. The two most crucial aspects of Chomsky's (1993) model of the CS are: (i) that the formal basis of meaning is LF and (ii) that the only structure-building operation is Merge. Specific instances of [H-a], [H-b], and [H-c] that we pursue all make crucial reference to LF c-command, and that is for the purpose of attaining maximal testability, as discussed in Ch. 3: section 7. Because of its categorical nature, Chomsky's 1993 model of the CS provides us with a basis for extracting, among the myriads of linguistic intuitions that we may observe, linguistic intuitions that we can characterize and describe in terms of our hypotheses about the CS couched within Chomsky's 1993 model of the CS, more specifically, in terms of LF c-command. Facts in language faculty science thus qualify as such only if they constitute a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry. A confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry is based on predicted schematic asymmetry, which is deduced from our hypotheses. It is in this sense that facts and hypotheses in language faculty science are inseparable.
　　We want to focus on, and hence want our experimental result to be revealing about, the validity of (a) particular hypothesis/ses among what has given rise to the predicted schematic asymmetry.^FN1 We refer to such (a) hypothesis/ses as the Main-Hypothesis/ses. Our Main-Experiment is concerned with the Main-Hypothesis/ses among the hypotheses that give rise to the predicted schematic asymmetry. The other hypotheses, which we refer to as the Sub-Hypotheses, are tested in Sub-Experiments.
　　As discussed in Chapter 4, failure to obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry suggests that (i) one or more of our hypotheses that have given rise to the predicted schematic asymmetry is/are not valid, (ii) the "instructions" to the informant in our Experiments, including how we specify the intended dependency interpretation, are not effective, or (iii) the degree of the informant resourcefulness is not high enough, or any combination of those. In order to make the result of the Main-Experiment revealing about the validity of the Main-Hypothesis/ses, it is therefore imperative that we ensure as much as possible that the failure to obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry would not be due to (some of) the Sub-Hypotheses not being valid, the "instructions" to the informant not being effective, or the informant not being resourceful enough. Sub-Experiments are conducted for that purpose.
　　As discussed also in Chapter 4, the key to obtaining definite and categorical experimental results is the reliability of the experimental device. Unlike a physical science, we do not have a physical device the reliability of the design, construction and operation of which we can check, at least at the moment. As pointed out in Ch. 4: sections 1 and 5, our informants and our instructions are part of our experimental device. We can consider the result of our Main-Experiment revealing about the validity our Main-Hypotheses only if we focus on the informants for whom the instructions are effective and for whom the Sub-Hypotheses seem valid, judging from the results of the Sub-Experiments. Interpreting the result of the Main-Experiment without reference to those of its Sub-Experiments would be like conducting experiments without taking necessary care and without doing necessary checks; see the Feynman quote given in Ch. 8: section 2.
　　In summary, the key to obtaining definite and categorical experimental results in accordance with our predicted schematic asymmetry is the recognition that the result of our Main-Experiment must be interpreted by making reference to the results of its Sub-Experiments, as introduced in Chapter 3 and further discussed in Chapter 4. As pointed out in Chapter 4, our predictions are not about any informant. It is about those informants who are reliable for the purpose of testing the Main-Hypothesis/ses in the Main-Experiment. Crucial reference to the results of Sub-Experiments is for the purpose of making the result of the Main-Experiment as significant as possible with respect to the validity of the Main-Hypotheses tested in the Main-Experiment, and that is analogous to enhancing the reliability and the precision of the experimental device in a physical science, as discussed in Ch. 4: section 1. What has led us to recognize the concept of Main-Hypotheses and Sub-Hypotheses as well as that of Main-Experiments and Sub-Experiments is the desire to be able to focus on (a) particular hypothesis/ses among those that give rise to the predicted schematic asymmetry. It stems from our desire to assign maximal significance to our experimental result with respect to such (a) hypothesis/ses. We want our experimental result to be as significant as possible, regardless of whether it turns out to be in line with our definite and categorical prediction.
　　In Chapters 6 and 7, I will illustrate the methodological proposal for language faculty science, drawing from a number of on-line Experiments, in support of its viability. The two chapters deal with English and Japanese, addressing the same universal hypotheses. Before we turn to empirical illustration of the proposed methodology, we will go over in this chapter the general design of our Experiments and how it reflects the proposed methodology. More in particular, I will addresses how experiments are designed and conducted in language faculty science and how the experimental results are interpreted, all in accordance with the proposed methodology for language faculty science as laid out in Chapters 2-4.
　　 The general design of our experiments has been developed by Ayumi Ueyama. The first template was created in 2004 and it has since undergone three major changes so as to reflect various stages of the methodological articulation that has eventually led to the proposal laid out in the preceding 4 chapters.^FN2 The innovations reflect (i) how we tried to obtain reproducible informant judgments among ourselves (the researchers) and in multiple-non-researcher-informant experiments and (ii) how we tried to ensure the significance of the informant judgments with regard to the validity of (a) particular hypothesis/ses under discussion. The former issue obviously concerns reproducibility/repeatability and the latter testability/falsifiability. ^FN3

FN1: See the discussion in Ch. 3: section 2 on the under-determination-of-theory-by-data issue raised by Poincaré and Duhem.
FN2: The experimental results presented in Hoji 2006a and 2006b are based on an earlier version of the program.
FN3: Hoji 2003a and 2003b were attempts to articulate my understanding of the relevant issue prior to 2004.