The first section and the first part of the last section of Chapter 3 are as follows:
(The footnotes are not included.)

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1. Introduction
By considering the informant judgments as being about schemata (not about example sentences), we came to recognize the fundamental asymmetry between the *Schema-based prediction and the okSchema-based prediction, as indicated in [P], repeated here.

[P]　a.　The *Schema-based prediction:
　　Every example sentence instantiating a *Schema is unacceptable with the specified interpretation pertaining to two expressions.
　b.　The okSchema-based prediction:
　　Some example sentences instantiating an okSchema are acceptable at least to some extent with the specified interpretation pertaining to two expressions.

The considerations of the fundamental asymmetry between [P-a] and [P-b] have led us to recognize the relative significance of the four possible results of an experiment in a single-informant experiment, as discussed in Chapter 2. Those considerations are independent of how our predictions are given rise to.
　　　Experiments are designed to test predictions and predictions are deduced from hypotheses. The significance of the experimental result should therefore be understood in relation to what hypotheses have given rise to the prediction in question―in our case, a predicted schematic asymmetry. In this chapter, I will discuss how a predicted schematic asymmetry is deduced in language faculty science. I will first briefly address the structure of prediction-deduction in language faculty science by making reference to what types of hypotheses give rise to a predicted schematic asymmetry. I will then provide further illustration of the point on the basis of specific hypotheses that give rise to predicted schematic asymmetries.



8. Summary
　　　The two points of departure in the present work are: (i) the object of inquiry is the language faculty (not "languages" or "language" as they are commonly understood) and (ii) we want to find out about (the universal aspects of) the language faculty by the "Guess-Compute-Compare" method (of testing hypotheses). They have led us to the need to work with schemata and then to the fundamental asymmetry between the *Schema-based prediction and the okSchema-based prediction, as discussed in Chapter 2.
In this chapter, we addressed another consequence of those basic premises, in relation to how we make a predicted schematic asymmetry. A predicted schematic asymmetry is given rise to (at least) by the three types of hypotheses in [H].

[H]　a.　　Universal hypotheses
　　b.　　Language-particular hypotheses
　　c.　　Bridging hypotheses

The desire to be able to assign maximal significance to the experimental result with respect to just one of the hypotheses that have given rise to the predicted schematic asymmetry has led us to recognize―though only at a conceptual level so far―the concept of Main-Hypotheses and Sub-Hypotheses as well as that of Main-Experiments and Sub-Experiments.
　　　I have then adopted Chomsky's (1993) model of the CS. With its categorical nature, it allows us to formulate hypotheses so as to make our predicted schematic asymmetry testable. The two most crucial aspects of Chomsky's (1993) model of the CS are: (i) the formal basis of meaning is LF and (ii) the only structural-building operation is Merge. A specific instance of a Universal hypothesis ([H-a]) makes reference to an LF object/relation FD(a, b) whose necessary condition is that a c-commands b at LF. A specific instance of a Language-particular hypothesis ([H-b]) relates the linear schematic representation of a phonetic string to a c-command-based hierarchical schematic representation at LF. A specific instance of a bridging hypothesis ([H-c]) is a hypothesis concerning how a particular interpretation detectable by the informant is based on FD.
(The rest of the section is not included here.)