Here is the table of contents as of 10/18/2015.

Internalist Perspective and Experiments in Language Faculty Science

1. Introductory remarks
1.1. Introduction
1.2. The Internalist perspective
1.3. Deductive structure
1.4. A single-researcher-informant experiment and the deductive structure
1.5. The aim and the summary of the book
1.6. Outline of the book
2. Language faculty science: a Review of Hoji 2015
2.1. Introduction
2.2. Evidence in language faculty science
2.2.1. Definite judgments and definite predictions
2.2.2. Definite testability
2.2.3. The fundamental schematic asymmetry
2.3. Hypotheses
2.3.1. Structural hypotheses
2.3.2. Lexical hypotheses
2.4. The difference between the structural hypotheses and the lexical hypotheses
2.5. Prediction-deduction
2.5.1. Illustration
2.5.2. Main- and Sub-Hypotheses
2.6. Experimental designs
2.6.1. Different ways of specifying the intended interpretations and a Sub-Experiment
2.6.2. The singular-denoting nature of α of BVA(α, β) and a Sub-Experiment
2.7. Experimental results
2.8. Summary
3. Internalist Perspective
4. Prediction-deduction
4.1. Deduction of a *Schema-based prediction
4.2. Hypotheses
4.2.1. Introduction
4.2.2. The three sources of BVA
4.2.3. The four sources of Coreference
4.2.4. Conditions on FD
4.2.5. A consequence: the formal basis of Spec-binding
4.2.6. Summary
5. A single-researcher-informant experiment
5.1. Experimental design
5.1.1. Introduction
5.1.2. SGs and LGs in Hoji 2015
5.1.3. Additional SGs and LGs
5.2. Experimental results
5.3. On Main- and Sub-Experiments in single-researcher-informant experiment
6. On the role of Sub-Experiments in a single-researcher-informant experiment
7. On the sources of judgmental fluctuation
7.1. Introduction
7.2. Large/small NPs and the semantic content of the head N
7.2.1. Introduction
7.2.2. How they affect the possibility of FD
7.2.3. How they affect Quirky-binding
7.2.4. How they affect the robustness of anti-locality condition on FD
7.2.5. Summary
7.3. Restrictions on what underlies the precedence-based anaphoric relation
7.3.1. Condition D' of Hoji et al. (Mod)
7.3.2. Pragmatic factors
8. Toward multiple-non-researcher-informant experiments
9. Results of a multiple-non-researcher-informant experiment
9.1. A Sub-Experiment on So vs. A: EPSA [10]-18
9.1.1. Design
9.1.2. Examples
9.1.3. Results
9.2. EPSA [1]-100-107 as Main-Experiments
9.2.1. Hypotheses
9.2.2. Predicted schematic asymmetry
9.2.3. Design
9.2.4. Examples
9.2.5. Different LGs in the other Experiments
9.2.6. Results
9.3. EPSA [1]-99 as a "training session" for EPSA [1]-100-107
9.3.1. Design
9.3.2. Examples
9.4. Results
9.4.1. Introduction
9.4.2. Results
10. General remarks about language faculty science
10.1.TBA
10.2. Its relation to Chomsky's generative enterprise
11. Concluding remarks
12. References

8. References
Chomsky, Noam. 1981. Lectures on government and binding, Foris, Dordrecht.Feynman, Richard. 1963. Six Easy Pieces, Basic Books, New York.
Chomsky, Noam. 1986. Knowledge of language, Praeger, New York.
Chomsky, Noam. 1993. A Minimalist Program for linguistic theory. In: Hale, Kenneth, and Samuel Jay Keyser (eds.), The view from Building 20: Essays in linguistics in honor of Sylvain Bromberger, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Feynman, Richard. 1965/1994. The character of physical law, The Modern Library, New York. (The page references are to the 1994 edition.)
Feynman, Richard. 1985. "Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman!", W. W. Norton & Company, NY.
Feynman, Richard. 1988. "What Do You Care What Other People Think?", W. W. Norton & Company, NY.
Feynman, Richard. 1999. The Pleasure of Finding Things Out, Basic Books, New York.
Fiengo, Robert. and Makiko Haruna. 1987. "Parameters in Binding Theory-Some Suggestions Based on an Analysis of Japanese," in T. Imai and M. Saito, eds., Issues in Japanese Linguistics, Foris Publications, Dordrecht.
Fukaya, Teruhiko and Hajime Hoji. 1999. Stripping and Sluicing in Japanese and Some Implications. In WCCFL 18, 145-158. Somerville: Cascadilla Press.
Fukaya, Teruhiko.. Sluicing and Stripping in Japanese and Some Implications, Doctoral Dissertation, USC.
Hankamer, Jorge and Ivan Sag. 1976. Deep and Surface Anaphora. Linguistic Inquiry 7: 391-428. (Available at: http://www.gges.xyz/hoji/research/hp-Fukaya.cgi)
Hayashishita, J.-R. 1997. "On the Scope Ambiguity in the Scrambling Construction in Japanese," ., University of Southern California.
Hayashishita, J.-R. 2004. Syntactic and non-syntactic scope, Doctoral dissertation, University of Southern California, Los Angeles. (available at: http://www.enteroflora.com/linguistics/dissertation.html)
Hayashishita, J.-R. 2008. "On Adnominal 'Focus-Sensitive' Particles," in Hudson, M. E, P. Sells, and S.-A. Jun, eds., Japanese/Korean Linguistics 13, pp.243-254, CSLI Publications.
Hayashishita, J.-R. 2013. "On the Nature of Inverse Scope Readings," Gengo Kenkyu, No.143 (March 2013).
Hayashishita, J.-R. and Ayumi Ueyama. 2012. "Quantity expressions in Japanese," In E. Keenan and D. Paperno, eds., Handbook of Quantifiers in Natural Language, Springer, pp.535-612.
Heim, Irene. 1992. "Anaphora and Semantic Interpretation: A Reinterpretation of Reinhart's Approach," Ms., MIT.
Hoji, Hajime. 1985. Logical Form Constraints and Configurational Structures in Japanese, Doctoral dissertation, University of Washington, Seattle, WA.
Hoji, Hajime. 1990. Theories of Anaphora and Aspects of Japanese Syntax, Ms., University of Southern California, Los Angeles.
Hoji, Hajime. 1991. "KARE," in C. Georgopoulos & R. Ishihara, eds., Interdisciplinary Approaches to Language: Essays in Honor of S.-Y. Kuroda, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, pp.287-304.
Hoji, Hajime. 1995. "Demonstrative binding and Principle B," In J.N. Beckman, ed., Proceedings of 25h North Eastern Linguistic Society, G.L.S.A., Linguistics Department, UMass, Amherst, MA, pp. 255-271. (Reprinted in Hoji 2013, as Paper 1)
Hoji, Hajime. 1997a. "Sloppy Identity and Principle B," In H. Bennis, P. Pica and J. Rooryck, eds., ATOMISM & BINDING, Foris Publications, Dordrecht, pp. 205-235. (Reprinted in Hoji 2013, as Paper 4)
Hoji, Hajime. 1997b. "Sloppy Identity and Formal Dependency," Proceedings of the 15th West Coast Conference on Formal Linguistics, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford, CA, pp. 209-223. (Reprinted in Hoji 2013, as Paper 3)
Hoji, Hajime. 1998a. "Null Object and Sloppy Identity in Japanese," Linguistic Inquiry 29:127-152. (Reprinted in Hoji 2013, as Paper 2)
Hoji, Hajime. 1998b. "Formal Dependency, Organization of Grammar and Japanese Demonstratives," In N. Akatsuka, H. Hoji, S. Iwasaki, S.-O. Sohn, and S. Strauss, eds., Japanese/Korean Linguistics 7, Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford, CA, pp. 649-677. (Reprinted in Hoji 2013, as Paper 5)
Hoji, Hajime. 2003a. "Falsifiability and repeatability in generative grammar: A case study of anaphora and scope dependency in Japanese," Lingua 113: 377-446. (Reprinted in Hoji 2013, as Paper 7)
Hoji, Hajime. 2003b. "Surface and Deep Anaphora, Sloppy Identity, and Experiments in Syntax," In Anaphora: A Reference Guide, ed. A. Barss, Blackwell, pp.172-236. (Reprinted in Hoji 2013 as Paper 6)
Hoji, Hajime. 2006a. Assessing competing analyses: Two hypotheses about “scrambling” in Japanese. In Ueyama, Ayumi, ed., Theoretical and empirical studies of reference and anaphora―Toward the establishment of generative grammar as an empirical science. A report of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B), Project No. 15320052, 139-185. Kyushu University (available at: http://www.gges.xyz/hoji/research/hp-papers.cgi).
Hoji, Hajime. 2006b. Otagai. In: Ueyama, Ayumi (ed.), Theoretical and empirical studies of reference and anaphora―Toward the establishment of generative grammar as an empirical science. A report of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B), Project No. 15320052, 126-138. Kyushu University (Available at: http://www.gges.xyz/hoji/research/hp-papers.cgi).
Hoji, Hajime. 2009. A foundation of generative grammar as an empirical science, Unpublished manuscript, University of Southern California.
Hoji, Hajime. 2010. "Hypothesis testing in generative grammar: Evaluations of predicted schematic asymmetries," Journal of Japanese Linguistics V. 16: Special issue: In Memory of S.-Y. Kuroda, pp. 25-52.
Hoji, Hajime. 2013. (edited by Yukinori Takubo and Ayumi Ueyama) Gengo kagaku-o mezasite (Toward Lingustics Science): Issues on anaphora in Japanese, Ohsumi Shoten, Shiga, Japan.
Hoji, Hajime. 2015. Language Faculty Science, Cambridge University Press.
Hoji, Hajime. (in preparation) Experiments and Internalist Perspective in Language Faculty Science.
Hoji, Hajime, Satoshi Kinsui, Yukinori Takubo, and Ayumi Ueyama. 1999. "Demonstratives, Bound Variables, and Reconstruction Effects," Proceedings of the Nanzan GLOW, The Second GLOW Meeting in Asia, September 19-22, 1999, pp.141-158.
Hoji, Hajime, Satoshi Kinsui, Yukinori Takubo, & Ayumi Ueyama. 2003 "Demonstratives in Modern Japanese," in A. Li & A. Simpson, eds., Functional Structure(s), Form and Interpretation, pp.97-128. Routledge, London.
Huang, C.-T. James. 1988 "Comments on Hasegawa's Paper," in W. Tawa, and M. Nakayama, eds., Proceedings of Japanese Syntax Workshop: Issues on Empty Categories, Japanese Program Connecticut College, New London, Connecticut.
Huang, C.-T. James. 1991. Remarks on the status of the null object. In Principles and Parameters in Comparative Grammar, ed. Robert Freidin, 56-76. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Kataoka, Kiyoko. 2006. Nihongo hiteibun-no koozoo―kakimazebun to hitei kooo hyoogen (The Syntactic Structure of Japanese Negative Sentences: Scrambling Construction and Negation-sensitive Elements). Kurosio Publisher, Tokyo, Japan.
Kayne, Richard. 1981. "Unambiguous Path," in May, Robert and Jan Koster, eds., Levels of Syntactic Representation, Foris Publications, Dordrecht.
Kayne, Richard. 1984. Connectedness and Binary Branching, Foris Publications, Dordrecht.
Kitagawa, Chisato. 1981. "Anaphora in Japanese: Kare and Zibun," in Coyote Papers 2, U. of Arizona, Tucson.
Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The University of Chicago Press.
Kuroda, S.-Y. 1965. Generative Grammatical Studies in the Japanese Language, Doctoral dissertation, MIT, Cambridge.
Lakatos, Imre. 1970. "Falsification and methodology of scientific research programmes," In: Lakatos, Imre and Musgrave, Alan (eds.), Criticism and the growth of knowledge, 91-195. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted as Lakatos (1978: chapter 1).
Lakatos, Imre. 1978. The methodology of scientific research programmes. Philosophical papers volume 1 (Worrall, John and Currie, Gregory (eds.)) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lasnik, Howard. 1989. Essays on Anaphora, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 149-167.
Lasnik, Howard. 1981. "On Two Recent Treatments of Disjoint Reference," Journal of Linguistic Research 1, 4, 48-58. (Reprinted in Lasnik 1989)
Mikami, Akira. 1972. (Reprinted from the 1953 edition) Gendai Gohoo Jyosetsu: Shintakusu no Kokoromi, Kuroshio Shuppan, Tokyo.
Otani, Kazuyo and John Whitman. 1991. "V-raising and VP-ellipsis," Linguistic Inquiry, 22:345-358.
Popper, Karl. 1963. "Science: Problems, aims, responsibilities," Federation Proceedings (Baltimore), Federations of American Societies of Experimental Biology 22.4: 961-972.
Reinhart, Tanya. 1983. Anaphora and semantic interpretation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Reinhart, Tanya. 1987. "Specifier and Operator Binding," in E. Reuland and, A. ter Meulen, eds., The Representation of (In)definiteness, pp.130-167, The MIT Press, Cambridge.
Saito, Mamoru and Hajime Hoji. 1983. "Weak Crossover and Move in Japanese," Natural Language & Linguistic Theory 1.
Ueyama, Ayumi. 1998. Two types of dependency. Doctoral dissertation. University of Southern California (distributed by GSIL publications, University of Southern California). (Available at http://www.gges.xyz/hoji/research/hp-Ayumi.cgi under "Dissertation: Two Types of Dependency 1998 USC.")
Ueyama, Ayumi. 2003. "Two Types of Scrambling Constructions," In Anaphora: A Reference Guide, ed. A. Barss, Blackwell, 23-71.
Ueyama, Ayumi. 2010. "Model of judgment making and hypotheses in generative grammar," In: Iwasaki, Shoichi; Hoji, Hajime; Clancy, Patricia; and Sohn, Sung-Ock (eds.), Japanese/Korean Linguistics 17, CSLI, Stanford, CA: 27-47. (Available at: http://www.gges.xyz/hoji/research/hp-Ayumi.cgi).

6. Evaluating the papers collected in this volume in light of Hoji 2015
6.1. Introduction
　　It would be important and useful to evaluate the papers collected in this volume in light of the methodological proposal advanced in Hoji 2015. For each paper, we can ask whether and how it makes a definite and categorical prediction. In the terms of Hoji 2015, we can ask whether it offers a predicted schematic asymmetry, and if it does, what universal and language-particular hypotheses give rise to it. We can also ask whether the prediction is experimentally supported, i.e., whether we obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in the terms of Hoji 2015. To put it in somewhat concrete terms, whenever we see an example sentence that is claimed or assumed to be unacceptable (with the specified interpretation), we can ask the questions in (12)-(14).

(12)The fundamental schematic asymmetry:
a.What is the *Schema that the example sentence in question instantiates?
b.What is the corresponding okSchema?

(13)The prediction-deduction:
What universal and language-particular hypotheses make the *Schema and okSchema in (12) a *Schema and an okSchema, respectively?

(14)Experimental results:
a.Does the *Schema-based prediction survive a rigorous attempt at disconfirmation? That is to say, is any sentence that we can construct instantiating the *Schema completely unacceptable (under the specified interpretation), no matter how hard we try to make it acceptable?
d.Is the okSchema-based prediction confirmed? That is to say, can we construct a sentence instantiating the okSchema that is more or less acceptable (under the specified interpretation)?

　　Trying to answer such questions would be a useful exercise for the purpose of evaluating a given paper with regard to its potential contribution to, and/or its relevance to, language faculty science. Even apart from the issues regarding language faculty science, addressing such questions will help us understand what testable predictions are made with what hypotheses, how explicitly each of those hypotheses is formulated, as well as what is assumed to be a valid generalization and whether it indeed qualifies as a confirmed (predicted) schematic asymmetry.

