1.7. The pf-LF correspondences

For the purpose of deducing categorical predictions about the informant judgment, we also need language-particular hypotheses regarding the correspondences between (i) the schematic linear sequence of linguistic expressions in the language under discussion and (ii) the schematic LF (hence, hierarchical) representation(s). Such hypotheses shall be called pf-LF correspondences and will be discussed in some depth in later chapters, in relation to the so-called scrambling construction in Japanese.

1.8. Two more issues to clarify
1.8.1. Reproducibility and intermediate judgments

There are two more interrelated issues I would like to clarify in this introductory exposition; one is how to interpret "intermediate judgments," (i.e., "Not completely unacceptable but not fully acceptable"), and the other is what should count as reproducibility of our experimental results. As in any scientific research program, identifying and working with reproducible phenomena is a minimal requirement for progress. If the informant judgments are not reproducible, they do not (yet) constitute a piece of data to account for in language faculty science. Let us thus first turn to how we should characterize a reproducible phenomenon in language faculty science.

1.8.2. Schemata

First of all, it is not the informant judgment on particular sentences that would count as evidence. If we deduce a prediction that sentences conforming to a certain schema do not give rise to a certain interpretation, such an interpretation should be unavailable in any sentence conforming to that schema, no matter what lexical or pragmatic adjustments and alterations might be made on what is left unspecified in the schema. Consider the schemata in (2a) and (2b).

(2) a. NP1 Verb [ … NP2 …]
b. [ … NP2 …] Verb NP1

The only thing specified in (2) is the positions of the two NPs, NP1 and NP2. To maximize the generality of each schema, it must be understood, for a sentence that instantiates each schema, that (i) the Verb can be inflected, (ii) any materials can in principle appear in the "…" parts, (iii) verbal or sentential modifiers can appear, and (iv) it can be embedded in a larger sentence, etc. Sentences such as John hates his book (with John=NP1 and his=NP2) and every boy was looking for a book that he had bought in New York (with every boy=NP1 and he=NP2) are among the examples conforming to (2a).

Secondly, the informant judgments on a single schema alone do not constitute a "fact" in language faculty science. I maintain that we have a "fact" in language faculty science only if we have obtained informant judgments on a set of schemata in accordance with our predictions. In light of the preceding considerations, a "fact" in language faculty science must minimally involve three schemata. Sentences conforming to one of the three types of schemata are predicted to be unacceptable. Such a schema shall be called a *Schema (which can be read as "star schema") and sentences conforming to it *Examples (which can be read as "star examples"). For any *Example, there should be no N (a set of lexical items) that would result in an LF representation in which the condition for γ(a, b) would be satisfied. It should thus be predicted that any *Example should be judged completely unacceptable under γ(a, b).

Corresponding to the *Schema, there are two types of okSchemata. One type is identical in form to the *Schema, but without the specification of γ(a, b); the other type corresponds to an LF representation in which the condition for γ(a, b) is satisfied. Corresponding to okExamples conforming to the latter type of okSchema, there must be a set of lexical items N that would yield the intended LF-PF.

Provided in (3) is an instance of a set of three schemata.

(3) a. okSchema
NP1 Verb [ … NP2 …], with γ(NP1, NP2)
b. *Schema
[ … NP2 …] Verb NP1, with γ(NP1, NP2)
c. okSchema
[ … NP2 …] Verb NP1, without γ(NP1, NP2)

In order to obtain the predicted schematic asymmetry as indicated in (3), we must be able to deduce from our hypotheses that the structural condition for the intuition γ(NP1, NP2) is not satisfied in any of the LF representations corresponding to (3b) but it is satisfied in at least one LF representation corresponding to (3a). For this deduction, we must have a hypothesis about the condition on γ(NP1, NP2). In accordance with the "Maximize testability" heuristic in (1b), we should consider γ(NP1, NP2) that is based on the structural relation that is most readily discernable in any language, i.e., one that can be defined most directly in terms of the only structure-building operation assumed in the model of the Computational System adopted here. We also need hypotheses regarding the correspondences between (i) the schematic linear sequence of linguistic expressions in the language under discussion and (ii) the schematic LF (hence, hierarchical) representation(s), i.e., pf-LF correspondences, as pointed out earlier.

If the dependency interpretation holding between every player and his (i.e., γ(every player, his)) is an instance of γ(a, b) under discussion, the English examples in (4a, b, c) can instantiate the schemata in (3a, b, c), respectively.

(4) a. okExample
Every player praised his coach. (with γ(every player, his))
b. *Example
His coach praised every player. (with γ(every player, his))
c. okExample
His coach praised every player.

