Chomsky 1995: 6-7 states as in (38).

(38)　　This way of formulating the issues, within the P&P model, brings out clearly a crucial inadequacy in the characterization of language as a state of the language faculty. The latter [I think this refers to 'a state of the language faculty', HH] can hardly be expected to be an instantiation of the initial state with parameter values fixed. Rather, a state of the language faculty is some accidental product of varied experience, of no particular interest in itself, no more so than other collections of phenomena in the natural world (which is why scientists do experiments instead of recording what happens in natural circumstances). My personal feeling is that much more substantial idealization is required if we hope to understand the properties of the language faculty, but misunderstandings and confusion engendered even by limited idealization are so pervasive that it may not be useful to pursue the matter today. Idealization, it should be noted, is a misleading term for the only reasonable way to approach a grasp of reality. (The emphasis is as in the original.)

What is meant by "this way of formulating the issues, within the P&P model" is the thesis expressed in (39).

(39) 　(Chomsky 1995: 6)
　a. 　Language differences and typology should be reducible to choice of values of parameters.
　　b. 　[The options in question] are restricted to formal features of functional categories...
　　c. 　In this context, language acquisition is interpreted as the process of fixing the parameters of the initial state in one of the permissible ways. A specific choice of parameter settings determines a language in the technical sense that concerns us here...

The view expressed above, in particular "much more substantial idealization is required if we hope to understand the properties of the language faculty," seems to be quite consistent with what we are pursuing. First all, "predict[ing] the possible (actual and potential) occurrence of all and only the grammatical sentences of a given language" is no longer "the minimum requirement' of a successful generative grammar, i.e., of a theory of the Computational System, or even of a 'theory' of a particular grammar if that is meant to be a combination of the Computational System and the mental Lexicon of the speaker of the language once we accept the conception of the goal of generative grammar and the methodological proposal about how we can assess our hypotheses about the Computational System. Once we have liberated ourselves from the 'minimum requirement', our research seems to be indeed making "much more substantial idealization" than, i.e., beyond, assuming "the idealized speaker-hearer," which we can understand is quite close, if not identical, to our "idealized informant-researcher." The notion of "the idealized speaker-hearer" is not addressed specifically with respect to experiments in Chomsky 1965, unlike "the idealized informant" in my book, and that is perhaps the only crucial difference between Chomsky's "idealized speaker-hearer" and my "idealized informant."
　　Our idealization can be seen, for example, in our answer to (40a) that it is a repeatable phenomenon, which can be understood, roughly, as a generalization whose defining characteristic is a contrast between total unacceptability and the lack thereof, rather than a mere 'statistically significant' contrast. (I will present the essential idea behind repeatable phenomena and illustrate the notion in chapter 2, and provide further articulation of the conceptual basis of repeatable phenomena and related issues in chapter 3.)

(40)　Two specific concerns stemming from (8):
a.What qualifies as data for research concerned with the properties of the Computational System?
b.How could we evaluate our hypotheses about the Computational System?

(8)　How should we proceed in order to ensure progress toward the goal of discovering the properties of the CS?


I might note, in relation to (41), that it indeed seems to be the case that interesting tests can be carried out only by involving a fairly involved experiment, as is illustrated in my book in some depth.

(41)　(Chomsky 1965: 21)
Perhaps the day will come when the kinds of data that we now can obtain in abundance will be insufficient to revolve deeper questions concerning the structure of language. However, many questions that can realistically and significantly be formulated today do not demand evidence of a kind that is unavailable or unattainable without significant improvements in objectivity of experimental technique.