6.2. General remarks
　　I will now make brief, and not particularly systematic, remarks on the papers collected in this volume from the perspective of Hoji 2015. The discussion is not intended to be self-contained because it not possible to fully illustrate here the methodology for language faculty science proposed in Hoji 2015. I would like to refer the reader to Hoji 2015. The accompanying website (http://www.gges.xyz/hojiCUP/) provides information about Hoji 2015, including the designs and the results of every Experiment discussed in Hoji 2015.
　　In the terms of Hoji 2015, Hoji 1985 tried to identify as good probes as possible in discovering the universal properties of the language faculty through the investigation of Japanese, and used the probes thus identified to argue for the thesis that the Japanese phrase structure is strictly binary branching. Clearly, I was not thinking in those terms when I wrote Hoji 1985. But this now seems to me to be a reasonable interpretation of what I was trying to do in Hoji 1985.
　　It may be interesting to note that there seems to be a general tendency in the generative tradition that when one works on a language other than English, one addresses generalizations in her/his language in relation to what seem to be analogous generalizations in English. Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with comparing two or more languages. But if the comparison or analogy is based on shaky empirical grounds, it is unclear what genuine insight we can expect to obtain about what formally underlies the intuitions of the speakers of the different languages, i.e., about the aspect of the language faculty responsible for the speaker intuitions under discussion. One might suggest that loosely "established" "generalizations" in a number of languages can lead us to an insight into general properties of language. It is unclear, however, how one can pursue rigorous testability in such research if, as discussed in Hoji 2015, rigorous testability is closely related to the deduction of definite predictions and experimental testing of the predictions.
　　If one "analyzes" a certain linguistic "phenomenon" in Japanese, for example, as being analogous to a phenomenon in English which has been characterized in terms of highly theoretical notions, one's long-term contribution depends in part upon (i) how robust the alleged generalization is and (ii) how aspects of the theoretical account of the generalization are motivated independently of the "phenomenon" at issue. The parasitic-gap analysis in Hoji 1985: Ch. 2 of what would later be called the A-Scrambling construction in Japanese is a good example of making an analogy of some loosely understood "phenomenon" in a non-English language to a phenomenon in English that is analyzed in highly theoretical terms. If the descriptive generalization in English itself is not as robust as one wishes it to be, and if aspects of the theoretical characterization of the phenomenon in question are not independently motivated on empirical grounds, the "theoretical characterization" of the loosely understood phenomenon in Japanese is bound not to survive the test of time.
　　Suppose that one's theoretical characterization of a phenomenon in Japanese were based on a solid empirical and experimental basis, in the form of confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries in the terms of Hoji 2015. That would mean that we have a prediction in the form of a predicted schematic asymmetry that is deduced from universal and language-particular hypotheses and that we have obtained experimental results precisely in accordance with our prediction. That would in turn mean that we now have an empirical basis that is almost entirely independent of a particular conception of grammar; see Hoji 2015: Chapter 3: note 33 and the discussion in the text thereabout). If the theoretical characterization of the phenomenon in English changes (over time), we would therefore be in a good position to check the empirical consequences of the theoretical change; hence we might be able to tell whether or not the change in question is sound and progressive in the terms of Lakatos 1970.
　　Rigorous testability can be pursued regarding our hypotheses only if our hypotheses are about something that has definite and categorical properties. Likewise, in order to pursue rigorous reproducibility (among informants as well as within an informant), we must deal with something that has definite and categorical properties. This is certainly true if we want to deduce definite predictions about the individual informant from our hypotheses about the language faculty.
　　In the terms of Hoji 2015, Papers 1-7 tried to identify as good probes as possible in discovering the universal properties of the language faculty through investigation of Japanese, and used the probes thus identified to argue for various hypotheses about Japanese phrase structure. If we take FD as our object of inquiry, we can try to determine what might be a good probe for investigating the properties of FD for a given informant, and for a given experimental set-up. This is the shift from (i) analyzing linguistic phenomena in terms of theoretical concepts to (ii) studying the nature of a theoretical (i.e., hypothesized) object by means of linguistic phenomena. Hoji 2015 articulates a conceptual and methodological basis for how we can do the latter and expect our predictions to be supported empirically. It also provides experimental demonstration for the viability of the proposed methodology.

6.3. Paper 1
　　From the perspective of Hoji 2015, the testability of one's research on the Binding Theory can be attained only if we can specify how co-indexation is related to the interpretation detectable by the informant. Furthermore, rigorous testability can be pursued only if we can identify, independently of binding-theoretic considerations, what expressions in the language in question have the [+anaphor] feature or the [+pronominal] feature. It is also imperative that we try to motivate the structural properties of a particular language under discussion that the binding conditions make crucial reference to, again independently of binding-theoretic considerations.

6.4. Paper 2
　　In accordance with the methodology proposed in Hoji 2015 for language faculty science, an okSchema alone, or the confirmation of an okSchema-based prediction alone, does not constitute a fact in language faculty science. An okSchema would be part of a fact in language faculty science only if it is combined with the corresponding *Schema, and only if we obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry―i.e., only if the *Schema-based prediction has survived a rigorous attempt at disconfirmation and the corresponding okSchema-based prediction has been confirmed. See Section 5 for a brief discussion of the proposal in Hoji 2015, which include various notions introduced here.
　　If we do not have a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry involving the NOC, we do not (yet) have a fact to explain, according to Hoji 2015. The inclusion of Sections 3 and 4 in Paper 2 is due to the lack of a clear understanding of the significance of the *Schema-based prediction and, I might say, also due to the fact that I was still a linguist then, not a language faculty scientist. When a linguist demonstrates that an alleged generalization is not valid by showing that there are acceptable *Examples instantiating the *Schema that is part of the alleged generalization, s/he often encounters a reaction like the following: "Okay. You have shown that the generalization under discussion is not valid. But there remains a contrast, at least to some degree, between the *Examples and the corresponding okExamples that originally motivated the generalization. You have shown that the generalization has exceptions and you have concluded that the hypotheses that accounted for the generalization should not be accepted as they stand. But, what is your alternative account of the tendency that the generalization in question points to?" The linguist tends to feel compelled to respond. The inclusion of Sections 3 and 4 in Paper 2 seems to me to be largely due to the tendency of a linguist responding in a context like that.
　　Papers 1-6 occasionally contain discussion of English paradigms. They are often used as a basis of the Japanese paradigms. One might suggest that the inclusion of the discussion of English paradigms in Papers 1-6 were prompted by the absence of the rigorous testability-seeking research orientation and the lack of the strong internalist commitment; see the remarks above regarding the "comparative research" as practiced in Hoji 1985 (in reference to its "parasitic gap" analysis). That seems to me to be a basically accurate characterization of the research orientation pursued in Papers 1-6. But the remark at the end of Paper 2: Section 1, "…in what follows I will refer mostly to O&W [which deals with Japanese] rather than to Huang 1988, 1991, only because I cannot evaluate the relevant data in Chinese in the way I have been able to evaluate the relevant data in Japanese," indicates that I already had the internalist inclination although I was not as committed to it as I am now and I did not know at that point how to try to pursue rigorous testability in research that deals with language or the language faculty.

6.5. Papers 3 and 4
　　Paper 3 and Paper 4 deal with the sloppy-identity reading and argue for the various points including those mentioned in (2). The two papers address the sloppy-identity reading and the Mix-reading pattern in "ellipsis constructions" in relation to the points listed in (2).
　　From the perspective of Hoji 2015, I should note that there is inherent difficulty in designing an experiment dealing with the sloppy-identity reading. Even if we deal with the simple cases of the sloppy-identity reading―e.g., cases that do not involve the Mix-reading pattern―it will be significantly more difficult to design an experiment on the sloppy-identity reading than on the BVA case. The reason has to do with how our experiment, which necessarily consists of a Main-Experiment and its Sub-Experiments, is to be designed. Our Experiments test a predicted schematic asymmetry. A predicted schematic asymmetry is given rise to by a set of hypotheses. A crucial part of the predicted schematic asymmetry is how the phonetic sequence (ps) in question is "represented" in the mind of the informant―more precisely, in what we call the LF representation corresponding to the ps. The crucial part of the consequences of the hypotheses is thus what condition(s) is/are or is/are not satisfied in the LF representation in question.
　　The Experiment involving the sloppy-identity reading necessarily involves at least two sentences, and the notion of parallelism is crucially involved. We, therefore, have to have hypotheses, not only about the LF representations corresponding to each of those sentences but also about how the two LF representations are related by the informant, especially in relation to the parallelism in question. This makes it qualitatively more difficult to design an effective experiment when dealing with the sloppy identity reading than when we are dealing with a single sentence.
　　Furthermore, when dealing with a single sentence, we can conduct a single-researcher-informant experiment and check various sentences with non-sense words and get very clear judgments despite (and sometimes because of) that. That, however, seems very difficult (if not impossible) to do if we dealt with the sloppy-identity reading because, as noted above, the sloppy-identity reading is crucially related to the notion of parallelism holding between two sentences and it is difficult to determine the parallelism in question without having some pragmatic context specified. The Mix-reading pattern poses an additional problem because of the complication of the relevant judgments and also because of the lack of hypotheses that can serve as a basis for designing an effective experiment which consists of a Main-Hypothesis and Sub-Hypotheses.
　　In order to be able to use the sloppy-identity reading as a good probe into the properties of the CS, we must therefore have a minimal articulation of how we can design an experiment dealing with the sloppy-identity reading that consists of a Main-Experiment and its Sub-Experiments, and how the result of the Main-Experiment is to be interpreted on the basis of the results of its Sub-Experiments. It is hoped that the articulation provided in Hoji 2015 will serve as a good basis for our future research in this domain and help us obtain confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries dealing with the sloppy-identity reading.

6.6. Paper 5
　　The main concern of Paper 5 is the three conditions on FD, two structural and one lexical. In the terms of Hoji 2015, the probe used in Paper 5 for testing the hypotheses in question was BVA. As discussed in Hoji 2015 and also in Paper 7, the choice of LG (i.e.  and  in BVA(, )) affects the effectiveness of the probe for a given informant. What is predicted is not about the individual informant's judgments on specific Examples of instantiating a particular Schema, but it is about the correlations of the individual informant's judgments "across" the three conditions and "across" different LGs (and in some cases "across" different SGs). The significance of the correlation of judgments is addressed in Paper 7. But in the paper, it is not articulated how we can obtain correlations of judgments in the terms of confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries.
　　Hoji 2015 offers experimental demonstration of the correlation of judgments across the lexical condition and the LF c-command condition on FD. Hoji in preparation tries to address the correlation of judgments across more dimensions, including the anti-locality condition on FD, as well as different LGs and different SGs, providing further support for the claim made in Paper 5.

6.7. Paper 6
　　By focusing on the sloppy-identity reading in surface anaphora, rather than in deep anaphora, Paper 6 tries to deal with something that has definite and categorical properties, i.e., the Computational System of the language faculty. FD is hypothesized as a formal object underlying the sloppy-identity reading observed only in surface anaphora. A number of operational tests were applied to various "ellipsis constructions."
　　It seems safe to say that the main concerns of Paper 6 were with the logical issue of testability. The relevant hypotheses were tested in a single-researcher-informant experiment (with myself being the informant) and in multiple-researcher-informant experiments of a rather limited scale, in the terms of Hoji 2015. Once one tries to design an experiment to test the empirical predictions made in Paper 6 with regard to the Mix-reading pattern, one understands that it would be quite challenging to design a Main-Experiment and its Sub-Experiments dealing with it and attain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in the Main-Experiment in a multiple-informant experiment. The difficulty in question is directly related to the difficulty regarding what universal and language-particular hypotheses lead to definite and testable predictions about the individual informant's judgments about the Mix-reading pattern. When I started conducting on-line experiments in 2004, as an attempt to see how we can replicate robust judgments among informants, I decided not to deal with the sloppy-identity reading because of the additional complications that such an attempt would invoke.

6.8. Paper 7
　　Paper 7 adopts Ueyama's (1998, 2003) analysis of the so-called Scrambling, i.e., OSV, in Japanese. The paper, however, discusses only a portion of the empirical consequences discussed in Ueyama' 1998, 2003. For example, it does not address 'multiple-scrambling' and 'long-distance scrambling' in any depth; but see Paper 7: footnotes 30 and 84 for brief remarks. As noted in the preceding pages, I had come to realize by the time of preparing Paper 7 that we must focus on the *Schema-based prediction to pursue rigorous testability and reproducibility. Ueyama's analysis, like other analyses in the field, however, does not give rise to a *Schema-based prediction if we limit our discussion, as we do in Paper 7, to the simplex OSV, i.e., the OSV without involving an embedded clause or without involving the multiple "Scrambling." To make a *Schema-based prediction with regard to the simplex OSV, I addressed "resumption" in Paper 7.
　　As noted in Section 4, the period between Paper 7 and Hoji 2015 was a slow process of my realizing (3), repeated here.

(3)a.If we want to pursue rigorous testability, we should be engaged in a study of the language faculty rather than language or languages.
b.In language faculty science, so-called linguistic phenomena are not the object of our investigation; rather, they are probes in our investigation of the properties of the language faculty.
c.Being concerned with the language faculty as our object of inquiry, we must be an internalist.
d.Being an internalist, we should be concerned with making and testing predictions about individuals.

After Paper 7, I started my attempt to obtain reproducible experimental results in accordance with the various empirical generalizations presented in Paper 7, initially in a multiple-researcher-informant experiment of a rather limited scale and then in a multiple-non-researcher-informant experiment. Although I was at one point working with the average among a group of informants, as in Hoji 2006a, 2006b, and 2010, the subsequent recognition of (3c, d) led me to focus on the reported judgments by individual informants, eventually leading me to the methodological proposal in Hoji 2015.
　　As suggested, Paper 7 paved the way to Hoji 2015 in terms of my conceptual understanding of what to pursue in language faculty science as an exact science and also in terms of what would serve as an empirical and experimental illustration of the methodology for language faculty science. There is a qualitative difference between Paper 7 and Hoji 2015 in terms of my understanding and articulation of various conceptual issues. The substantial difference between Paper 7 and Hoji 2015 in terms of the level of my understanding and articulation of various issues, however, makes it difficult to present an assessment of the methodological contribution of Paper 7 from the perspective of Hoji 2015. I would like to try to do so on a separate occasion.

6.9. Summary
　　During 1985-2015, the concern and the focus of my research have slowly shifted, eventually leading to Hoji 2015. During the research that led to the papers collected in this volume, I came to be increasingly concerned with methodological issues, as indicated by the titles of Papers 6 and 7. The shift can perhaps be characterized as being from compatibility-seeking to testability-seeking research.
　　One might point out that compatibility-seeking and testability-seeking are not mutually exclusive. One can test the degree of compatibility. The difference between the two I intend here has to do with whether one deduces definite predictions and aspires to obtain definite experimental results in accordance with the definite predictions. What is referred to here as compatibility-seeking research does not aspire to do so. It typically proceeds based on rather loose compatibility among various observations, a collection of which is regarded as constituting a generalization, and on a rather loose sense of compatibility between such "generalizations" and the theory under discussion (which in turn is often rather loosely formulated). It typically addresses "predictions" that have not been deduced from hypotheses in a rigorous fashion, and the formulation of their hypotheses is typically independent of whether the hypotheses lead to definite and testable predictions.
　　The difference between testability-seeking research and compatibility-seeking research can also be understood in relation to what is typically considered as supporting evidence (for hypotheses) in each type of research. The testability-seeking research tries very hard to look for ways in which its hypotheses can be shown to be invalid. What constitutes evidence in support of its hypotheses under the testability-seeking research is the definite prediction made under the hypotheses having survived a rigorous attempt at disconfirmation. In order for a given hypothesis to have the chance to receive empirical support, it must be possible for the hypothesis, in conjunction with other hypotheses, to gives rise to a definite prediction. When a hypothesis is put forth, one of the first questions to be considered is, therefore, how it can be put to rigorous empirical test, i.e., how its validity can be tested experimentally. Under this approach, the formulation of hypotheses and even the choice of the specific research topic are severely limited by the desire to seek testability and the desire to deduce definite predictions from hypotheses.
　　The compatibility-seeking research, on the other hand, does not make (rigorous) attempt at disconfirmation of the predictions made under its hypotheses. Instead, it typically seeks confirming evidence for its hypotheses. What constitutes confirming evidence depends in part upon how rigorously one carries out one's research. But it may be the confirmation of an okSchema-based prediction in the terms of Hoji 2015 or the identification of some pairs of Examples that seem to exhibit a contrast in the direction of what is suggested, though not necessarily deduced, by the hypotheses in question, and often despite the fact that the contrast does not constitute a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in the terms of Hoji 2015. There are a number of issues that deserve serious discussion in relation to this, but I cannot pursue the discussion further in this essay.

