One might find it difficult to imagine how one can pursue what is suggested above in research that deals with the language faculty. (That seems understandable in light of how research has been done in the past and how students are trained in the field that deals with language and the language faculty.)

As an illustration of the point in the parentheses above, if you are familiar with the field, you can ask how often you read a paper in which conscious efforts seem to be exerted to make it transparent how the proposal(s) therein can be put to rigorous empirical test and can be shown to be invalid.

In The Pleasure of Finding Things Out: 108-109 in the section "What is and what should be the role of scientific culture in modern society," which is a talk that he "gave to an audience of scientists at the Galileo Symposium in Italy, in 1964," Feynman states:

"Now I am going to mention still another thing which is a little more doubtful, but still I believe that in the judging of evidence, the reporting of evidence and so on, there is a kind of responsibility which the scientists feel toward each other which you can represent as a kind of morality. What's the right way and the wrong way to report results? Disinterestedly, so that the other man is free to understand precisely what you are saying, and as nearly as possible not covering it with your desires. That this is a useful thing, that this is a thing which helps each of us to understand each other, in fact to develop in a way that isn't personally in our own interest, but for the general development of ideas, is a very valuable thing. And so there is, if you will, a kind of scientific morality. I believe, hopelessly, that this morality should be extended much more widely; this idea, this kind of scientific morality, that such things as propaganda should be a dirty word. … This immorality is so extensive that one gets so used to it in ordinary life, that you do not appreciate that it is a bad thing. …"

In Linguistics, well, at least in the generative research that I am familiar with, I wonder what people could do if they were not allowed to advertise the merit of their work and if they were allowed to only present research results disinterestedly. I suppose that it would be difficult to do so without having "hard facts" you can report on. And, since people do not seem to yet understand what can constitute a "hard fact" and a "hard prediction" and how we can aspire to understand the relation between the two, they feel that they have to do advertisement. Well, that is what I think.

In Language Faculty Science, I do not address issues like this almost at all, because the book is concerned with how language faculty science can be pursued as an exact science (a scientific issue), not with how the field is (or has been) (which I think is more of a sociological issue, about which one may find insightful discussion in Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions)

See also [44416] under this posting for Feynman's remarks on business and advertisement, as opposed to science.