A passage from Chomsky, Noam. 1979 Language and Responsibility: Based on conversations with Mitsou Ronat, Panthen Books, New York, 73 is given below.

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I should also mention work on history and philosophy of science, which has begun to furnish a richer and more exact understanding of the manner in which ideas develop and take root in the natural sciences. This work -- for example, that of Thomas Kuhn or Imre Lakatos -- has gone well beyond the often artificial models of verification and falsification, which were prevalent for a long time and which exercised a dubious influence on the "soft sciences," as the latter did not rest on the foundations of a healthy intellectual tradition that could guide their development. It is useful, in my opinion, for people working in these fields to become familiar with ways in which the natural sciences have been able to progress; in particular, to recognize how, at critical moments of their development, they have been guided by radical idealization, a concern for depth of insight and explanatory power rather than by a concern to accommodate "all the facts" -- a notion that approaches meaninglessness -- even at times disregarding apparent counterexamples in the hope (which at times has proven justified only after many years or even centuries) that subsequent insights would explain them. These are useful lessons that have been obscured in much of the discussion about epistemology and the philosophy of science.
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It is easy to foresee objections to the main methodological claim in the Lingua paper, on the basis of the above passage. One might, for example, maintain that the serious (or possibly fatal) shortcoming of the Lingua paper is that it adopts an artificial model of falsification.
I will try to respond to such a (hypothetical) objection at some later point.