5. Hoji 2015
5.1. Introduction
　　As noted above, the concerns addressed in the papers collected in this volume and subsequent research have led to the methodological proposal in Hoji 2015, which explore how we can aspire to accumulate knowledge about the language faculty in line with Feynman's statement "The test of all knowledge is experiment," as noted above. The two pillars of the proposed methodology for language faculty science are the internalist approach advocated by Chomsky and what Feynman calls the "Guess-Compute-Compare" method. Taking the internalist approach, the book is concerned with the I-language of an individual speaker. Adopting the Guess-Compute-Compare method, it aims at deducing definite predictions and comparing them with experimental results.
　　It is hypothesized, in Chomsky 1986 among many other places, that the language faculty in its initial state is uniform across the members of the species and that, in its steady state, where its non-trivial "growth" has stopped, it varies in accordance with one’s linguistic experience, within the limit imposed by the genetic endowment. Given this, it follows that our hypotheses about the language faculty are of two types: one is about its initial state and the other is about its steady state. The initial state of the language faculty is uniform across the members of the species; hence, we refer to hypotheses about it as universal hypotheses. The steady state of the language faculty varies based on one's linguistic experience, as just noted, but it is hypothesized that most of the properties of its initial state remain unchanged in the steady state. Hypotheses about the steady state of the language faculty of an individual speaker must therefore consist of universal hypotheses and hypotheses about the particular consequences of the linguistic maturation that the individual has undergone. If we grossly simplify and assume, as is done in Hoji 2015 without addressing the issue, that a group of speakers of a particular language have undergone the same linguistic maturation, we can call the latter type of hypotheses language-particular hypotheses.
　　The object of inquiry in language faculty science is the language faculty. The language faculty, however, is not directly observable. Not only that, the language faculty as an independent module of the mind is itself a hypothesized concept/object. Language faculty science thus aspires to find out about a hypothesized object by putting forth hypotheses about this hypothesized object. As remarked in Hoji 2015: p. 5, this makes language faculty science "an extreme case of a theory-laden research program even at its very early stage of development."
　　The major challenge we face is, therefore, how to attain rigorous testability when dealing with something that is not directly observable. Among the crucial issues is what can be regarded as being revealing about the properties of the language faculty. It should be something that we can deduce as a definite prediction and identify in our experiments as being definite because otherwise we would not be able to compare it with our definite predictions.
　　Since, by hypothesis, the language faculty relates linguistic sounds and meaning, the most elementary form of an experiment in language faculty science seems to be such that the informant is asked whether a given sentence is acceptable under a specified interpretation. As remarked on Hoji 2015: 5, however, "One may wonder how we can make definite and categorical predictions about the judgment of an individual speaker of a particular language as a reflection of universal properties of the language faculty and how we can attain experimental results in accordance with such predictions." In Hoji 2015, I "provide answers to these and related questions and illustrate them by making reference to actual experiments." Hoji 2015 is thus an attempt to show how we can make language faculty science a rigorous empirical research program despite its inherently theory-laden nature. According to the proposed methodology, we check hard predictions with hard facts and state the hard facts in a theory-neutral way, although they are identified as such by being predicted by hypotheses. "Hard" in "hard predictions" and "hard fact" here is borrowed from Feynman (1999: 198–199):


　　In the strong nuclear interaction, we have this theory of colored quarks and gluons, very precise and completely stated, but with very few hard predictions. It’s technically very difficult to get a sharp test of the theory, and that's a challenge. I feel passionately that that’s a loose thread; while there's no evidence in conflict with the theory, we're not likely to make much progress until we can check hard predictions with hard numbers.


In other words, Hoji 2015 is "an attempt to show how we can deduce hard predictions and how we can identify hard facts in language faculty science." In summary, Hoji 2015 offers a conceptual articulation of how we deduce definite predictions about the judgments of an individual speaker on the basis of universal and language-particular hypotheses and how we obtain experimental results precisely in accordance with such predictions.

5.2. The key to deducing definite and categorical predictions
　　With regard to what should count as evidence for or against our hypotheses about properties of the language faculty, Hoji 2015 proposes that we should focus on what is predicted to be impossible and check whether we obtain informant judgments in line with such a prediction in a reproducible manner. It is argued in Hoji 2015: Chapters 2 and 3 that the key to deducing definite and categorical predictions about the informant judgment is the recognition of the fundamental asymmetry in [P-a] and [P-b].

[P]The fundamental schematic asymmetry
a.The *Schema-based prediction:
Every example sentence instantiating a *Schema is unacceptable with the specified interpretation pertaining to two expressions.
b.The okSchema-based prediction:
Some example sentences instantiating an okSchema are acceptable at least to some extent with the specified interpretation pertaining to two expressions.

[P-a] is a universal statement but [P-b] is an existential one. [P-a] can be disconfirmed but it cannot be confirmed while [P-b] cannot be disconfirmed but it can be confirmed.
　　Without recognizing this asymmetry, it would not be possible to deduce definite and categorical predictions about the informant judgment and expect them to be supported experimentally. According to Hoji 2015, definite and categorical predictions in language faculty science are about the complete unacceptability of example sentences that instantiate a *Schema, in contrast to those instantiating its corresponding okSchema.
　　The combination of a *Schema-based prediction [P-a] and its corresponding okSchema-based prediction [P-b] is called a predicted schematic asymmetry. When the *Schema-based prediction has survived a rigorous attempt at disconfirmation and the corresponding okSchema-based prediction has been confirmed, the reported judgments by the informants on the relevant *Examples and okExamples are said to constitute a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry. It is suggested in Hoij 2015 that the confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry is the smallest unit of fact in language faculty science.

5.3. The key to obtaining definite and categorical experimental results as predicted
　　As discussed in Hoji 2015: Chapter 4, the key to obtaining definite and categorical experimental results in accordance with our predictions (in the form of predicted schematic asymmetries) is a clear understanding of the structure of our prediction-deduction, i.e., what universal and language-particular hypotheses give rise to the predictions in question.
　　The relevant considerations have led to the recognition in Hoji 2015 that an experiment in language faculty science must consist of a Main-Experiment and its Sub-Experiment(s). We must also clearly understand what the informant's reported judgments mean for the validity of each of the hypotheses that have given rise to the prediction in question. A Main-Experiment tests for each informant the validity of the Main-Hypotheses of a predicted schematic asymmetry. Sub-Experiments test for each informant (i) the validity of Sub-Hypotheses of a predicted schematic asymmetry and/or (ii) the reliability of the design of the Main-Experiment such as how we convey the intended dependency interpretation to our informants.
　　In order to effectively assess the validity of the Main-Hypotheses tested in the Main-Experiment, it is necessary to interpret its results by focusing on the informants whose judgments in the Main-Experiment are significant with regard to the validity of its Main-Hypotheses, i.e., those (i) for whom the Sub-Hypotheses of the predicted schematic asymmetry seem valid and (ii) who clearly understand the instructions, including the intended dependency interpretation.Our predictions are not about any informant. It is about those informants who are deemed reliable for the purpose of testing the Main-Hypothesis/ses in the Main-Experiment. Crucial reference to the results of Sub-Experiments is for the purpose of making the result of the Main-Experiment as significant as possible with respect to the validity of the Main-Hypotheses tested in the Main-Experiment, and that is analogous to enhancing the reliability and the precision of the experimental device in a physical science. What has led us to recognize Main-Hypotheses and Sub-Hypotheses as well as Main-Experiments and Sub-Experiments is the desire to be able to focus on the validity of (a) particular hypothesis/ses among those that give rise to the predicted schematic asymmetry. It stems from our desire to assign maximal significance to our experimental result with respect to such (a) hypothesis/ses. We want our experimental result to be as significant as possible. This is regardless of whether it turns out to be in line with our definite and categorical prediction.
　　The key to obtaining definite and categorical experimental results is thus ensuring the reliability of the experimental device as much as possible. It is imperative that we pay close attention to the effectiveness and the precision of the experimental device in language faculty science, just as it is imperative to do so in a physical science. Unlike a physical science, however, we do not, at least at the moment, have a physical experimental device. We cannot, therefore, check the reliability of the design, construction and operation of a physical experimental device. What then is an experimental device in language faculty science? It seems reasonable to consider our informants and our instructions to be part of our experimental device in language faculty science. Once we recognize this, it follows that we must pay close attention to the reliability and the effectiveness of our informants and our instructions.
　　What Hoji 2015 suggests is as follows: We can consider the result of our Main-Experiment revealing about the validity of its Main-Hypotheses only if we focus on the informants for whom the instructions are effective and for whom the Sub-Hypotheses seem valid, judging from the results of the Sub-Experiments. Interpreting the result of the Main-Experiment without reference to those of its Sub-Experiments would be like conducting experiments without taking necessary care and without necessary checks; see the Feynman quote given in (11).
　　As noted above, unless we use certain types of expressions for A and B in BVA(A, B), we cannot expect to obtain robust informant judgments as indicated in (1). This is as expected if there are more than one source of BVA(A, B), and the choice of A and B affects the possibility of the BVA(A, B) of different sources, as discussed in Paper 1 and more in depth in Ueyama 1998. Likewise, as discussed in Papers 2-6, there are more than one sources of the sloppy-identity reading, and the relevant lexical choice affects how the sloppy-identity reading can arise.
　　As also noted above, it seems reasonable to understand Hoji 1985 as an attempt to identify the informant intuitions that are necessarily based on the satisfaction of the c-command condition. One might suggest that Papers 1-6 were concerned with the nature of BVA and the sloppy-identity reading that are based on LF c-command, and especially with the identification of the expressions whose use necessarily results in the BVA or the sloppy-identity reading that is based on LF c-command.
　　We can regard Papers 1-7 as research that is concerned with analyzing linguistic phenomena in terms of theoretical concepts such as LF c-command, anti-locality, and the lexical property in question. We can take the conditions noted above to be on BVA and the sloppy-identity reading, or more strictly, on the type of BVA and on the type of sloppy-identity reading whose availability is contingent upon the satisfaction of those conditions.
　　As indicated in Papers 1-7, however, I was actually pursuing the possibility that those conditions are on a theoretical/hypothesized/formal object (FD), rather than on BVA or the sloppy-identity reading. I was not fully aware that I was doing so while preparing Papers 1-7. But while preparing Hoji 2015 I have come to a clear understanding that I am investigating the properties of FD (and eventually, what underlies FD and other theoretical/hypothesized/formal objects like FD). Close examination of BVA and the sloppy-identity reading is for the purpose of finding out about FD. As it has in fact turned out, the particular choice of A and B for BVA(A, B) does not necessarily result in robust judgments for every speaker although it does for most speakers, and there are judgmental fluctuations among speakers and even within a single speaker. If linguistic phenomena are our object of inquiry, so to speak, it seems impossible to deduce definite predictions about the individual informant's judgments about the phenomena in question and expect them to be supported experimentally.

5.4. Pursuing rigorous testability and identifying facts in language faculty science
　　Through my research subsequent to Hoji 1985, I have come to think that much of the research in the field of generative grammar does not pursue rigorous testability. This seems to me to have resulted over the years in the general lack of a clear sense of progress in the field. I had thought for some time that such a state of affairs was due to the lack of intellectual rigor on the part of the practitioners, including myself. Upon reading Feynman's "Cargo Cult Science" several years ago (included in Feynman 1985), however, I came to think that one of the reasons for what one might call the absence of intellectual rigor and integrity in question is that we do not have a means to determine what the facts are. If we do not know what the facts are, it may not be entirely clear how to be honest and how not to fool ourselves; see the Feynman quotes given in (4) and (5).
　　I provide some quotations of Feynman's remarks here in hopes that they might give the reader a general idea about the intended points. For a fuller discussion, the readers are referred to Hoji 2015.

(4)　　"Now it behooves me, of course, to tell you what they're missing. But it would be just about as difficult to explain to the South Sea islanders how they have to arrange things so that they get some wealth in their system. It is not something simple like telling them how to improve the shapes of the earphones. But there is one feature I notice that is generally missing in cargo cult science. That is the idea that we all hope you have learned in studying science in school―we never say explicitly what this is, but just hope that you catch on by all the examples of scientific investigation. It is interesting, therefore, to bring it out now and speak of it explicitly. It's a kind of scientific integrity, a principle of scientific thought that corresponds to a kind of utter honesty―a kind of leaning over backwards. For example, if you're doing an experiment, you should report everything that you think might make it invalid―not only what you think is right about it: other causes that could possibly explain your results; and things you thought of that you've eliminated by some other experiment, and how they worked―to make sure the other fellow can tell they have been eliminated.

　　Details that could throw doubt on your interpretation must be given, if you know them. You must do the best you can―if you know anything at all wrong, or possibly wrong―to explain it. If you make a theory, for example, and advertise it, or put it out, then you must also put down all the facts that disagree with it, as well as those that agree with it. There is also a more subtle problem. When you have put a lot of ideas together to make an elaborate theory, you want to make sure, when explaining what it fits, that those things it fits are not just the things that gave you the idea for the theory; but that the finished theory makes something else come out right, in addition." (From "Cargo Cult Science," included in Feynman 1985 Surely You're Joking Mr. Feynman ) (p. 340-341).


(5)　　"The only way to have real success in science, the field I'm familiar with, is to describe the evidence very carefully without regard to the way you feel it should be. If you have a theory, you must try to explain what's good and what's bad about it equally. In science, you learn a kind of scientific integrity and honesty.
In other fields, such as business, it's different. For example, almost every advertisement you see is obviously designed, in some way or another, to fool the customer: the print that they don't want you to read is small; the statement are written in an obscure way. It is obvious to anybody that the product is not being presented in a scientific and balanced way. Therefore, in the selling business, there's a lack of integrity." (Feynman 1988: 217-218)


(6)　　"In the strong nuclear interaction, we have this theory of colored quarks and gluons, very precise and completely stated, but with very few hard predictions. It’s technically very difficult to get a sharp test of the theory, and that’s a challenge. I feel passionately that that’s a loose thread; while there’s no evidence in conflict with the theory, we’re not likely to make much progress until we can check hard predictions with hard numbers." (Feynman 1999: 199)


(7)　　"Another thing I must point out is that you cannot prove a vague theory wrong. If the guess that you make is poorly expressed and rather vague, and the method that you use for figuring out the consequences is a little vague―you are not sure, and you say, “I think everything’s right because it’s all due to so and so, and such and such do this and that more or less, and I can sort of explain how this works …”, then you see that this theory is good, because it cannot be proved wrong! Also if the process of computing the consequences is indefinite, then with a little skill any experimental results can be made to look like the expected consequences." (Feynman 1965/94: 152–153)


(8)　　"The principle of science, the definition, almost, is the following: The test of all knowledge is experiment. Experiment is the sole judge of scientific ‘truth’." (The Feynman Lectures on Physics: 1-1, reproduced in Feynman 1963: 2).


