"A Review of Japanese Syntax and Semantics by S.-Y. Kuroda," (1998) in Language 74, pp. 146-152. contains (i).

(i) Since our sense experiences, such as introspective judgments about a given sentence in a given language, most likely reflect more than the language faculty proper, such a task necessarily involves hypotheses about the nature of the relevant sense experiences, in particular, hypotheses as to which aspects of our sense experiences under discussion are reflections of our grammar, and in what theoretical terms they are to be expressed.

Once we start addressing the above issue, we must recognize (ii).

(ii) a. The grammar's yielding something as its output does not guarantee that the speaker finds it to be acceptable; after all, non-grammatical as well grammatical factors must contribute to the ultimate judgment of the speaker on the 'acceptability' of a 'sentence' under a specified interpretation.
b. The grammar's failure to yield something as its output, on the other hand, should necessarily mean that the 'sentence form' corresponding to such a 'failed representation' should be judged unacceptable under the specified interpretation.

(ii-b) is the basis for our emphasis on the significance of negative predictions in generative grammar. If something is predicted to be impossible due to the hypothesized formal properties under discussion, how can some pragmatic adjustment save it?

There has been much debate in regard to the validity of Popper's demarcation criterion; see Lakatos' critique, for example). But if the goal of generative grammar is to demonstrate the existence of the language faculty as an autonomous system and discover its properties, and if we adopt the working hypothesis that the language faculty, as it manifests itself in the mind of an individual speaker, consists of the grammar and a lexicon, and the grammar is a computational system, which, given an input (i.e., a set of items from the lexicon), mechanically yields two representations as its output, one having to do with 'sound' and the other with 'meaning', (ii) seem to me to be unavoidable, regardless of the ultimate verdict on Popper's demarcation criterion. Only by taking the points in (ii), especially (ii-b), to heart and by putting forth a hypothesis so as to yield a negative prediction, do we have a hope of making generative grammar an empirical science or making it a progressive research program in the sense of Lakatos 1970. If we did not take (ii) seriously, we would not be able to realize the difficulty we are faced with in identifying what should qualify as data in generative grammar. As suggested above, such identification goes hand in hand with theory construction; and that makes it even more important to recognize the significance of (ii).

And most of the work in generative grammar, at least in so-called generative grammatical studies of Japanese, seems to me to have abandoned the hope just noted. Otherwise, how would it be possible to maintain hypotheses whose negative predictions are so clearly disconfirmed, and demonstrated as such in published works, and to keep on using them in a crucial way?

If you are interested, please check section 3 of "Assessing Competing Analyses: Two Hypotheses about 'Scrambling' in Japanese" (2006) in Ayumi Ueyama, ed., Theoretical and Empirical Studies of Reference and Anaphora?Toward the establishment of generative grammar as an empirical science, pp. 139-185.

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