The first two paragraphs and the last three paragraphs of Chapter 2 are as follows:

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Introduction

The present work attempts to pursue and defend the thesis that it is possible to investigate the language faculty by applying the hypothetico-deductive method, which Feynman puts as the "Guess-Compute-Compare" method. The passage from Feynman 1965/94 quoted in Chapter 1 is repeated here.

In general, we look for a new law by the following process. First we guess it. Then we compute the consequences of the guess to see what would be implied if this law that we guessed is right. Then we compare the result of the computation to nature, with experiment or experience, compare it directly with observation, to see if it works. If it disagrees with experiment, it is wrong. In that simple statement is the key to science. It does not make any difference how beautiful your guess is. It does not make any difference how smart you are, who made the guess, or what his name is―if it disagrees with the experiment, it is wrong. That's all there is to it. (Feynman 1965/94: 150)

More specifically, I argue that the language faculty can be studied as an exact science. By an "exact science" I mean a research program in which definite/categorical predictions are deduced from hypotheses and are tested against experimental results (or observations). Such a research program will be called language faculty science, as noted in Chapter 1. Insofar as we can carry this out successfully with compelling empirical demonstration, that will constitute support for the existence of the language faculty.
　　Given the assumption that the language faculty underlies our ability to relate sounds and meaning, it seems reasonable to ask informants about the relation between sounds and meaning and consider the informants' reported judgments as evidence for or against our hypotheses about the language faculty. One should, however, naturally wonder how we can justify the use of informants' introspective judgments as crucial evidence, in light of the observation that the informant judgment can be unstable, especially when we consider "meaning." The present work proposes how informant judgments can constitute hard evidence in language faculty science, providing conceptual articulation of the claim and its empirical demonstration. This and the subsequent two chapters provide an overview of the proposed methodology for language faculty science.


Summary

　　The internalist approach we adopt to the study of "language" leads us to investigate properties of I-language, rather than E-language, in the sense of Chomsky 1986. Since the I-language of a speaker is internal to the mind of the speaker, our research deals with an individual informant. Since we are concerned with what underlies our ability to relate sounds and meaning, we have decided to work with an individual informant's judgment on the relation between sounds and meaning as it seems to be the most direct means to discover properties of our subject matter.^{FN 6}
　　While we deal an individual informant's judgment on the relation between sounds and meaning in a particular language, we want to make the individual informant's judgment as revealing as possible about universal properties of the language faculty. Our desire to seek as much generality as possible with regard to the judgments of an individual informant has led us to work with schemata. Schemata are schematic representations of sentences in terms of the linear precedence relations among the relevant expressions, sometimes aided by the use of the notation of containment for the sake of clarity of what is intended by the schema.^{FN 7} Once we focus on Schemata, we realize that our predictions are about an individual informant's judgment on sentences instantiating a *Schema and those instantiating an okSchema. Sentences instantiating each Schema are infinite, as long as the Schema is stated with a minimal degree of generality. They can be as simple as the Schema allows it but they can also be infinitely complicated as long as they instantiate the Schema in question. This leads us to recognize the fundamental asymmetry between the *Schema-based prediction and the okSchema-based prediction. We predict that any sentence instantiating the *Schema is unacceptable. We cannot, however, predict that any sentence instantiating the okSchema is acceptable. By making the sentence in question sufficiently complicated, one can make it unacceptable. It is therefore not possible to predict that any sentence instantiating an okSchema is acceptable. Any sentence that instantiates a *Schema, on the other hand, is predicted to be unacceptable, regardless of how simple we might make the sentence. We are thus led to recognize that the *Schema-based prediction is a universal prediction while the okSchema-based prediction is an existential prediction.
　　A combination of a *Schema-based prediction and its corresponding okSchema-based prediction is called a predicted schematic asymmetry. When the *Schema-based prediction has survived a rigorous attempt of disconfirmation and the corresponding okSchema-based prediction has been confirmed, the individual informant's reported judgments are said to constitute a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry. I suggest that confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries are basic units of facts in language faculty science. Questions remain as to what counts as "a rigorous attempt of disconfirmation" of the *Schema-based prediction, how we can aspire to replicate the confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry that we have obtained in a single-informant experiment in a multiple-informant experiment, among other questions. Before I begin to address such questions, it is necessary to discuss what hypotheses give rise to our predictions, how that should affect the way we design our experiments and how we should interpret the experimental results. We will turn to those and related conceptual issues in the next two chapters.

FN 6: As noted earlier, we leave open the possibility that other types of evidence may serve the same purpose and provide converging evidence for our hypotheses. It must be made clear, however, as also suggested in Chapter 1 (see remarks around footnote 6 therein), how we can deduce definite predictions about it (at least in part) on the basis of hypotheses about the language faculty and how such evidence can be revealing about universal aspects of the language faculty.

FN 7Though schemata are not intended to express the hypothesized structures of the sentences in question, the schematic representation allows us to address the hypothesized structural relations among the parts that are specified in the schemata. In this sense, working with schemata (not with actual example sentences) can be considered as the first step toward working with the abstract mental (structural) representations expressed in terms of universal concepts and relations that underlies an individual speaker's ability to relate sounds and meaning.
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