(9)　　"In general, we look for a new law by the following process. First we guess it. Then we compute the consequences of the guess to see what would be implied if this law that we guessed is right. Then we compare the result of the computation to nature, with experiment or experience, compare it directly with observation, to see if it works. If it disagrees with experiment, it is wrong. In that simple statement is the key to science. It does not make any difference how beautiful your guess is. It does not make any difference how smart you are, who made the guess, or what his name is―if it disagrees with the experiment, it is wrong. That’s all there is to it." (Feynman 1965/94: 150)


(10)　　"It is true that one has to check a little to make sure that it is wrong, because whoever did the experiment may have reported incorrectly, or there may have been some feature in the experiment that was not noticed, some dirt or something; or the man who computed the consequences, even though it may have been the one who made the guesses, could have made some mistake in the analysis. These are obvious remarks, so when I say if it disagrees with experiment it is wrong, I mean after the experiment has been checked, the calculations have been checked, and the thing has been rubbed back and forth a few times to make sure that the consequences are logical consequences from the guess, and that in fact it disagrees with a very carefully checked experiment." (Feynman 1965/94: 150–151)


(11)　　"Because of the success of science, there is, I think, a kind of pseudoscience. Social science is an example of a science which is not a science; they don’t do [things] scientifically, they follow the forms―or you gather data, you do so-and-so and so forth but they don’t get any laws, they haven’t found out anything. They haven’t got anywhere yet―maybe someday they will, but it is not very well developed … I may be quite wrong, maybe they do know all these things, but I don’t think I’m wrong. You see, I have the advantage of having found out how hard it is to get to really know something, how careful you have to be about checking the experiments, how easy it is to make mistakes and fool yourself. I know what it means to know something, and therefore I see how they get their information and I can’t believe that they know it, they haven’t done the work necessary, haven’t done the checks necessary, haven’t done the care necessary. I have a great suspicion that they don’t know, that this stuff is [wrong] and they’re intimidating people. I think so. I don’t know the world very well but that’s what I think." (Feynman 1999: 22)


　　The language faculty is our object of inquiry. But it is what we hypothesize to be underlying our ability to relate linguistic sounds and meaning. The fact that the language faculty, our object of inquiry, is a hypothesized object makes language faculty science an extreme case of a theory-laden research program, even at the earliest stages of its development, as pointed out in Hoji 2015: Chapter 1. One of the concrete proposals in Hoji 2015 is about how to identify facts in a research program that aims at discovering properties of the language faculty by following Feynman's "Guess-Compute-Compare" method. In other words, Hoji 2015 proposes how we can pursue rigorous testability and reproducibility in language faculty science, despite its highly theory-laden nature.

4. Paper 7: A transition to language faculty science
　　The period between Paper 7 and Hoji 2015 is a slow process of my realizing:

(3)a.If we want to pursue rigorous testability, we should be engaged in a study of the language faculty rather than language or languages.
b.In language faculty science, so-called linguistic phenomena are not the object of our investigation; rather, they are probes in our investigation of the properties of the language faculty.
c.Being concerned with the language faculty as our object of inquiry, we must be an internalist.
d.Being an internalist, we should be concerned with making and testing predictions about individuals.

　　Paper 7 summarizes the empirical findings in Papers 1-6, focusing on BVA (and to a somewhat lesser degree on DR), but not addressing the sloppy-identity reading. The paper focuses on various correlations of informant judgments regarding the availability of BVA(A, B) and DR(A, B), drawing in part from works by A. Ueyama and J.-R. Hayashishita; see footnote 2. The paper also addresses local disjointness effects. It points out that local disjointness effects with BVA are not as robust as what is suggested in Paper 2, even with the kind of BVA that seems to have to be based on FD, and suggests a means to attain a more robust experimental result.

[(※ In this Preface, Chapters 1, 2, 3, etc. of this volume will be referred to as Papers 1, 2, 3, etc., respectively.)
Paper 1: Hoji, Hajime (1995) "Demonstrative Binding and Principle B," NELS 25, pp.255-271.
Paper 2: Hoji, Hajime (1998) "Null Object and Sloppy Identity in Japanese," Linguistic Inquiry 29-1, pp.127-152.
Paper 3: Hoji, Hajime (1997) "Sloppy Identity and Formal Dependency," WCCFL 15, pp.209-223.
Paper 4: Hoji, Hajime (1997) "Sloppy Identity and Principle B," in H. Bennis, P. Pica, & J. Rooryck, eds., Atomism and Binding, Foris Publications, pp.205-235.
Paper 5: Hoji, Hajime (1998) "Formal Dependency, Organization of Grammar, and Japanese Demonstratives," Japanese/Korean Linguistics, vol.7, pp.649-677, CSLI Publications.
Paper 6: Hoji, Hajime (2003) "Surface and Deep Anaphora, Sloppy Identity, and Experiments in Syntax," in A. Barss, ed., Anaphora: A Reference Guide. Blackwell, Cambridge, pp.172-236.
Paper 7: Hoji, Hajime (2003) "Falsifiability and Repeatability in Generative Grammar: A Case Study of Anaphora and Scope Dependency in Japanese," Lingua, vol.113, No.4-6, pp.377-446.]

3. Papers 1-6
　　Papers 1-6 were written in the context briefly described above. The work in Japanese generative syntax around 1985 was concerned with how one might be able to express some "phenomena" in Japanese in the terms of the theory or theories being pursued at the time and what one might be able to say about the theory or theories on the basis of one's "findings" in Japanese. In the 1980s and the early 1990s, when a large portion of the generative research was concerned with "binding," researchers in Japanese generative syntax tried to see if there might be some "phenomena" in Japanese that could be expressed in the terms of the theory or theories being pursued at the time regarding "binding" and could suggest something interesting about the theory or theories.
　　The Binding Theory (as discussed in Chomsky 1981, among other places) was formulated so as to regulate the hypothesized co-indexation relation between two nominal expressions, on the basis of their hypothesized structural relation, by making crucial reference to the hypothesized features of [+/- anaphor] and [+/- pronominal]. One of the three binding conditions/principles applies to anaphors ([+anaphor, -pronominal]) and another to pronouns ([-anaphor, +pronominal]). When efforts were expended to explore how the Binding Theory might apply to Japanese and what theoretical contributions we might be able to make based on Japanese, the correctness was assumed of the conception of the Binding Theory in terms of [+/- anaphor] and [+/- pronominal] features and in terms of co-indexation. It was assumed, more in particular, that Japanese has an anaphor and a pronoun so that the Binding Theory is indeed applicable to the language under its standard conception.
　　By the time I started preparing Hoji 1990, I had been convinced that there are no expressions in Japanese whose distribution is subject to the binding condition regulating the expressions with the [+anaphor] feature, even if we allowed the subcategories of anaphors, distinguishing so-called local anaphors and non-local anaphors, and assumed that the binding condition in question applies only to the former. As to pronouns, I addressed in Hoji 1990: Ch. 6 the issue of how the child can learn that a given expression has the [+ pronominal] feature (and for that matter, the [+ anaphor] feature, as well). In part based on the considerations discussed there and in part based on the absence of clear effects in Japanese of the binding condition regulating the expressions with the [+ pronominal] feature, I came to pursue the hypothesis that Japanese does not have expressions that have the [+ pronominal] feature.
　　In Paper 1, I observed that BVA can arise at least in two distinct ways, and introduced the notions of Arg-binding and Dem-binding, arguing that the former is subject to the local disjointness condition of Binding Principle B, but the latter is not. I extended the idea to English, looking into cases where we seem to detect local disjointness effects even when the intended bindee is not a pronominal. On the basis of such observations, it is proposed in Paper 1 that so-called Binding Principle B regulates any category (as the dependent term) that does not have the formal [+anaphor] feature rather than regulating categories that have the formal [+pronominal] feature.
　　Turning to the sloppy-identity reading, I came to realize, while preparing Hoji 1990, that it was not an easy matter to demonstrate that the availability of the sloppy-identity reading in Japanese is subject to the c-command condition. More specifically, I came to realize that many "constructions" in Japanese allow a sloppy-identity reading, irrespective of the satisfaction of the c-command condition. In such "constructions," the sloppy-identity reading obtains even when what corresponds to the "sloppy pronoun" is an inherently "referential" one, such as a proper noun or an a-NP. Such sloppy-identity readings are thus most likely not based on an LF c-command-based dependency relation. This line of reasoning is supported by the independent observation that such "ellipsis constructions" also do not exhibit island effects, in sharp contrast to the other type of "ellipsis constructions" where the sloppy-identity reading seemed subject to (i) the c-command condition and (ii) the lexical condition that the "sloppy pronoun" must be a so-NP.
　　In the meantime, Otani and Whitman 1991 (O&W) appeared, in which the sloppy-identity reading in Japanese is discussed. I had been convinced by then, on the basis of the research reported in Hoji 1990, that what was considered in O&W as the sloppy-identity reading in Japanese is NOT regulated by syntactic conditions such as the c-command condition and that its (un)availability is subject to various pragmatic factors, and hence, cannot be regarded as constituting evidence for or against hypotheses about the grammar, if we adopt a categorical conception of grammar; see Hoji 2015: Chapter 3 for relevant discussion. The main goal of Paper 2 was to point that out.
　　As noted in Paper 2: Section 1, "[t]he main purpose of [Paper 2] is to demonstrate that the NOC [=Null Object Construction] in Japanese cannot be analyzed on a par with VPE [=VP Ellipsis] in English." At the end of its Section 2, Paper 2 states, "Having thus shown that both of the empirical bases for the VPE analysis of the NOC are invalid, I take it to be established that the NOC in Japanese cannot be analyzed as an instance of VPE in disguise, contrary to O&W." Since that was the main purpose of the paper, I could have stopped there. At the time of writing Paper 2, however, I did not have a clear understanding of the significance of the *Schema-based prediction in the terms of Hoji 2015 (see the Glossary provided at http://www.gges.xyz/hojiCUP/and Section 6.2 below), and I thought it was necessary to say something minimally coherent about the source of what Paper 2 calls "the sloppy-like reading" and the property of the "null object" that underlies the "sloppy-like reading."
　　Among the outstanding issues remaining in Papers 1 and 2 are: (i) whether we can show a clear correlation in Japanese between the effects of the c-command condition and those of the local disjointness condition, (ii) whether it is possible to make definite and testable predictions with regard to the availability of the sloppy-identity reading and have them supported by experimental results in a reproducible manner, and (iii) what formal mechanism underlies the local disjointness effects.
　　Papers 3-5 were written just about the same time. They address the issues just noted. Because of the page limit imposed on each of these papers, what could have been placed in one single and long paper were divided into the three papers, which resulted in some degree of redundancy among the papers, with regard to the discussion of the background issues and the general claims therein. An attempt is made in Paper 6 to synthesize the empirical results in Papers 3-5 as well as Paper 2.
　　One thing that I found unsatisfactory with the work reported in Paper 2 is that, while the paper successfully demonstrates something is possible, contrary to what is claimed in O&W, the paper does not demonstrate that something is clearly impossible due to the formal aspects of the grammar. In Papers 3-5 and Paper 6, I tried to make what would be called *Schema-based predictions in the terms of Hoji 2015. The desire to obtain robust informant judgments (about what is predicted to be impossible) led me to consider increasingly more involved sentence patterns and interpretive possibilities.
　　Papers 3 and 4, for examples, discuss the Mix-reading patterns in "comparative ellipsis" in Japanese. I got clear (enough) judgments on the relevant sentences myself, and so did my colleagues. But, I was concerned with how to substantiate our judgments, so to speak, by making further predictions and by obtaining informant judgments precisely in accordance with those new predictions; see the second paragraph in (4) below. What was crucially investigated was how the availability of the sloppy-identity reading is restricted by the LF c-command relation, the locality, and the lexical choices, all in accordance with the thesis pursued in Papers 3-6 that the sloppy-identity reading of a certain type is necessarily based on Formal Dependency (FD). It is in this context that Papers 3, 4 and 6 consider the Mix-reading paradigm. The ultimate test in this regard involves the local disjointness effects in the Mix-reading paradigm.
　　Paper 3 is a continuation of Paper 2 and, to a somewhat lesser degree, of Paper 1 as well. Its main points are:

(2)a.Principle B is a condition on Formal Dependency, rather than on co-indexation.
b.There are at least two types of sloppy identity readings and only one of them is based on Formal Dependency.
c.The so-called "interface between the Computational System and language use" contains the Formal Dependency System, as schematized in (i).
(i)

[The chart not provided here.]


d.Local disjointness effects that have been regarded as being due to Binding Condition B must be understood as arising from different sources, reflecting different components in the above diagram.
e.Kare can be marked [+Dep] in the terms of Hoji 2015.

　　(2a) is already suggested in Paper 1, but without empirical evidence. Paper 3's empirical evidence in support of (2a) draws from Heim 1992; see Paper 3: (8), (10), and footnote 4. The first half of (2b) is already demonstrated in Paper 2, where it is shown that the so-called Null Object Construction in Japanese (NOC) is not akin to English VP Ellipsis (VPE), with regard to the availability of the sloppy-identity reading. In Paper 2, the NOC was contrasted with "comparative ellipsis" in Japanese, which seems to share properties with English VPE. Paper 3 discusses the soo su ('do so') construction in Japanese and shows that it behaves like the NOC (and "comparative deletion," which is called the Non-CM-comparative in Paper 6, as opposed to "comparative ellipsis," which is called the CM-comparative in Paper 6). Paper 3 also elaborates on the main point in (2d), which is made in Paper 1, without specific reference to (2c-i).
　　Multiple sources of the sloppy-identity reading and those of local-disjointness effects, as discussed in Paper 3, should be understood along with multiple sources of BVA and those of DR. I wanted to obtain most robust generalizations with regard to these "phenomena" in Japanese. I had come to believe that we would have the best chance to do so if we focused on the informant intuitions that are crucially based on the (LF) c-command relation. What led to this belief includes my own experience over the years as a researcher-informant and the conceptual/theoretical reason addressed in Reinhart 1983. I thus tried to identify informant intuitions that are crucially based on the formal relation that is based on (LF) c-command.
　　The observation that led to (2e) was significant because it had been observed since the early 1980s (see Paper 1: Section 1 for some early references) that kare cannot be used as a bound variable. The validity of the empirical basis for (2e) as discussed in Paper 3, which involves the Mix-reading paradigm, however, has yet to be experimentally demonstrated, especially in a multiple-non-researcher-informant experiment in the terms of Hoji 2015. It is, however, interesting to note that Hoji et al. 1999 points out that it is possible for some speakers to have kare as B of BVA(A, B) even in the "reconstruction context," hence where it must be based on LF c-command. The relevant observation thus suggests that kare can be α of FD(α, β) at least for some speakers.
　　Paper 4 focuses on what formal relation Binding Principle B regulates. The evidence adduced there in support of (2a) involves the local-disjointness effects in the Mix-reading paradigm, as compared to the absence of the local-disjointness effects in the same "local context" in other "ellipsis constructions." As in the case of Papers 2 and 3, Paper 4 makes crucial use of "comparative ellipsis" in Japanese.
　　Paper 4 also suggests an account of why it recommended it in English clearly does not allow coreference while its Japanese counterpart readily allows it. This is closely related to (2d). I had been concerned with this issue for some time, starting with Hoji 1990. Some related discussion is also in Paper 1. As the exposition in Paper 1 may suggest, I came to be concerned with (2d) initially based on my observation that Japanese lacks local disjointness effects for coreference as observed in English (as in it recommended it, for example). It remains to be a challenge how to account for the clear effects of local disjointness for coreference in English and their absence in Japanese in such a way that the account makes predictions beyond local disjointness; see the second paragraph of (4) below. But the results of multiple-non-researcher-informant experiments in English and in Japanese seem to provide striking confirmation for the difference between the two languages in this regard. Hoji 2015 does not discuss the issue although the relevant experimental results are included at the website accompanying Hoji 2015, in the form of "raw data" for English and in the form of result charts for Japanese.
　　Paper 5 addresses the lexical condition on FD, along with the two structural conditions on it, the c-command condition and the anti-locality condition. The three conditions are empirically illustrated together and fairly systematically for the first time in Paper 5. Paper 5 considers only BVA, not the sloppy-identity reading, and also elaborates on (2c) and (2d).
　　Paper 6 was an attempt to grapple with the issues that had remained in Papers 2-5. I had realized, on the basis of the research that had resulted in Paper 1 and Papers 2-5, that the testability and reproducibility we had been able to attain was not nearly as robust as we wished. I thus tried to seek in Paper 6 a higher degree of testability (and reproducibility) with regard to the availability of the sloppy-identity reading. Around that time, I came to be concerned with the issue of testability more acutely than before, and the main methodological concern of Paper 6 was how we can pursue rigorous testability, not compatibility, in dealing with the sloppy-identity reading; see Appendix.
　　The general goal of Paper 6 is to illustrate how we can try to tease apart the contributions of the language faculty and those of the factors outside it. Following Hankamer & Sag 1976, Paper 6 recognizes two types of "ellipsis constructions" in Japanese and English, surface anaphora and deep anaphora, and classifies various "constructions" into one of these two types, on the basis of the operational tests that are designed in accordance with the hypothesized structural and lexical properties of the hypothesized formal object, FD; see below.

