What is given below is not about generative grammar; see the original passage at this page. It is the 5th Q and A there. (I have changed the [ ] parts.)

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Q. In the current mainstream practice of [generative grammar], is falsifiability ignored entirely?

A. No. It would in a sense be easier if it were ignored altogether. Mainstream [generative grammar] pays lip service to it; that is, it always says, "Oh, yes, of course, [grammatical] theory should be confronted by evidence. And, of course, if the evidence is contrary, if it seems to refute the theory, oh, yes, we certainly pay attention to that, and we must adjust the theory or even consider possibly a new theory." So, they do not in any way disagree with the implications of falsifiability. They preach it but they do not practice it. In other words, when confronted with contrary evidence of some beloved theory, they adjust the theory, or they minimize the evidence. Sometimes they even ignore the evidence. They do not look very hard at contrary evidence, preferring to confirm rather than to look for refuting evidence.

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The above remarks seem to apply to much of the practice in generative grammar. The last sentence, i.e., "They do not look very hard at contrary evidence, preferring to confirm rather than to look for refuting evidence," reminds us of Popper's remark cited in footnote 82 of my "Falsifiability" paper (2003) in Lingua (see the end of section 4 the paper).