It continues as:
(The formatting and the footnotes are not provided below.)

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1.3. Evidence in language faculty science

There are various types of evidence that we can in principle bring to bear on the validity of our hypotheses. Some are "experimental" while others are not. Whatever type of evidence one wishes to consider, it has to be articulated how the predicted "value" can be deduced from a set of hypotheses, how a particular experimental result or an observation can be understood as a reflection of properties of the language faculty, and finally, how we can rigorously compare the prediction and the experimental result or the observation. Without minimally satisfactory answers to such questions, it remains unclear what significance can be assigned to the experimental result or the observation.

Given the assumption that the language faculty underlies our ability to relate a sequence of sounds/signs to a "meaning," it makes sense to ask informants, including ourselves, about possible correspondences between sounds/signs and "meanings." However, in light of the fact that the informant judgments, especially when "meanings" are involved, have been known to be extremely slippery, one should naturally wonder how we can justify the use of informants' introspective judgments as crucial evidence, let alone the use of the researcher's own judgments. The present work proposes a specific way to make informant judgments qualify as evidence in language faculty science, as something measurable and reproducible.

1.4. Three heuristics

The proposal is embedded in a larger methodological proposal about how we can deduce definite predictions and test them experimentally in accordance with the research heuristics in (1).

(1) a. Secure testability.
b. Maximize testability.
c. Maximize the significance of the experimental result.

I take it for granted that, regardless of the object of inquiry, one should like to adopt the research heuristics in (1) if it is at all possible to do so. The methodology proposed in the present work is a consequence of having the language faculty as the object of inquiry and adopting (1). The present work thus shares its goal with Chomsky's research program and proposes a means to achieve the goal by pursuing rigorous testability.

1.5. Deducing a categorical prediction
1.5.1. The model of the Computational System

In order to deduce a categorical prediction about informant judgments, it is necessary for (part of) the language faculty to have a categorical nature. Chomsky's (1993) model of the Computational System indeed has such a categorical nature; it is a structure-building system such that (i) its input is a set of items taken from the mental lexicon, (ii) its only structure-building operation takes two objects and forms one, and (iii) it yields two output representations, called an LF and a PF representation. The LF representation is a hierarchical organization of abstract objects and is the formal basis of the "meaning," and the PF representation underlies the "sound/sign." Given a set of items taken from the mental lexicon, the Computational System either generates or fails to generate an LF-PF pair of representations. It is in this sense that Chomsky's (1993) model of the Computational System is categorical and can serve as a basis for deducing a definite prediction.

1.5.2. The model of judgment-making

Assuming the Computational System, which has this categorical nature, however, is not sufficient for deducing a categorical prediction about the informant judgments. It must be articulated how the Computational System is involved in the act of judgment-making; otherwise, it remains unclear how the informant judgment could be revealing about the properties of the Computational System. Such a model of judgment-making has been put forth in Ueyama 2010. Ueyama (2010) proposes that the informant, upon hearing a presented sentence α, selects a set of lexical items N, in part on the basis of her/his past linguistic experience, and once the N is selected and enters the Computational System as its input, the system generates or does not generate an LF-PF pair, as noted above. We thus have a further basis for deducing a definite prediction about the informant judgment.
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