2. Hoji 1985
　　The papers in this volume were published during 1995-2003. Papers 1-6 draw heavily from Hoji 1990, which is in turn a continuation of Hoji 1985. In retrospect, Hoji 1985 tried to identify the informant intuitions that are necessarily based on the satisfaction of a c-command condition. I was concerned mainly with the (un)availability of bound variable construal and scope dependency in Japanese that seem to be sensitive to (i.e., seem to require the satisfaction of) a c-command condition. By making reference to the (un)availability of the dependency interpretations in question, I argued for a particular view of the phrase structure of Japanese that it is strictly binary-branching.
　　My main concern in Hoji 1985 was to express/describe some "phenomena" in Japanese in the terms of the theory I adopted at the time and to consider what I might possibly be able to say about the theory on the basis of my "findings" in Japanese. The empirical generalizations put forth (or adopted) in Hoji 1985 are, however, often far from being robust.
　　It seems to me to be reasonable to say that my research subsequent to Hoji 1985 started out as an attempt to overcome the shortcoming of Hoji 1985 that the empirical generalizations put forth (or adopted) there are often far from being robust, despite the fact that they have been accepted in much of the subsequent generative research as one of the basic sets of generalizations in Japanese, along with the proposed/assumed structural analyses for the sentence patterns in question.
　　Focusing on BVA, it has become clear to me over the years that we could replicate the robust informant judgments as schematized in (1) (and other related paradigms) only if we used certain types of expressions for A and B in BVA(A, B).

(1)a.A-ga ... [ ... B ... ]-o ... V-T
with BVA(A, B)
b.*[ ... B ... ]-ga ... A-o ... V-T
with BVA(A, B)
c.[ ... B ... ]-o ... A-ga ... V-T
with BVA(A, B)
d.A-o ... [ ... B ... ]-ga ... V-T
with BVA(A, B)
e.[ ... B ... ]-ga ... A-o ... V-T
B is referential.

The empirical thesis I pursued over the years can be summarized roughly as follows: the use of the "right types of expressions" for A and B of BVA(A, B) makes it possible to obtain robust informant judgments in line with the patterns indicated in (1) and that we obtain not-very-robust informant judgments when "wrong types of expressions" are used as A and/or B of BVA(A, B). Ueyama 1998 proposes what this means, on the basis of her theory of anaphoric relations and her proposal about how the OSV order in Japanese is derived.
　　In Hoji 1985, I tried to establish paradigms instantiating the generalization in (1), and a similar generalization for DR, with a number of different expressions for A of BVA(A, B) and also for A of DR(A, B). All the papers contained in this volume are concerned with the issue of how we can establish the robust empirical generalizations under discussion, directly (when they deal with BVA(A, B)) or indirectly (when they deal with the sloppy-identity reading).
　　The evidence presented in Hoji 1985 for the binary-branching thesis for Japanese was based on the distribution of BVA, DR, and coreference. The distribution in question was identified in the terms of, i.e., by adopting, theories that make reference solely to c-command. At that time, there had been theories of anaphoric and/or scope dependency based on precedence (combined with some structural relation, such as c-command). If the relevance of precedence had been accepted (along with the relevance of c-command) in the description of the distribution of BVA, DR, and coreference, it would not have been possible to construct arguments for the binary-branching thesis for Japanese in Hoji 1985 on the basis of the distribution of BVA, DR, and coreference. It is in this sense that the arguments in Hoji 1985 for the binary-branching thesis for Japanese were circular, as pointed out by Fritz Newmeyer (p.c. 1985).
　　Reinhart 1983: Chapter 7 suggests that what formally underlies the BVA(A, B) also underlies the sloppy-identity reading and that the availability of BVA(A, B) and that of the sloppy-identity reading are both constrained by the local disjointness condition, widely known (then) as Principle B of the Binding Theory, as well as by the c-command condition. The discussion of the paradigms of the sloppy-identity reading in English in Reinhart 1983: Chapter 7, among other works, prompted me to see whether we could clearly observe the effects of the structural conditions, i.e., the c-command condition and the local disjointness condition, on the availability of BVA and the sloppy-identity reading in Japanese. In Hoji 1990, I continued my attempt in Hoji 1985 to establish the crucial relevance of c-command for BVA(A, B) while at the same time searching for the best choices of A and B for BVA(A, B) and the best choices of the relevant expressions in the sloppy-identity reading context for the purpose of obtaining as robust judgments as possible, as a reflection of formal properties of the language faculty. My concern was how to demonstrate that BVA(A, B) and the sloppy-identity reading (of the "right type"―see above) are regulated by the same structural and lexical conditions. Such considerations in turn lead us to consider the properties of various sentence patterns and give us ideas about how those sentence patterns should be formally represented.

1. Introduction
In this essay, I address what I consider to be the main contribution(s) of each of the papers collected in this volume. I also address how the papers contained in this volume are related to my earlier works in Hoji 1985 and Hoji 1990 as well as to my recent work in Hoji 2015. The discussion provides some background information about the papers in this volume. Remarks will be made also on some methodological issues that arise in the course of the discussion.

The draft of the Preface has been commented by others and it has been revised during the past couple of months.

The title of the Preface is:
"Towards Language Faculty Science: Remarks on the papers collected in Hoji 2013"

Under this posting, I will post the content of each of its sections, as of 10/18/2015. I am not going to provide the footnotes. Most of the font/paragraph formatting is lost here. There are currently 49 footnotes. The Preface is 24 pages long in a Word file, single-spaced.

I have started preparing the second book on language faculty science. I have written about 100 pages so far, and I will soon have to start worrying about how to make it short enough. The title of the book, at the moment is Internalist Perspective and Experiments in Language Faculty Science.

I plan to add the following at the bottom of the website accompanying Language Faculty Science (http://www.gges.xyz/hojiCUP/).

***
Remarks on the forthcoming books, including Experiments and Internalist Perspective in Language Faculty Science
Hajime Hoji
(October 15, 2015)

　　There are multiple book projects following Hoji 2015. In the next book, I will try to provide further illustration and demonstration of the viability of language faculty science as an exact science as outlined in Hoji 2015. I will discuss in some depth my own single-researcher-informant experiment. This is in line with the internalist thesis, according to which the experimental task of a language faculty scientist should start with one's own single-researcher-informant experiment.
　　In non-researcher-informant experiments, there is a severe limit to the number of Examples that can be included and also to the degree of complications regarding the sentence patterns and the specified interpretations. The number of SGs and that of LGs in an experiment must be small enough when we deal with a non-researcher-informant experiment. In my own single-researcher-informant experiment, on the other hand, I do not have any such restrictions. I can use as large a number of SGs and LGs as I wish and make the sentences as complicated or unnatural as I wish, as long as I can test the various predicted schematic asymmetries myself. That allows me to address the hypotheses that give rise to the bridging hypotheses, which was not possible in Hoji 2015.
　　The inclusion of the additional SGs and LGs in my own single-researcher-informant experiment also makes it possible for me to experimentally test the validity of the claim made in Ueyama 1998 that FD can underlie coreference as well as BVA. The result of my own single-researcher-informant experiment supports Ueyama's claim and clearly indicates that coreference in Japanese can be a good probe into the properties of FD (and hence of those of the CS). The experimental result is replicated in a multiple-non-researcher-informant experiment, thereby providing a compelling demonstration of the validity of the anti-locality condition on FD, for which I have long argued for in works such as Hoji 1997a, 1997b, 1998b, 2003a, 2003b, but had not been able to demonstrate experimentally. This is an extremely significant discovery for people, like myself, who have assumed that the distribution of coreference, unlike that of BVA, cannot be a good probe into FD (and hence the CS).
　　The discovery that coreference can be a good probe for investigating the properties of FD (and hence those of the CS) and that the availability of FD-based coreference and that of FD-based BVA are constrained by exactly the same structural conditions and the same lexical condition, in turn, allows us to consider the formal basis of so-called Spec-binding. Empirical discovery about the nature of coreference, the anti-locality condition, and Spec-binding are made possible crucially by the proposed methodology for language faculty science in Hoji 2015. And in that sense, it provides support of the proposed methodology.
　　In summary, further illustration and demonstration of the viability of language faculty science will be provided in the forthcoming book Experiments and Internalist Perspective in Language Faculty Science, where I address in some depth my own single-researcher-informant experiment. The discussion of my single-researcher-informant experiment confirms the commitment to the internalist thesis. It also allows me to consider the hypotheses that give rise to the bridging hypotheses about Japanese discussed in Hoji 2015. My own judgmental fluctuation experienced in my own single-researcher-informant experiment will be accounted for in the terms of such hypotheses, and the proposed account will serve as a basis for the design of a multiple-non-researcher-informant experiment, which, as emphasized in Hoji 2015, is none other than a collection of single-non-researcher-informant experiments.
***

What is noted above addresses my own papers collected in the Ohsumi volume, but it applies to any work that is (presumably) meant to be about the language faculty or that is alleged/claimed to pursue rigorous testability.

So, it applies to Hoji 1985 and Hoji 1990, as well.
Going over Hoji 1985, for example, from the perspectives of Hoji 2015 gives us a clear sense about the difference in research orientation in Hoji 1985 and Hoji 2015.

(The following remarks have been copied from a draft of the Preface.)

"In retrospect, Hoji 1985 tried to identify the informant intuitions that are necessarily based on the satisfaction of a c-command condition, being concerned mainly with the (un)availability of bound variable construal and scope dependency in Japanese that seem to be sensitive to, i.e., that seem to require the satisfaction of, a c-command condition. By making reference to the (un)availability of the dependency interpretations in question, I argued for a particular view of the phrase structure of Japanese that it is strictly binary-branching. In the terms of Hoji 2015, Hoji 1985 tried to identify as good probes as possible in discovering the universal properties of the language faculty through investigation of Japanese, and used the probes thus identified to argue for the thesis that the Japanese phrase structure is strictly binary branching. Clearly, I was not thinking in those terms when I wrote Hoji 1985. But, this now seems to me to be a reasonable interpretation of what I was trying to do in Hoji 1985."

"I do not mean that I was not concerned with testability in Hoji 1985. I would like to say I was, to the extent that I was concerned in Hoji 1985 with how robust the proposed or adopted generalizations were. The empirical generalizations put forth (or adopted) in Hoji 1985 are, however, often far from being robust. Following what I understood to be the common practice in the field, my main concern in Hoji 1985 was to express/describe some "phenomena" in Japanese in the terms of the theory I adopted at the time and what I might be able to say about the theory on the basis my "findings" in Japanese. The essentially compatibility-seeking research attitude adopted in Hoji 1985, coupled with the absence of strong commitment to the internalist approach resulted in the way "generalizations" are handled and presented in Hoji 1985."

(The list of Feynman quotations is given as I have somewhat randomly compiled them. I part because of an effective exposition and in part because I do not want to give the readers the false impression that my research methodology has been developed on the basis of what Feynman has stated -- I came to learn about Feynman's remarks long after I had come to pursue my research basically in line with what is presented in Hoji 2015 -- I am not going to give tons of Feynman quotations in the Preface.)

"Through my research subsequent to Hoji 1985, I have come to think that much of the research in the field of generative grammar does not pursue rigorous testability. This seems to me to have resulted in the general lack of a clear sense of progress in the field over the years. I had thought that such a state of affairs was due to the lack of intellectual rigor on the part of the practitioners, including myself. Upon having read Feynman's "Cargo Cult Science" several years ago, I came to realize that one of the reasons for what one might call the absence of intellectual rigor and integrity is that we do not have a means to determine what the facts are. If we do not know what the facts are, we may not know how not to fool ourselves.
I provide some quotations of Feynman's remarks here in hopes that they might give the reader a general idea about the intended points. For a fuller discussion, the readers are referred to Hoji 2015.

"Now it behooves me, of course, to tell you what they're missing. But it would be just about as difficult to explain to the South Sea islanders how they have to arrange things so that they get some wealth in their system. It is not something simple like telling them how to improve the shapes of the earphones. But there is one feature I notice that is generally missing in cargo cult science. That is the idea that we all hope you have learned in studying science in school―we never say explicitly what this is, but just hope that you catch on by all the examples of scientific investigation. It is interesting, therefore, to bring it out now and speak of it explicitly. It's a kind of scientific integrity, a principle of scientific thought that corresponds to a kind of utter honesty―a kind of leaning over backwards. For example, if you're doing an experiment, you should report everything that you think might make it invalid―not only what you think is right about it: other causes that could possibly explain your results; and things you thought of that you've eliminated by some other experiment, and how they worked―to make sure the other fellow can tell they have been eliminated.

Details that could throw doubt on your interpretation must be given, if you know them. You must do the best you can―if you know anything at all wrong, or possibly wrong―to explain it. If you make a theory, for example, and advertise it, or put it out, then you must also put down all the facts that disagree with it, as well as those that agree with it. There is also a more subtle problem. When you have put a lot of ideas together to make an elaborate theory, you want to make sure, when explaining what it fits, that those things it fits are not just the things that gave you the idea for the theory; but that the finished theory makes something else come out right, in addition." (From "Cargo Cult Science," included in Feynman 1985 Surely You're Joking Mr. Feynman ) (p. 340-341).

"In the strong nuclear interaction, we have this theory of colored quarks and gluons, very precise and completely stated, but with very few hard predictions. It’s technically very difficult to get a sharp test of the theory, and that’s a challenge. I feel passionately that that’s a loose thread; while there’s no evidence in conflict with the theory, we’re not likely to make much progress until we can check hard predictions with hard numbers." (Feynman 1999: 199)

"Another thing I must point out is that you cannot prove a vague theory wrong. If the guess that you make is poorly expressed and rather vague, and the method that you use for figuring out the consequences is a little vague―you are not sure, and you say, “I think everything’s right because it’s all due to so and so, and such and such do this and that more or less, and I can sort of explain how this works …”, then you see that this theory is good, because it cannot be proved wrong! Also if the process of computing the consequences is indefinite, then with a little skill any experimental results can be made to look like the expected consequences." (Feynman 1965/94: 152–153)

"The principle of science, the definition, almost, is the following: The test of all knowledge is experiment. Experiment is the sole judge of scientific ‘truth’" (The Feynman Lectures on Physics: 1-1, reproduced in Feynman 1963: 2).

"In general, we look for a new law by the following process. First we guess it. Then we compute the consequences of the guess to see what would be implied if this law that we guessed is right. Then we compare the result of the computation to nature, with experiment or experience, compare it directly with observation, to see if it works. If it disagrees with experiment, it is wrong. In that simple statement is the key to science. It does not make any difference how beautiful your guess is. It does not make any difference how smart you are, who made the guess, or what his name is – if it disagrees with the experiment, it is wrong. That’s all there is to it." (Feynman 1965/94: 150)

"It is true that one has to check a little to make sure that it is wrong, because whoever did the experiment may have reported incorrectly, or there may have been some feature in the experiment that was not noticed, some dirt or something; or the man who computed the consequences, even though it may have been the one who made the guesses, could have made some mistake in the analysis. These are obvious remarks, so when I say if it disagrees with experiment it is wrong, I mean after the experiment has been checked, the calculations have been checked, and the thing has been rubbed back and forth a few times to make sure that the con- sequences are logical consequences from the guess, and that in fact it disagrees with a very carefully checked experiment." (Feynman 1965/94: 150–151)

"Because of the success of science, there is, I think, a kind of pseudoscience. Social science is an example of a science which is not a science; they don’t do [things] scientifically, they follow the forms–or you gather data, you do so-and- so and so forth but they don’t get any laws, they haven’t found out anything. They haven’t got anywhere yet–maybe someday they will, but it is not very well developed … I may be quite wrong, maybe they do know all these things, but I don’t think I’m wrong. You see, I have the advantage of having found out how hard it is to get to really know something, how careful you have to be about checking the experiments, how easy it is to make mistakes and fool yourself. I know what it means to know something, and therefore I see how they get their information and I can’t believe that they know it, they haven’t done the work necessary, haven’t done the checks necessary, haven’t done the care necessary. I have a great suspicion that they don’t know, that this stuff is [wrong] and they’re intimidating people. I think so. I don’t know the world very well but that’s what I think." (Feynman 1999: 22)

One of the concrete proposals in Hoji 2015 is how to identify facts in a research program that aims at discovering properties of the language faculty by following Feynman's "Guess-Compute-Compare" method, so that we can try not to fool ourselves."