1.8.3. The fundamental asymmetry
The existence of an N corresponding to the presented sentence α that would result in the intended LF-PF does not necessarily mean that the informant will judge α to be acceptable. As noted above, the parsing difficulty might result in the informant's failure to come up with such an N; it is also possible that the informant reports an "intermediate acceptability" due to the (extreme) unnaturalness of the interpretation of α, quite independently from the availability of γ(a, b). Hence, the prediction in question, which we shall call an okSchema-based prediction, is that okExamples conforming to it are not necessarily completely unacceptable under γ(a, b), while a *Schema-based prediction is that any *Example should be judged completely unacceptable under γ(a, b). The recognition of this asymmetry between the two types of predictions is one of the keys to language faculty science as an exact science.

1.8.4. Intermediate judgments
We surely would like the informant judgments on the okExamples much 'better than' "just barely acceptable" or "slightly more acceptable than" the completely unacceptable *Examples. But the fundamental asymmetry that must be recognized is that *Examples are predicted to be completely unacceptable under γ(a, b) while okExamples are not. From this recognition follows how the "intermediate acceptability" is to be interpreted; "intermediate acceptability" reported by the informant must mean that there is an N that would result in the intended LF-PF. Its less-than-perfect status must be due to extra-grammatical factors for the following reason: If the condition for γ(a, b) were not satisfied in any LF representation corresponding to it, the presented sentence α should be judged to be completely unacceptable according to the *Schema-based prediction, provided that the informant clearly understands what is meant by γ(a, b) under discussion.

1.8.5. Reproducibility
Reproducibility in language faculty science should ultimately be across-language reproducibility because language faculty science is concerned with the properties that are invariant among the members of the human species. In this sense, it must be understood clearly that a given experiment in language faculty science, which necessarily deals with (a) specific language(s), should be dealing with a universal hypothesis. Hence the reproducible result in one language should in principle be replicated in any other language. Across-language reproducibility, however, can be meaningfully pursued only if we have attained within-language reproducibility, i.e., across-informant reproducibility within a language. Across-informant reproducibility in turn can be meaningfully pursued only if we have attained within-informant reproducibility, which consists of across-example reproducibility and across-occasion reproducibility. In the absence of within-informant reproducibility, with reproducibility as characterized above in terms of confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries, it would be unclear what significance we could assign to an experimental result, no matter what statistical method might be employed to analyze the data and how massive the relevant data might be.

1.9. Summary

How we can deduce a definite and categorical prediction about the informant judgment is crucially tied to the recognition of the fundamental asymmetry between the two types of predictions. For the reasons noted above, it is the informant judgments on (examples conforming to) a *Schema that we can expect to be categorical. The measurability and the reproducibility that we can aspire to obtain in language faculty science are thus about complete unacceptability and the lack thereof. It is such conceptual articulation as given above that leads to the conclusion that the study of the language faculty can become an exact science. When it comes to how we can actually obtain categorical judgments from informants, more issues need to be addressed, including the effectiveness of various experimental devices, such as the instructions given to the informants, as will be discussed in later chapters.

The present work puts forth the following theses: The informant judgments should count as a "fact" in language faculty science only if they constitute a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry. A confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry obtains if and only if a *Schema-based prediction has survived a rigorous attempt of disconfirmation and it is accompanied by corroboration of the corresponding okSchema-based predictions. A *Schema-based prediction is that informants judge any sentence conforming to a *Schema to be completely unacceptable under γ(a, b) (a specified interpretive relation holding between two expressions a and b). An okSchema-based prediction is that informants judge sentences conforming to an okSchema to be acceptable under γ(a, b), to varying degrees. There is a fundamental asymmetry between a *Schema-based prediction and an okSchema-based prediction. The former can be disconfirmed but cannot be confirmed while the latter can be confirmed but cannot be disconfirmed. Testability is brought about most crucially by a*Schema-based prediction. In accordance with the "Secure testability" and the "Maximize testability" heuristics in (1a, b), we should therefore pursue hypotheses that would give rise to *Schema-based predictions. Furthermore, when modifying hypotheses, we should try to retain the existing *Schema-based prediction(s) or, better yet, obtain new *Schema-based predictions, again in line with the heuristic in (1a. b). In the subsequent chapters, I will elaborate on each of these points, and will illustrate them by making reference to results of a number of on-line experiments.

Unless we start accumulating results in language faculty science based on research that rigorously pursues testability, the research program initiated by Chomsky in the mid-1950s will most likely remain to be regarded as a metaphysical speculation, at least by those outside the field. The present work is an attempt to articulate how it is possible to pursue language faculty science as an exact science. It provides a conceptual basis for how that is possible in principle and empirical illustration of how that has actually been done.