The first paragraph of the Preface now reads:

"The papers in this volume were published during 1995-2003. Many of the papers (more specifically, Papers 1-6) draw heavily from Hoji 1990, which, it is reasonable to say, is a continuation of Hoji 1985. During the research that led to the papers collected in this volume, I came to be increasingly concerned with methodological issues, as indicated by the titles of Paper 6 and especially of Paper 7. During 1985-2015, the concern and the focus of my research have slowly shifted, eventually leading to Hoji 2015 . The shift can perhaps be characterized as being from E-linguistics to I-linguistics, from compatibility-seeking to testability-seeking research, and one might even say, from linguistics to language faculty science."

The shift from E-linguistics to I-linguistics -- with the latter including the internalist approach -- means a shift from considering "linguistic phenomena" as the object of inquiry to considering them as a probe into investigation of properties of the language faculty (and more narrowly, those of the CS). Among the "linguistic phenomena" in question are BVA, DR, the sloppy-identity reading, and coreference. The property of the CS in question is the hypothesized object FD. Very simplistically put, as a result of the shift, the nature of "linguistic phenomena" such as BVA, DR, the sloppy-identity reading, and coreference are no longer the object of our inquiry. Yes, we do "study" them. But we study them as a potential probe into FD.

People's judgments on the availability of BVA, DR, the sloppy-identity reading, and coreference (in a particular Schema and with a particular LG) may vary. Such "gradient" judgments, however, do not mean gradient properties of FD. The hypothesized properties of FD are categorical.

What Hoji 2015 shows is that it is possible to obtain definite informant judgments on BVA by carefully designing an experiment and interpreting its results in accordance with its design. In the process of interpreting the results of the Main-Experiment in accordance with the design of our experiment, we remove the reported judgments by many informants out of our consideration. In other words, the definite properties of FD are seen only in the judgments by the informants who have been classified, on the basis of the results of the Sub-Experiments, to be significant for the Main-Hypotheses for the predicted schematic asymmetry in the Main-Experiment.

One can naturally wonder whether it would be possible to see definite properties of FD in the judgments by other informants as well. I think being able to give a positive answer to this question is crucial for convincing (more) people about the viability of language faculty science as an exact science. That will be one of the main issues I plan to address in the next book on language faculty science.

The first paragraph of the Preface now reads:

"The papers in this volume were published during 1995-2003. Many of the papers (more specifically, Papers 1-6) draw heavily from Hoji 1990, which, it is reasonable to say, is a continuation of Hoji 1985. During the research that led to the papers collected in this volume, I came to be increasingly concerned with methodological issues, as indicated by the titles of Paper 6 and especially of Paper 7. During 1985-2015, the concern and the focus of my research have slowly shifted, eventually leading to Hoji 2015 . The shift can perhaps be characterized as being from E-linguistics to I-linguistics, from compatibility-seeking to testability-seeking research, and one might even say, from linguistics to language faculty science."

The first two paragraph of the old version were:

"The papers in this volume were published during 1995-2003. The research therein was carried out within the Chomskian research program, broadly construed. It is concerned (ultimately) with the language faculty (I-language in the terms of Chomsky 1986) not language (E-language in the terms of Chomsky 1986). It was a continuation of the attempt in Hoji 1985 to identify and establish syntactic generalizations in Japanese that are as robust as possible, so as to be able to place our subsequent research on solid footing.
In retrospect, Hoji 1985 tried to identify the informant intuitions that are necessarily based on the satisfaction of a c-command condition, being concerned mainly with the (un)availability of bound variable construal and scope dependency in Japanese that seem to be sensitive to, i.e., that seem to require the satisfaction of, a c-command condition. By making reference to the (un)availability of the dependency interpretations in question, I argued for a particular view of the phrase structure of Japanese that it is strictly binary-branching. In the terms of Hoji 2015, Hoji 1985 tried to identify as good probes as possible in discovering the universal properties of the language faculty through investigation of Japanese, and used the probes thus identified to argue for the thesis that the Japanese phrase structure is strictly binary branching. Clearly, I was not thinking in those terms when I wrote Hoji 1985. But, this now seems to me to be a reasonable interpretation of what I was trying to do in Hoji 1985."

I am trying to be direct about what I think about my current research and how I would assess the papers collected in Hoji 2013 (i.e., the Ohsumi volume).

Here is how the last substantive section of the Preface reads at the moment.

*****
13. Evaluating the papers in light of Hoji 2015
It would be important and useful to evaluate the papers collected in this volume in light of the methodological proposal advanced in Hoji 2015. For each paper, we can ask whether and how it makes a definite and categorical prediction. In the terms of Hoji 2015, we can ask whether a paper offers a predicted schematic asymmetry, and if it does, what universal and language-particular hypotheses give rise to it.^FN20

FN20: See the Glossary available at http://www.gges.xyz/hojiCUP/.

We can also ask whether the prediction is experimentally supported, i.e., whether we obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in the terms of Hoji 2015. To put it in somewhat concrete terms, whenever we see an example sentence that is claimed or assumed to be unacceptable (with the specified interpretation), we can ask the questions in (5)-(7).

(5)The fundamental schematic asymmetry:^FN21
a.What is the *Schema that the example sentence in question instantiates?
b.What is the corresponding okSchema?

FN21: As mentioned in footnote 6, I cannot fully discuss here the content of the various aspects of the methodological proposal in Hoji 2015 and their conceptual justifications and experimental illustration. In this and the following few footnotes, I try to give the basic ideas behind the notions introduced here. I argue in Hoji 2015 that our predictions are not about specific example sentences but about schemata that specific example sentences instantiate, as indicated in [P] in section 1.8.2.

(6)The prediction-deduction:^FN22
What universal and language-particular hypotheses make the *Schema and okSchema in (5) a *Schema and an okSchema, respectively?

FN22: In language faculty science, the ultimate concern is the universal aspects of the language faculty, but we must deal with speakers of a particular language (because there are no speakers of the "universal language"). Our predictions, therefore, must be deduced based on both universal and language-particular hypotheses.

(7)Experimental results:^FN23
a. Does the *Schema-based prediction survive a rigorous attempt at disconfirmation? That is to say, is any sentence that we can construct instantiating the *Schema completely unacceptable (under the specified interpretation) no matter how hard we try to make it acceptable?
b. Is the okSchema-based prediction confirmed? That is to say, can we construct a sentence instantiating the okSchema that is more or less acceptable (under the specified interpretation)?

FN23:An experiment in language faculty science consists of a Main-Experiment and its Sub-Experiments, reflecting the structure of the prediction-deduction and more specifically, how each fundamental schematic asymmetry (see [P] in section 1.8.2) tested in the Main-Experiment is deduced. The result of the Main-Experiment is to be considered in light of the results of its Sub-Experiments. Reproducibility in language faculty science can be pursued at different levels, including across-Example and across-occasion reproducibility within a single-informant, across-informant reproducibility, and across-language reproducibility. Depending upon the type and the number of the informants, our experiment can be: a single-researcher-informant experiment, a multiple-researcher-informant experiment, a multiple-non-researcher-informant experiment, etc. Here we can focus on across-Example reproducibility in a single-informant experiment.

Trying to answer such questions would be a useful exercise for the purpose of evaluating a given paper with regard to its potential contribution to, or its relevance to, language faculty science. Even apart from the issues regarding language faculty science, addressing such questions will help us understand what testable predictions are made with what hypotheses, how explicitly formulated each of those hypotheses is, as well as what is assumed to be a valid generalization (in the form of a confirmed (predicted) schematic asymmetry) and whether that indeed qualifies as a confirmed (predicted) schematic asymmetry.

[P] is repeated here for convenience.


[P] The fundamental schematic asymmetry
a. The *Schema-based prediction:
Every example sentence instantiating a *Schema is unacceptable with the specified interpretation pertaining to two expressions.
b. The okSchema-based prediction:
Some example sentences instantiating an okSchema are acceptable at least to some extent with the specified interpretation pertaining to two expressions.*****

What is noted above addresses my own papers collected in the Ohsumi volume, but it applies to any work that is (presumably) meant to be about the language faculty or that is alleged/claimed to pursue rigorous testability.

I am preparing a Preface (instead of a Postscript) to the e-edition of the Ohsumi volume. The Preface addresses, fairly directly, the relationship among my 1985 dissertation, the papers included in the Ohsumi volume and my forthcoming Language Faculty Science.

　　A network of judgments in question is one of confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries in the terms of Hoji 2015. It thus follows (i) that we should pursue hypotheses (and our choices of SGs and LGs in the terms of Hoji 2015) that lead to the predicted schematic asymmetry that the informant's %(Y) on Schema B is 0 and (ii) that we should aspire to obtain experimental results in line with our predictions about a network of judgments.

Provided below are some explanations for what is meant by some of the notions above, taken from the Glossary of Hoji 2015 Language Faculty Science (Cambridge University Press). I am providing them here in hopes that they might make the content of [44822] a little more understandable than otherwise, although I am aware that more Glossary items need to be provided for a fuller understanding and that, in fact, the Glossary items alone would not be sufficient and the book has to be read...


%(Y)
　　%(Y) on an Example
　　　The percentage of the Yes Answers among all the answers given on the Example in question.
　　%(Y) on an Schema
　　　The percentage of the Yes Answers among all the answers given on the Examples instantiating the Schema in question.
　　　[N.B.] [%(Y) on an Example or the one on a Schema can be about an individual informant or about a group of informants. The %(Y) on Schema B in an Main-Experiment should be 0% for any informant (i) for whom the Sub-Hypotheses in the Main-Experiment are valid and (ii) who clearly understands the instructions, including the intended dependency interpretation.]


Answer
　　No Answer
　　　The reported judgment that the Example in question is completely unacceptable (with the specified dependency interpretation). In the book, "No" is used instead of "No Answer" when the context makes it clear what is intended.
　　Yes Answer
　　　The reported judgment that the Example in question is acceptable at least to some extent (with the specified dependency interpretation). In the book, "Yes" is used instead of "Yes Answer" when the context makes it clear what is intended.


BVA(α, β)
　　　The dependency interpretation detectable by the informant such that the reference invoked by singular-denoting expression β co-varies with what is invoked by non-singular-denoting expression α.
　　　[N.B.] [The bridging hypothesis that makes reference to BVA(α, β), with α and β being specified, states that BVA(α, β) is possible only if there is FD(LF(α), LF()), where "LF(α)" stands for an LF syntactic object corresponding to expression α. In this book, we focus on BVA(α, β), with specific choices of α and β, as a probe into properties of FD and hence of the Computational System. BVA(α, β) seems to be a most effective probe if is singular-denoting and α is not, and that is why we focus on this type of BVA(α, β). Although the term BVA comes from "bound variable anaphora," the former should not be equated with the latter. We do not, for example, consider the anaphoric relation that may hold between some boy and his as an instance of BVA(α, β) but we take the one that may hold between even John and his as an instance of BVA(α, β).]


bridging hypothesis
　　　Bridging hypotheses relate a particular dependency interpretation detectable by the informant to some LF object by stating the latter as a necessary condition for the former.
　　　[N.B.] [They are hypotheses about effective probes for finding out about properties of the CS. We can deduce a categorical prediction about the individual informant's judgment by adopting Chomsky's (1993) model of the CS and Ueyama's (2010) model of judgment-making by the informant, and combining the universal and language-particular hypotheses with a bridging hypothesis. With universal hypotheses and language-particular hypotheses, we deduce a definite consequence, but it is a bridging hypothesis that turns the definite consequence into a testable prediction.]


confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry
　　　The predicted schematic asymmetry that has been supported by Experimental results.
　　　[N.B.] [It is suggested in this book that constituting a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry is a necessary condition for a set of informant intuitions on a set of Examples in an Experiment to be regarded as a reflection of properties of the Computational System. We can address whether we obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry at various levels of experiments. The confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry attained in a single-informant experiment becomes more convincing if it is reproduced in a multiple-informant experiment.]


FD (Formal Dependency)
　　　A hypothesized LF object. The structural condition on FD(a, b) is expressed in terms of the structural relation of c-command, which is directly definable by Merge.
　　　[N.B.] [Language faculty science as addressed and pursued in this book tries to discover properties of FD, hypothesized to be universal, by putting forth structural and lexical hypotheses about it. We deduce definite consequences by combining such universal hypotheses with language-particular structural and lexical hypotheses, and by making those consequences testable by means of bridging hypotheses.]


Lexical group (=LG)
　　　One of the three dimensions by which the Examples of our Experiment are classified. The other two dimensions are Schema type (one of Schema A, Schema B, and Schema C) and Schema groups.
　　　[N.B.] [In a Main-Experiment discussed in this book, if its Main-Hypotheses are structural in nature, the choice of a Lexical group is due to the choice of a particular bridging hypothesis.]


Merge
　　　The only structure-building operation in the Computational System according to Chomsky's (1993) model of the Computational System. It combines two syntactic objects and forms one.


Schema
　　　A schematic representation that covers, i.e., can be instantiated by, an infinite number of pf representations.
　　　[N.B.] [An actual sentence used in an Experiment instantiates one of the three Schema types (Schema A, Schema B, and Schema C). Schema A and Schema B minimally specify where the two items mentioned in the bridging hypothesis (α and β of BVA(α, β) in the case of BVA) occur in a phonetic sequence. Any pf representation instantiating Schema B is predicted to be completely unacceptable, and some pf representations instantiating Schema A are predicted to be acceptable, at least to some extent, with the dependency interpretation specified by the bridging hypothesis.]
　　*Schema
　　　A Schema such that, according to the hypotheses in question, any Example that instantiates it is completely unacceptable with the specified dependency interpretation, i.e., there is no LF representation corresponding to a pf representation instantiating the *Schema in which the structural and lexical conditions for the LF object/relation in question are all satisfied. It is Schema B among the three Schema types (Schema A, Schema B, and Schema C).
　　*Schema-based prediction
　　　The prediction that any Example instantiating a *Schema (i.e., Schema B) is completely unacceptable with the specified dependency interpretation.
　　okSchema
　　　Schema A and Schema C among the three Schema types (Schema A, Schema B, and Schema C).
　　okSchema-based prediction
　　　The prediction that some Examples instantiating Schema A are acceptable to some extent, i.e., not completely unacceptable, with the specified dependency interpretation.
　　Schema A
　　　One of the two okSchemata among the three Schema types (Schema A, Schema B, and Schema C). Schema A is contrasted with the corresponding Schema B (=*Schema), both with a specified dependency interpretation.
　　　[N.B.] [A consequence of our hypotheses is that, corresponding to a pf representation instantiating Schema A, there is an LF representation where the conditions imposed by the Main-Hypothesis/ses and the Sub-Hypotheses are all satisfied.]
　　Schema B
　　　The only *Schema among the three Schema types (Schema A, Schema B, and Schema C).
　　　[N.B.] [A consequence of our hypotheses is that, corresponding to a pf representation instantiating Schema B, there is no LF representation where the conditions imposed by the Main-Hypothesis/ses and the Sub-Hypotheses are all satisfied. Our Main-Experiment is designed so that, corresponding to a pf representation instantiating Schema B, there is an LF representation where the condition(s) imposed by the Sub-Hypothesis/ses on the LF object underlying the dependency interpretation in question is/are satisfied but not the one(s) imposed by the Main-Hypothesis/ses.]
　　Schema C
　　　One of the two okSchemata among the three Schema types (Schema A, Schema B, and Schema C) that is (as) identical (as possible) to Schema B, but without the dependency interpretation considered in the case of Schema B.
　　　[N.B.] [The fundamental schematic asymmetry is between Schema A and Schema B. But Schema C has its own function of making the No answer to *Examples instantiating Schema B significant with regard to the validity of the Main-Hypotheses because a Yes answer to okExamples instantiating Schema C makes it unlikely that the No answer to the *Examples instantiating Schema B is due to a parsing problem.]
　　Schema group (=SG)
　　　One of the three dimensions by which the Examples of our Experiment are classified. The other two dimensions are Schema types (Schema A, Schema B, and Schema C) and Lexical groups.
　　　[N.B.] [In a Main-Experiment discussed in this book, if its Main-Hypotheses are structural in nature, its Schema groups are often based on the structural hypotheses being tested therein.]

　　In terms of the history of research, the concern about FD grew out of the desire to obtain an empirical generalization (in the form of informant judgments) that is as solid as possible and that can be expressed in terms of basic theoretical concepts. The basic theoretical concept turned out to be FD. From the perspective of conceptual articulation of the character of the research in language faculty science in question, as outlined in Hoji 2015, a rather different picture emerges as to the relation between FD and the empirical generalizations in question. It seems that a more appropriate characterization of the relation is that we search for a solid empirical generalization in hopes that it is revealing about properties of FD. Given the inseparability of facts and hypotheses, it is therefore crucial that we have as rich a deductive structure as possible for prediction-making and as rich a network of judgments as possible that are tightly correlated with each other in accordance with our hypotheses. Otherwise, our theoretical account of the solid empirical generalization would remain to be a mere descriptive statement. It is with such a deductive structure of prediction-making and the network of predicted judgments (in the form of predicted schematic asymmetries) that we can expect to make new predictions and aspire to attain a high degree of testability.^FN

FN: It is based on a clear understanding of this point that we place severe constraints as to what kind of description (or, to put it more accurately, what kind of a theoretical account) we want to assign to a given generalization. Some options lead to a set of new predictions that we already know, or have a pretty good idea about, how to test. Other options do not. Testability-seeking research tries to pursue the former type of options while compatibility-seeking research may not.

　　A network of judgments in question is one of confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries in the terms of Hoji 2015. It thus follows (i) that we should pursue hypotheses (and our choices of SGs and LGs in the terms of Hoji 2015) that lead to the predicted schematic asymmetry that the informant's %(Y) on Schema B is 0 and (ii) that we should aspire to obtain experimental results in line with our predictions about a network of judgments.

　　In Hoji 2015, the correlation is between the informant judgments on the predicted schematic asymmetry crucially based on the lexical hypothesis about FD and those that are crucially based on the LF c-command-related structural hypothesis about FD, leaving aside the informant judgments having to do with the effectiveness of the design of the Main-Experiment.

　　As pointed out briefly in Hoji 2015, there is another structural hypothesis about FD having to do with the anti-locality condition.

　　A fuller discussion would have therefore addressed the correlation of informant judgments among the three "dimensions" (the lexical condition and the two structural conditions on FD).

　　As also pointed out briefly in Hoji 2015, not only certain types of BVA but also a certain type of sloppy-identity readings and a certain type of coreference seem to be based on FD. The network of predicted informant judgments is now significantly wider than what is addressed in Hoji 2015.

　　It is by successfully demonstrating that our hypotheses lead to confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries in these seemingly distinct "phenomena" that the proposed methodology for language faculty science as an exact science will begin to be convincing to those who remain skeptical about the viability of the proposed methodology. (I am only considering those who have interest in understanding aspects of the language faculty by the "Guess-Compute-Compare" method. I have nothing to say about what might be convincing to those who do not share that interest.)

It seems that the postscript to the 1995 NELS paper will include my current assessment of my 1985 dissertation, including what concerns I had at the time of writing it, and what I tried to do about them in my works between 1985 and 1995, including the 1990 manuscript. The papers included in the Oshumi volume in fact all grew out of those concerns, which eventually led to Language Faculty Science.

I have come to realize that it is not an easy task to write a postscript just to the 1995 NELS paper because of what is noted above. It may therefore be a while before I can post a draft of the postscript here. So, I will state a very rough outline of the points that I intend to include in the postscript.

As indicated in (some of) the earlier postings under this thread, what has driven my research since my 1985 dissertation is a pursuit of rigorous testability and reproducibility. I had concern about how clearly my own judgments as reported in Hoji 1985 would be reproduced not only by other speakers of Japanese but also by myself if we took the reported generalizations, if we took the reported generalizations as they are stated there.

A rigorous empirical research ought to make it clear exactly how we expect to obtain reproducibility about the claimed empirical generalizations. Hoji 1985, however, only presents empirical discussion of various lexical choices, reflecting how I thought I/we had obtained clear judgments with certain lexical items though not with some others. I was aware that the different lexical choices affect the judgments, and that was why I tried different "QPs" in Hoji 1985. But, the discussion in Hoji 1985 did not clearly state what lexical items to use as A and B of BVA(A, B) (or A of DR(A, B)) to obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry, using the terminology in my CUP book (Language Faculty Science) or why such should be the case.

The exposition there expects the native-speaker-of-Japanese readers to be willing to accept the validity of the claimed generalizations on the basis of the existence of a paradigm with particular choices of lexical items for which they have the predicted judgments, assuming that they indeed do. I have to check Hoji 1985 to make sure that this is an accurate assessment of Hoji 1985; but that is how I recall regarding the point at hand.

One of the central concerns in my work since 1985 and up to the CUP book has been about how to identify the best choices of A and B of BVA(A, B) (and also A of DR(A, B)) in Japanese; the best choices in the sense that they lead to the clearest judgments in accordance with the claimed generalizations. (It must be understood that back in 1985 I did not have a clear understanding of the importance of the fundamental asymmetry between the *Schema-based prediction and the okSchema-based prediction in the terms of the CUP book. So, I used to make much more efforts than I would make now to make okExamples (more) acceptable (not only for myself but also for other informants).)

Back in 1985 and for a long time after that, I thought I was investigating properties of BVA (and DR (= a wide-scope distributive reading involving two "quantity-expressing" expressions)). While working on the 2009 manuscript and the CUP book, I came to understand that the reason why I consider informant judgments about the availability of BVA(A, B) (and DR(A, B) and also the sloppy-identity reading) is that I want to find out about properties of (the Computational System of) the language faculty and that I want to identify what can be the best probes for doing that. Focusing just on FD -- which is a hypothesized formal object at LF --, the work on BVA(A, B) and the sloppy-identity reading is for the purpose of finding out about properties of FD and hence of the Computational System. I have known since my work on the 1990 book manuscript (available at http://www.gges.xyz/hoji/download/upload.cgi) that what appears to be BVA(A, B) can arise in more than one way and that the same is true for what appears to be the sloppy-identity reading. In order to find out about properties of the Computational System, we must therefore focus on the type of BVA(A, B) and the type of the sloppy-identity reading that are crucially based on FD.

Here are a few things that are important to note, I think.

First, although the CUP book only deals with the LF c-command condition on FD, in addition to the lexical condition on FD), I have been concerned, since shortly after 1985, with the/an additional structural condition on FD, often associated with Principle B of the Binding Theory. For ease of exposition, let us call the additional condition on FD "the anti-locality condition.

Second, when the judgments on a certain paradigm are not as clear as we want them to be and when they seem to be affected by certain factors we do not fully understand, we work on (slightly) different paradigms, to see if our judgments get replicated among different types of paradigms and to see if we get the sense that the judgments are converging. Well, that is what I tried in Hoji 1985 by considering DR(A, B) in addition to BVA(A, B). It is in that context since 1985 that I started to look into the effects of (i) the LF c-command condition, (ii) the anti-locality condition and (iii) the lexical condition on FD with regard to [BVA(A, B) and the sloppy-identity reading].


My 1990 book manuscript addressed various paradigms in this regard. The 1995 (NELS) paper focuses on the anti-locality condition on FD, in the context briefly outlined above.

When I saw the Otani and Whitman's (1991) LI paper, it was immediately clear to me that the type of sloppy-identity reading they were considering need not be based on FD. Upon further considerations, I came to understand that it cannot be based on FD. (In did not have the term "FD" then, but that is not very important.) If the sloppy-identity reading is necessarily based on FD, the informant judgments should be very clear -- especially with regard to what is called in the CUP book a *Schema-based prediction -- but we got nothing even close to that in Otani and Whitman's paradigms. My "reply" to their paper did not appear until 1998 for the reasons I do not get into here. But, I only mention here that the main point of my 1998 LI paper was to show that the sloppy-identity paradigm presented in Otani and Whitman's paper does not reflect a grammatical property that it is claimed to represent, by demonstrating that what appears to be the sloppy-identity reading is available even when necessary conditions for the establishment of FD, such as the LF c-command condition or the lexical condition (see above), are not satisfied.

There is a rather interesting aspect of the linguistics field, at least the part of the field I am familiar with to some extent, which is Japanese syntax and, to a lesser degree, syntax in general . That is the absence of the understanding that the accumulation of knowledge is based on the demonstration that something is not right about our hypotheses, which is a common sense in physics, as far as I understand; see Feynman's remarks quoted below (copied from General Remarks board [44446] "The theory could never be proved right," which is under [44413] "A key to language faculty science as an exact science").

"You can see, of course, that with this method we can attempt to disprove any definite theory. If we have a definite theory, a real guess, from which we can conveniently compute consequences which can be compared with experiment, then in principle we can get rid of any theory. There is always the possibility of proving any definite theory wrong; but notice that we can never prove it right. Suppose that you invent a good guess, calculate the consequences, and discover every time that the consequences you have calculated agree with experiment. The theory is then right? No, it is simply not proved wrong. In the future you could compute a wider range of consequences, there could be a wider range of experiments, and you might then discover that the thing is wrong. That is why laws like Newton's laws for the motion of planets last such a long time. He guessed the law of gravitation, calculated all kinds of consequences for the system and so on, compared them with experiment--and it took several hundred years before the slight error of the motion of Mercury was observed. During all that time the theory had not been proved wrong, and could be taken temporarily to be right. But it could never be proved right, because tomorrow's experiment might succeed in proving wrong what you thought was right. We never are definitely right, we can only be sure we are wrong. However, it is rather remarkable how we can have some ideas which will last so long." (Feynman 1965/94 (The Character of Physical Law): 151-152)

The paragraph that immediately follows this starts with:

"One of the ways of stopping science would be only to do experiments in the regions where you know the law. But experimenters search most diligently, and with the greatest efforts, in exactly those places where it seems most likely that we can prove our theories wrong. In other words we are trying to prove ourselves wrong as quickly as possible, because only in that way can we find progress."

At a more elementary or basic level, if you are interested in finding out about properties of the Computational System and use informant intuitions/judgments as evidence for or against your hypotheses, you want to focus on informant intuitions/judgments that can be reasonably understood as a reflection of properties of the Computational System. You do not expect to make progress if you did not do that. Once we accept this, it follows that a certain set of observations (in the form of intuitions/judgments by informants, including the researcher's own) may not be something that research concerned with the Computational System of the language faculty should try to provide a formal account of.

It, however, seems to be a fairly common practice in the field to demand that there be an account of a set of observations even when it is demonstrated that the set of observations do not reflect a robust empirical generalization as long as such observations have been presented with an analysis (in published work) . It is because of that demand, I included a section in Hoji 1998 where I provided an account of some contrasts that cannot be considered as a reflection of properties of the Computational System, at least as things were understood at that point. One may find the proposed account under discussion in Hoji 1998 less than compelling. And that is as expected, the account was not supposed to be a formal account in Hoji 1998. It would not lead to a predicted schematic asymmetry, in the terms of my CUP book. See the postings under General Remarks board [40868] "Recent ellipsis-related discussion in Japanese" for related discussion/remarks.

It has turned out to be extremely difficult to come up with a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry dealing with the sloppy-identity reading, as can be seen in my 2003 (Surface and Deep ...) paper (available at http://www.gges.xyz/hoji/download/upload.cgi). And that is why I stopped working on the topic shortly after preparing that paper.)

In light of what is briefly noted above, my papers in the late 1990s and in the early 2000s dealing with the sloppy-identity reading should thus be understood as a report on how I tried to come up with confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries dealing with the sloppy-identity reading and failed to come up with an effective experimental design. Although I failed in that regard, I think I indicated fairly clearly what needed to be done if one wanted to pursue rigorous testability, dealing with the sloppy-identity reading. If we read Hoji 2003 (Surface and Deep …) from the perspective of my CUP book, we will perhaps get the sense of how the author of Hoji 2003 tried his best but failed to achieve what he wanted to.

A clear understanding of my own concern about the deducibility of definite predictions about our judgments on the basis of universal and language-particular hypotheses came much later and it came only very gradually. My 2003 (Lingua) paper is an interim report on my understanding around 2000.

A revised and expanded version of what is stated above can be the Preface to the Kindle edition of the Ohsumi volume.

As I noted elsewhere at some of the Discussion boards here, I plan to prepare (a) paper(s) in which I critically evaluate some of the papers included in the Ohsumi volume by following the methodology proposed in the CUP book.

Because the content of its postings has become more substantive than I initially thought, I have moved the thread from "General remarks" board to this board.

As announced in "What's New" on 2/26/2014, a book containing 7 of my past papers has recently been published in Japan (Ohsumi Shoten).
It contains the following papers:

Chapter 1: Demonstrative Binding and Principle B
Chapter 2: Null Object and Sloppy Identity in Japanese
Chapter 3: Sloppy Identity and Formal Dependency
Chapter 4: Sloppy Identity and Principle B
Chapter 5: Formal Dependency, Organization of Grammar, and Japanese Demonstratives
Chapter 6: Surface and Deep Anaphora, Sloppy Identity, and Experiments in Syntax
Chapter 7: Falsifiability and Repeatability in Generative Grammar: A Case Study of Anaphora and Scope Dependency in Japanese

It has an Index, which is very useful to have, well, at least for me.

If you can read Japanese, you can visit this page and read the Preface/Forward by Yuki Takubo and the Epilogue (Atogaki) and one other piece by Ayumi Ueyama.

Among the main empirical issues addressed in those papers are "sloppy-identity" readings and local disjointness effects (i.e., so-called Binding Principle B effects).

As discussed in some depth in the paper reproduced as Chapter 6 of that volume (also addressed in other papers), it is difficult to (i) deduce a definite and testable predictions having to do with "ellipsis" and (ii) design an experiment and (iii) obtain experimental results in accordance with the definite predictions we make. Chapter 6 of the volume is an attempt to pursue rigorous testability, which was not possible in Chapter 2 of the volume for a principled reason. Well, it is not easy to do that, especially (iii), even when we deal with "phenomena" not involving "ellipsis." My forthcoming book Language Faculty Science addresses how we can do (i)-(iii), but its empirical illustration does not involve "ellipsis."

Because of the realization, as the result of the research reported in Chapter 6 of the volume noted above (among other papers), that we face immense difficulty in trying to do (i)-(iii) above, dealing with "ellipsis," I have been focusing on what is more manageable than "ellipsis" since my work on Chapter 6 (around 2000 -- Chapter 6 was published in 2003 but its draft was written around 2000).

Once Language Faculty Science is published (which will be around the summer of 2015) and an introductory book on language faculty science has is prepared, I will try to return to "sloppy-identity" readings and local disjointness effects (i.e., so-called Binding Principle B effects), in light of the methodological proposal made in Language Faculty Science.

Such works will clarify how the papers included in the volume mentioned above try to make definite and testable predictions and what difficulty it is faced with. The difficulty is not just about designing a set of Experiments and obtaining Experimental results in accordance with the definite and categorical predictions. It is also about how to deduce such definite predictions.

With the methodological and conceptual articulation for language faculty science (as an exact science) and with its empirical (i.e., experimental) illustration provided in Language Faculty Science, I think I will be in a position to do that.

It has taken me a long time to get to this point, but I think the work for the past 10 years was necessary.

I have started preparing postscripts for papers in the Ohsumi volume.
The postscripts will be included in its Kindle edition.
I plan to post drafts of the postscripts here.

I am not sure if I will have a postscript for each paper in the Ohsumi volume, but I am pretty sure that I will write one for Chs. 1, 2, 6 and 7, which are:

1995 NELS
1998 LI
2003 Arizona
2003 Lingua

Chapter 1: Demonstrative Binding and Principle B
Chapter 2: Null Object and Sloppy Identity in Japanese
Chapter 6: Surface and Deep Anaphora, Sloppy Identity, and Experiments in Syntax
Chapter 7: Falsifiability and Repeatability in Generative Grammar: A Case Study of Anaphora and Scope Dependency in Japanese
I started preparing one for 1995 NELS (=Chapter 1).

I started the postscript to the 1995 NELS paper, as follows:

A Postscript to Hoji 1995

Hoji 1985: Ch. 1 starts with:

"This thesis is an attempt to provide basically descriptive analyses of certain syntactic phenomena in Japanese."

Back in 1985, some people might have considered my dissertation to be a theoretical piece of work. Those researchers whose work on Japanese was descriptive in its more traditional sense would have thought that my dissertation was far from being descriptive. What I meant by the above remark was that what my thesis offers is how one can describe (what I thought of as) generalizations in Japanese by using some theoretical vocabulary.

By "theoretical vocabulary," I mean the structural relation of c-command. That was one of the very few things, if not the only thing, that I felt was real when I tried to understand my linguistic intuitions in terms of the theoretical vocabulary that I had been exposed to and came to understand at the time of my dissertation-writing, at least to some extent. "Real" in the sense that I thought I was able to detect its "effects" clearly enough; i.e., I thought I was able to detect what was predicted about the linguistic intuitions of native speakers of Japanese, including myself, on the basis of hypotheses that made reference to c-command.

Regarding other concepts such as Case, government, and locality in relation to binding theory (pertaining to Principles A and B), which I had read about back in 1985, I was not able to detect their "effects" clearly (enough, or at all) and hence was not in a position to try replicate them in the minds of other native speakers of Japanese.

The effects of c-command, by contrast, I thought I was able to detect in relation to coreference, bound variable anaphora and quantifier scope. I had been able to replicate my intuitions in the minds of other native speakers of Japanese, to a pretty good extent. So, my dissertation dealt with them.

The structure of the "arguments" for the main claims in my dissertation was basically as follows: (I was not particularly satisfied with this, as I will point out later, with regard to specific issues.)

Let us assume certain conditions/principles that underlie the availability of certain interpretations (coreference, bound variable anaphora, quantifier scope)―because that is assumed/accepted by many people in the field presumably in light of empirical evidence in English and other languages. Once we make such assumptions, certain intuitions of native speakers of Japanese―especially my own―can be accounted for by particular hypotheses about how sentences in Japanese (such as SOV, OSV, S IO DO V, S DO IO V, etc.) are represented in terms of the c-command relations among S and O, and those among S, IO, and DO. (DO: direct object; IO: indirect object) To the extent that the proposed account of the intuitions of native speakers of Japanese regarding certain interpretations (coreference, bound variable anaphora, quantifier scope) is valid, it provides support not only for the hypotheses, made or adopted in my dissertation, about how sentences in Japanese are represented (in the sense noted above), but also for the "original assumptions" about the conditions/principles that underlie the availability of certain interpretations.

I had concerns like the following:

(1) How much replicability there is to the proposed generalizations in my dissertation

(2) What independent evidence there is for the hypothesis that the crucial structural relation is c-command (at LF)

The 1995 NELS paper grew out of such concerns as (1) and (2). Those concerns also led to my works between 1985 and 1995, including the 1990 manuscript, eventually leading to Language Faculty Science.
***

It seems that the postscript to the 1995 NELS paper will include my current assessment of my 1985 dissertation, including what concerns I had at the time or writing it, and what I tried to do about them in my works between 1985 and 1995, including the 1990 manuscript. The papers included in the Oshumi volume in fact all grew out of those concerns, which eventually led to Language Faculty Science.

It may thus be more appropriate to prepare a postscript to my 1985 dissertation and one to the 1990 manuscript; otherwise, the postscript to the 1995 NELS paper may become quite long.

[The discussion here is getting more and more substantive. So, I will perhaps move this thread to the "Remarks" board later.]

It may be more appropriate to prepare a postscript to my 1985 dissertation and one to the 1990 manuscript; otherwise, the postscript to the 1995 NELS paper may become quite long.

When I wrote my 1985 dissertation, I knew that I could not clearly detect the locality effects of Binding Principle A or the anti-locality effects of Binding Principle B in Japanese, at least when we deal with coreference.
(Years later, I conducted multiple-informant Experiments to test whether such effects are detected by other native speakers of Japanese, and the results of such Experiments seemed consistent with my own.)

By the time I wrote the 1990 ms., I knew that I could not clearly detect the effects of Binding Condition C in Japanese, corresponding to English examples such as John praised John's father. I want to leave aside the effects of Binding Condition D in Japanese, corresponding to English examples such as he praised John's father, because of extra complications. (Chapters 2 and 3 of Hoji 1990 (mainly) discuss Condition D effects (using about 200 pages...)
(Years later, I conducted multiple-informant Experiments to test whether such effects are detected by other native speakers of Japanese, and the results of such Experiments seemed consistent with my current judgments. Chapter 6 of Language Faculty Science reports results of multiple-informant Experiments dealing with the English examples.)

By the time I wrote the 1990 ms., I thought that I was able to clearly observe WCO effects and the anti-locality effects in Japanese if we used the "right" A and B for BVA(A, B).

The 1995 NELS paper was written with the "understanding" as indicated above.
(But, I came to understand, in the late 1990s, that (i) the choices for A and B of BVA(A, B) must be much more carefully made than indicated in the 1990 ms. and the 1995 NELS paper and (ii) what is presented in the 1995 NELS paper as the clearest case of the anti-locality effects in Japanese turns out to be much less clear than I thought. My 2003 Lingua paper discusses (i) and (ii) and related issues.)

I plan to upload a longer (and more personal) Preface at the accompanying website.

I may also add Q&As regarding the book at the website.

The Appendix that will not be included discusses the language-particular hypothesis that otagai in Japanese has a formal feature that makes it a local anaphor. The EPSA Experiments discussed there replicate the experimental results reported in:

Hoji, Hajime. 2006b. Otagai. In: Ueyama, Ayumi (ed.), Theoretical and empirical studies of reference and anaphora―Toward the establishment of generative grammar as an empirical science. A report of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B), Project No. 15320052, 126-138. Kyushu University (available at: http://www.gges.xyz/hoji/research/hp-papers.cgi).

Although they are not included in the book, they will be made available at the accompanying website.

The Preface starts with:
(The formatting is lost here.)

***
This book grew out of the concern addressed in my 2003 paper "Falsifiability and repeatability in generative grammar: A case study of anaphora and scope dependency in Japanese" and the earlier (1998) paper "Null object and sloppy identity in Japanese." The concern is how we can evaluate proposals in our research so as to be able to secure as much progress as possible in what we do. The concern is directly related to questions such as what our object of inquiry is, what counts as evidence for or against our hypotheses about our subject matter, whether and how we can deduce definite predictions from our hypotheses, how such predictions can be put to rigorous empirical test, and how we should interpret results of our experiments. The subsequent work led to the 2009 book manuscript A foundation of generative grammar as an empirical science and eventually to this book.
　　　In the meantime, the first template for the general design of on-line experiments was developed in 2004 and it has since undergone changes, reflecting various stages of the methodological articulation that has led to the proposal to be laid out and illustrated in this book. A number of on-line experiments have been conducted over the years. The empirical illustration of the proposed methodology for language faculty science in this book is based on some of those experiments, the details of which are available at the accompanying website (http://www.xxx).
　　　Concern with empirical rigor in research in linguistics has resulted in a recent explosion of "experimental" research. Such research―to the extent that they deal with informants―typically deal with a group of informants and analyze the distribution of their reactions by statistical methods developed for, and utilized in, fields such as agricultural, social and behavioral sciences. We also conduct multiple-informant experiments. But, for us, a multiple-informant experiment is none other than a collection of single-informant experiments. Our predictions are about individual informants, not about a group of informants. They are definite predictions, not about a tendency or about a difference. Our experiments test our definite predictions about individual informants. One may wonder, quite understandably, whether and how it might be possible to deduce definite predictions about individual informants and obtain experimental results in accordance with such predictions. The following chapters address how.
***

My 2009 book manuscript addresses in some depth consequences of the distinction I make between PF representations and pf representations. But, in an attempt to make the presentation simpler, the CUP book does not emphasize the distinction. That has, however, resulted in difficulty in straightforwardly addressing the nature (or what one may call the ontology) of Schemata.

One of the footnotes of Chapter 3 now contains:

***
A pf representation is a non-hierarchical phonetic sequence of audible items that is directly read off a PF representation. I assume that the PF representation, unlike the pf representation, expresses hierarchical relations among the items taken from the mental lexicon and it may contain syntactic objects that have no phonetic content (so-called "empty categories"). A Schema, such as [SA1a] and [SA1b], covers, i.e., can be instantiated by, an infinite number of pf representations. It minimally specifies where the two items mentioned in the bridging hypothesis (alpha and beta of BVA(alpha, beta) in the case of BVA) occur in a phonetic sequence. The use of the square brackets in a Schema, as in [SA1] and other Schemata to be discussed below, is a reflection of the fact that the pf representation is based on a PF representation. Insofar as the hierarchical information thus made reference to by a Schema is part of the elementary constituent structure that transcends different conceptions of the CS, a Schema, and hence a schematic asymmetry, can be understood as being theory-neutral. It is in this sense that confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries are theory-neutral though the predicted schematic asymmetries in question are given rise to by our hypotheses.
***

The Glossary entry for "Schema" is as in:

***
Schema:
A schematic representation that covers, i.e., can be instantiated by, an infinite number of pf representations. It minimally specifies where the two items mentioned in the bridging hypothesis (alpha and beta of BVA(alpha, beta) in the case of BVA) occur in a phonetic sequence in such a way that (i) any pf representation instantiating Schema B is predicted to be unacceptable and (ii) some pf representations instantiating Schema A are acceptable, at least to some extent, with the dependency interpretation specified by the bridging hypothesis.
***

I am now working on the Glossary.
The book introduces a number of new concepts, including:

Yes Answer
No Answer
%(I)
%(Y) on a Schema
%(Y) on an Example
%(N)
pf representation (as opposed to PF representation)
Schema
Schema A
Schema B
Schema C
Three-Schema set
Schema group
Lexical group
*Schema
okSchema
Example
Three-Example set
okExamples
*Examples
bridging hypothesis

Concepts that look familiar such as:

Universal hypothesis
Language-particular hypothesis
Structural hypothesis
Lexical hypothesis

and

Language Faculty
Universal Grammar (UG)
I-language
The Computational System (of the language faculty) (CS)
LF representation
PF representation

are also characterized in such a way that we can articulate prediction-deduction as clearly as possible and we can pursue rigorous testability.

Once I have finished preparing the Glossary and once I have prepared a couple of non-technical files, I will send the files to the publisher for copy editing.

Appendix: On the Accompanying Website: the last three paragraphs are as follows:
(The formatting is lost and the footnotes are not provided here.)

***
　　This book has an accompanying website (http://www.xxxxx). The purpose of the website is to make it possible for others to examine the validity of the book's empirical claims more thoroughly than is made possible in the preceding pages. As noted in Ch. 6: footnote 2, I only provide summaries of the results of our Experiments, due to space considerations, as they seem to be most informative for the purpose of this book. For each Experiment discussed in this book, the website provides a full description of its design, its Examples, and its result, along with various informant classifications, as discussed in this book. When the Experimental results are provided with an informant classification, the list of informants based on that classification is also provided, with the informants' codenames. The website also provides the "raw data" of the experimental results discussed in this book so that interested people can analyze them on their own.
　　The website is meant to encourage interested readers to conduct a series of Experiments in accordance with their designs and analyze the result of the Main-Experiment in light of the results of the Sub-Experiments. They are encouraged to check how clearly they obtain the replication of the result of the Main-Experiment (on the basis of informant classification in light of the results of the Sub-Experiments) as reported in this book and at the accompanying website. Interested readers are also encouraged to make their own Example sentences in accordance with the specified design of a given Experiment; see Chapter 2: 2.3. The *Schema-based prediction is that no *Examples are acceptable with the intended dependency interpretation no matter how hard we might try to make them acceptable. Suppose that *Examples constructed in accordance with the specified design are not completely unacceptable for the informants whose judgments are deemed significant, in light of their reported judgments in the Sub-Experiments, with regard to the validity of the Main-Hypotheses in the Main-Experiment. Such a result provides us with an opportunity to learn something new, provided that we have tested the validity of each of the hypotheses that give rise to our predicted schematic asymmetry by designing and conducting our prior experiments with utmost care.
　　Taking the internalist approach to language (see Chapter 1), we consider the obtaining of a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in a single-researcher-informant experiment as the first step toward establishing a fact in language faculty science. A confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry is based on a predicted schematic asymmetry. Predicted schematic asymmetries are given rise to by universal hypotheses, along with language-particular hypotheses and bridging hypotheses. It is in this sense that an individual informant's judgment is revealing about universal properties of the language faculty. It is also in this sense that facts in language faculty science are closely related to our hypotheses about universal properties of the steady state of the language faculty.
　　It may not be an easy matter to obtain an experimental result that constitutes a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry even in a single-researcher-informant experiment. But it is, ultimately, the replication of a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in a multiple-non-researcher-informant experiment that makes us confident about the validity of our hypotheses that have given rise to the predicted schematic asymmetry. It is also such replication that would prompt us to pay serious attention to the empirical and "factual" claims put forth by others dealing with a language about which we do not have native intuitions. One may in fact suggest that it is the replication of a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in multiple-non-researcher-informant experiments that would make us hopeful that language faculty science may indeed be possible.
　　As stressed above, the replication of particular judgments by informants on a set of particular Examples is not our concern. We are concerned ultimately with the replication of our experimental results at a more abstract and general level. We are interested in finding out universal properties of the language faculty. We have chosen to work with a dependency interpretation as a probe for that purpose; see Chapter 3 for a conceptual basis for our choice. What type of dependency interpretation can be a good probe for the purpose may differ among languages, and even among speakers of the "same language." In our experiments dealing with individual speakers of a particular language, we check predicted schematic asymmetries given rise to by universal hypotheses, language-particular hypotheses and bridging hypotheses. It is the universal hypotheses among them that would help us understand what universal properties underlie individual informants' judgments on Examples of "different constructions," with "different dependency interpretation," in "different languages." Before we begin to be able to address replicability of our experimental result at such an abstract and general level, however, a great deal of work has to be carried out dealing with particular languages, starting with the establishment and the accumulation of confirmed predicted schematic asymmetries, first in a single-informant experiment and ultimately in multiple-non-researcher-informant experiments. The accompanying website illustrates how such attempts have been made.

The last two paragraphs of Ch. 6: Appendix are as follows:
(The formatting is lost and the footnotes are not provided here.)

***
　　One might point out that not being able to obtain a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in EPSA [31]-3 (=[31]-10), or even in its improved version, might not be particularly surprising if the contrast between (78a) and (78b) is due to factors outside the CS, as Chomsky (2012: 37) suggests; see also Ludlow 2011: Appendix: 187. According to the proposed methodology for language faculty science, informant judgments constituting a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry is a necessary condition for the relevant informant judgments to be regarded as a reflection of properties of the CS. As long as informant judgments continue to fail to form a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in EPSA [31]-3 (=[31]-10) (or its improved version), with improved informant classification, the relevant informant judgments cannot be taken as a reflection of properties of the CS; see section 4.3 for informant judgments forming a confirmed predicted schematic asymmetry in EPSA [31]-11.
　　My own position at this point is this: anaphora (such as BVA(A, B) (and scope dependency as well) can be an effective probe into properties of the CS although much more rigorous and careful work has to be carried out than we typically see practiced in the field, in order to obtain experimental results in accordance with our definite and categorical predictions. The relevant work would involve an articulation of how our definite and categorical predictions are deduced, how our experiment is designed and how our experimental results are interpreted accordingly. It is only through such rigorous and careful research we will be able to determine whether something that seems to involve non-local relations is indeed part of the language faculty and/or how it can be revealing about properties of the language faculty.